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Abstract
This paper proposes a new Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
with credit frictions and a banking sector, which endogenizes loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios of households and banks by expressing them as a function of systemic and
idiosyncratic proxies for risk. Moreover, the model features endogenous balance
sheet choices and a novel formulation of the targeted leverage ratio, in which as-
sets are risk-weighted by risk-sensitivity measures. The results highlighted in this
paper are important along two dimensions. First of all, the presence of endogenous
LTV ratios exacerbates the procyclicality of lending conditions. Second, the model
contributes to deeper understand the role of prudential regulatory frameworks in
affecting business cycle fluctuations and in restoring macroeconomic and financial
stability. The results suggest that when the economy is severely stressed by shocks
originating in the financial sector, prudential regimes such as Basel II and Basel III
are capable of downsizing substantially aggregate volatility, with Basel III found
to be significantly more effective than Basel II.
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1 Introduction
Until the early 2000s, large-scale structural macro models, such as Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, have often neglected financial and credit dynam-
ics, with a few notable exceptions (Christiano et al., 2003). Most of the policy models
currently employed by central banks (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005;
Christoffel et al., 2008) either assume frictionless financial markets or lack a realistic and
comprehensive representation of the financial sector.
The recent growing interaction between the real economy and financial markets along
with the emergence of several questions linked to financial stability, macro-prudential
regulations and monetary policy, has provided a strong motivation to create fully artic-
ulated macroeconomic models describing the role of financial frictions and structures in
a modern market economy. As the recent global downturn unfolded, the necessity of
reforming standard macro models along these lines has become even more urgent.
However, the literature on macroeconomic modeling and that regarding financial and
credit market imperfections have run for a long time on parallel paths without converg-
ing.1 As for the latter, it has long been recognized that financial markets are highly
imperfect (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, costly state verification issues, and the eventuality of
bankruptcies, defaults and contagions, are the main factors that may potentially disrupt
the smooth working of financial and credit markets. It follows that agents are not able
to perfectly smooth consumption in reaction to shocks, and business cycle fluctuations
are likely to be amplified.
This financial accelerator effect, whereby shocks to the net worth of agents have
procyclical effects on their borrowing capacity, amplifying, in such a way, business cycle
fluctuations, has been first formalized by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and subsequently
incorporated into structural macroeconomic models by Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In the first case, the so-called costly state verification setting,
1The following literature review is far from being exhaustive. For a comprehensive survey, see Roger
and Vlcek (2012).
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the financial accelerator effect occurs because the premium on external financing, which
depends on the net worth, is procyclical, implying that economic disturbances influence
the borrowing capacity of agents. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the amplification of
business cycles’ magnitude and persistence arises because of the dynamic interactions
between borrowing limits and asset prices, generated by explicitly modeling collateral for
loans.
Frictions relying on the costly state verification and default risk a` la Bernanke et al.
(1999) and limited enforceability and collateralized debt a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
have been recently employed to enrich standard DSGE models (Aoki et al., 2004; Gertler
et al., 2007; Christensen and Dib, 2008; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Lom-
bardo and McAdam, 2012).2
Most of the earlier macroeconomics literature imposed financial frictions on non-
financial borrowers, treating financial intermediaries as a veil. Modeling financial in-
termediaries entails the presence of a more or less structured bank’s balance sheet, which
establishes a link between banking activity and the macroeconomy. Some recent models
with financial intermediaries emphasize the demand side of credit, i.e. a perfectly com-
petitive banking sector accommodates any changes in the demand for credit coming from
households and firms (Christiano et al., 2003, 2008, 2010).
Another strand of the literature captures supply side aspects of credit dynamics by
introducing a more realistic representation of financial intermediaries. First of all, the
work by Gerali et al. (2010) paved the way to a flourishing literature that models banks
with a certain degree of market power (Dib, 2010; Andre´s and Arce, 2012). In Gerali
et al. (2010), banks, by operating in monopolistically competitive markets, impose interest
rates on loans and deposits that are, respectively, policy rate markups and markdowns.
This amplifies the effect of policy rate movements for borrowers, and attenuates those for
lenders. Therefore, the transmission mechanisms of shocks are richer in comparison with
standard models.
2Recent extensions to these settings try to introduce endogenous default (Forlati and Lambertini,
2011), and substantial non-linearities to generate “occasionally binding” collateral constraints (Mendoza,
2010).
3
A second important element is the presence of bank capital and, in particular, capital
requirements for banking activity. Bank capital requirements are usually imposed to
limit the moral hazard on the part of banks arising with deposit insurance. However,
capital requirements are costly because they reduce the possibility for banks to create
liquidity. Meh and Moran (2010) introduce bank capital to model moral hazard problems
between borrowers and investors. In other contributions (den Heuvel, 2008; Angeloni
and Faia, 2013; Zhang, 2009; Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010; Age´nor et al., 2012; Angelini
et al., 2012), bank capital is motivated by regulatory requirements. In fact, recent events
have strengthened the role of the so-called “prudential” policies, namely policies that,
focusing on the interactions between financial institutions, markets and the business cycle,
aim at mitigating the impact of financial fluctuations.3 Usual instruments of macro-
prudential policies are countercyclical capital and liquidity requirements, and loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios. Modeling bank capital requirements allows economists: a) to analyze
the macroeconomic impact of regulations (e.g. how regulatory instruments can attenuate
the tendency of the economy to over-leverage during booms and deleverage during busts);4
b) to better capture the effect of shocks originating in financial markets; c) to study how
the transmission of shocks is altered depending on the strength of the financial sector,
and, in particular, how macro-prudential and monetary policies can be coordinated and
combined effectively.5
Within this research area, Angelini et al. (2012), by adapting the model by Gerali
et al. (2010), analyze the strategic interaction between macro-prudential policies and
monetary policy. They consider two types of interaction between monetary and regulatory
authorities: cooperative and non-cooperative interaction. Their results suggest that when
the economy is hit by supply shocks (i.e. in normal times), macro-prudential policies
have limited effect on macroeconomic stability. By contrast, when the economy is hit by
3Prudential policies are, for example, provided for by the Basel Accords. For an extensive and updated
review on prudential policies see Beau et al. (2012) and Galati and Moessner (2012).
4There is indeed strong empirical evidence that bank leverage is strongly procyclical (Adrian and
Shin, 2010b).
5As stressed by Beau et al. (2012), the reason for the close link between macro-prudential and mon-
etary policies is that they work through the same transmission channels, such as the bank lending and
the balance sheet channels.
4
financial shocks (i.e. in extraordinary times), macro-prudential policies help to stabilize
macroeconomic fluctuations, and cooperation with monetary policy plays an important
role in strengthening this effect.
By embracing the supply side approach in modeling the banking sector, this paper
proposes a new DSGE model able to analyze the interconnections between financial mar-
kets and the macroeconomy. In particular, we adopt some of the elements present at
the frontiers of research, highlighted above, and add to them. First of all, in line with
some existing contributions in the literature, the model exhibits financially constrained
households a` la Iacoviello (2005), whose capacity to borrow is tied to the value of their
real estate holdings, and a rich banks’ balance sheet representation including deposits,
loans to households, government bonds, loans from the central bank, and bank’s equity.
Hence, balance sheet choices are totally endogenous and the model features procyclical
leverage.
Second, this leverage procyclicality is strengthened by the presence of proxies for
measured risk, which are expressed in a novel formulation. While most of the existing
general equilibrium models assume constant LTV ratios, empirical evidence shows that
this value varies substantially over time, also reflecting movements in risk perception
in financial markets (Gruss and Sgherri, 2009; Campbell and Cocco, 2011).6 Partially
drawing on Angelini et al. (2012), our setting endogenizes LTV ratios by expressing
them as a function of proxies for both systemic and idiosyncratic risk, both at the level
of households and banks.7 Moreover, we propose a novel formulation of the targeted
leverage ratio, in which assets are risk-weighted by cyclical risk-sensitivity measures.8
Inspired by the empirical evidence suggesting that procyclical leverage affects aggregate
volatility and particularly the price of risk (Adrian and Shin, 2010b), the proxies for risk
perception and the risk-sensitivity measures depend, inter alia, on the leverage conditions
6Furthermore, LTV ratios vary significantly also across countries, reflecting differences in legal and
regulatory frameworks (Calza et al., 2007).
7Endogenous LTV ratios have also been proposed by Lambertini et al. (2011). In this model, the
endogenous LTV is derived based on an agency problem between lenders and borrowers.
8A similar formulation is proposed by Age´nor et al. (2012), who relate instead the risk-measures to
the repayment probability.
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of households and banks.
The new role for risk combined with endogenous balance sheet choices, allows us,
among the other things, to better analyze how financial intermediaries affect the conduct
of monetary policy, and, in particular, to isolate the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy described by Adrian and Shin (2010a). According to this channel, monetary policy
actions affect the risk-taking capacity of banks, leading to shifts in the supply of credit.
Third, banks are subjected to the standard tool used by regulatory authorities, i.e.
capital requirements. The innovative formulation of the targeted leverage ratio includes
two types of banking assets, namely loans to households and government bonds. As
already stressed, the targeted leverage ratio presents an endogenous source of risk per-
ception that differs among asset classes. Since both loans to households and government
bonds are considered risky assets, the model is particularly suitable to investigate in a
realistic way the effectiveness of different prudential regimes.
A fourth key peculiarity of the model is the presence of a structured connection be-
tween financial intermediaries and the monetary authority in order to better capture mon-
etary policy transmission dynamics. We do this by introducing financially constrained
banks besides financially constrained households. More specifically, the amount of loans
that banks can receive from the central bank is subject to a collateralized borrowing
constraint. Loans to households and government bonds are assumed to be employed
as collateral by banks. These features aim at reproducing the lending facilities usually
offered by monetary authorities to banks.
In light of the novelties introduced, our model represents a unique instrument for sim-
ulating, within a general equilibrium framework, credit crunch dynamics and analyzing
the effect of prudential regulatory measures. The results highlighted in the paper are
important along two dimensions. First, the model provides new insights on the interac-
tions between the banking and credit sectors and the rest of the economy. Second, and
more importantly, it contributes to deeper understand the role of supervisory authori-
ties in affecting business cycle fluctuations and in restoring macroeconomic and financial
stability.
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More precisely, our findings suggest that the presence of endogenous LTV ratios exac-
erbates the severity of a simulated credit crunch, and, more generally, the procyclicality
of lending conditions, in comparison with a baseline model without these features, and it
is thus able to reproduce the salient facts of the recent financial crisis. Endogenous risk
weights and LTV ratios are capable of affecting substantially lending quantities, due to
the interaction between: a) movements in the LTV ratios, due to changes in labor market-
and macroeconomic conditions; b) movements in the weighted leverage cost, due to the
combination of changes in interest rates and housing prices, which affect the perception
of risk associated with mortgage assets held by banks.
Lastly, by modifying the configuration of the key parameters and steady-states of
the model, we are able to compare different prudential policy regimes, such as the Basel
Accords. The results suggest that when the economy is mainly affected by standard
macroeconomic shocks (normal times), prudential regulatory regimes like Basel II and
Basel III increase the volatility of macroeconomic and credit variables. By contrast, when
the economy is severely stressed by shocks originating in the financial sector (extraordi-
nary times), these regimes are capable of downsizing substantially aggregate volatility,
making business cycle fluctuations smoother, with Basel III found to be significantly
more effective than Basel II.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the model
and introduces its key features. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A stylized representation of the model economy is sketched in Figure 1. The economy
is populated by two types of households, namely constrained and unconstrained house-
holds. Constrained households supply labor inputs and accumulate housing stock, while
unconstrained households supply capital inputs. Monopolistically competitive firms hire
labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. The two groups of households exhibit a
different discount factor, i.e. they discount differently the stream of future utility, which
ensures positive financial flows in equilibrium. Thus, constrained households borrow a
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positive amount of loans from banks, whereas unconstrained households invest their re-
sources by purchasing positive amounts of deposits and zero-coupon government bonds.
The availability of loans to constrained households is subject to a borrowing constraint
linked to the market value of their housing stock. Banks operate in a perfect competitive
market. The asset side of their balance sheet is composed of government bonds and loans
to households. They are assumed to purchase government bonds. Loans to households
and purchases of government bonds are financed by collection of deposits, net worth,
and loans from the central bank collateralized against banks’ asset holdings.9 Lastly, a
consolidated government-central bank conducts: a) a standard passive fiscal policy; b)
a standard monetary policy consisting in setting the policy rate via a Taylor rule; c) a
monetary policy involving the lending facility for banks.
2.1 Constrained Households
Preferences of the representative constrained household are defined over consumption
CCt , real money balances
MCt
Pt
, hours worked Ft, and real stock of housing
Ht
Pt
, and are
described by the infinite stream of utility:
UCt =
∞∑
t=0
βtCu
C
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
(1)
where βC is the intertemporal discount factor.
The instantaneous utility function of the representative constrained household uC
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
is given by:
uC
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
=
(CCt − γCCt−1)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
1
1− χ
(
MCt
Pt
)1−χ
− Ψ
1 + 1/ψ
F
1+1/ψ
t +J
h log
Ht
Pt
(2)
where γ measures the importance of consumption habits, σ is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, χ is the elasticity of money demand, and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of
9This is a sort of discount window offered by the monetary authority to banks.
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labor supply.
In this economy, each agent (both constrained and unconstrained) can choose the
composition of a basket of differentiated final goods. Preferences across varieties of goods
have the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form a` la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977):
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
θt−1
θt dj
] θt
θt−1
(3)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption index of all the differentiated final goods produced
in the economy under monopolistic competition. There are j-th varieties of final goods
(j ∈ [0, 1]), and θ is the elasticity of substitution between different final goods varieties
(θ > 1).
Each constrained agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
CCt +
PHt Ht
Pt
+
LCt−1R
C
t−1
Pt
+
MCt
Pt
+ TCt =
MCt−1
Pt
+
LCt
Pt
+ wtFt +
PHt−1Ht−1
Pt
(4)
Constrained agents allocate their wealth among money holding MCt and housing Ht,
where PHt is the price of houses. They receive wage income wtFt, where wt is the real
wage (hereafter, lower-case letters denote real variables). They also pay a real lump-sum
tax TCt . Constrained households borrow from banks an amount of loans L
C
t at the interest
rate RCt . Pt is the aggregate price level. The housing stock is assumed to be fixed. A
shock to the house price level, νHt , is introduced. It follows an AR(1) process with an
i.i.d. disturbance εP
H
t with zero mean and standard deviation σPH .
Moreover, each constrained household is also subject to the following borrowing con-
straint:
LCt R
C
t
Pt
≤ LTV Ct Et
[
PHt+1Ht
Pt+1
]
(5)
Thus, constrained households can borrow from banks, but the expected value of their
housing stock must guarantee repayment of loans and interests, as in Iacoviello (2005) and
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Iacoviello and Neri (2010). LTV Ct is the loan-to-value ratio of the constrained agent and
reflects the preferences of banks. As stressed by Gerali et al. (2010), from a microeconomic
point of view it can be interpreted as the cost of collateral repossession for banks in case
of default. Differently from most of previous studies, which assume an exogenous LTV
ratio, LTV Ct is determined endogenously by the following equation:
LTV Ct
LTV C
=
(
LTV Ct−1
LTV C
)φ
LTV C
(
PHt Ht
PHH
)ϕ1,H (wtFt
wF
)ϕ2,H (Yt
Y
)ϕ3,H
exp
(
εLTV
C
t
)
(6)
where variables without the temporal subscript denote steady-state values. φLTV C is an
autoregressive parameter, 0 < φLTV C < 1, to model sluggish LTV changes over time.
εLTV
C
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σLTV C . In the right-hand
side of (6) we can distinguish other three terms. The first term represents the variation
in the value of the stock of houses held by constrained households relative to its steady-
state value, and it is a proxy for the value of the collateral. The second term measures
variations in the labor income of constrained households relative to its steady-state value
to capture the risk related to households’ income fluctuations. We then add a component
associated with fluctuations of output around its steady-state level: it is a proxy for the
systemic risk of the economy. It is assumed that ϕ1,H ,ϕ2,H ,ϕ3,H ≥ 0, i.e. increases in the
value of the stock of houses, real labor income, and aggregate income, lead to an increase
in the LTV ratio, allowing constrained households to expand their borrowing capacity.
Thanks to this formulation, we are able to endogenize the amount of credit that banks
provide to constrained households given the value of their collateral.
Constrained households maximize their lifetime utility (1), subject to the budget
constraint (4) and the borrowing constraint (5). The first order necessary conditions
with respect to consumption, labor, money, houses, and loans are respectively given by:
(CCt − γCCt−1)−1/σ − βCγEt
[
(CCt+1 − γCCt )−1/σ
]
= λCt (7)
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ΨF
1/ψ
t = λ
C
t wt − Et
[
µCt ϕ2,HLTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
(8)
(
mCt
)−χ
+ βCEt
[
λCt+1
pit+1
]
= λCt (9)
Jh
ht
= λCt P
H
t −Et
[
βCλ
C
t+1P
H
t
pit+1
]
−Et
[
µCt LTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
−Et
[
µCt ϕ1,HLTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
(10)
λCt = βCEt
[
λCt+1R
C
t
pit+1
]
+ µCt R
C
t (11)
where λCt and µ
C
t are the Lagrange multipliers, and pit is the gross inflation rate (pit =
Pt/Pt−1).
2.2 Unconstrained Households
The preferences of the representative unconstrained households are defined over consump-
tion CUt and an aggregator of real monetary assets xt, and are described by the infinite
stream of utility:
UUt =
∞∑
t=0
βtUu
U
(
CUt , xt
)
(12)
where βU is the intertemporal discount factor. In line with the existing literature, we
assume that βU < βC , so that agents with a lower discount factor are savers in equilibrium,
whereas agents with a higher discount factor are borrowers in equilibrium.
The instantaneous utility function of the representative unconstrained household uU
(
CUt , xt
)
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is given by:
uU
(
CUt , xt
)
=
(CUt − γCUt−1)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ ηx log xt (13)
where ηx > 0. Drawing on Age´nor et al. (2012), the composite index of real monetary
assets xt is defined via a Cobb-Douglas function:
xt =
(
mUt
)v
d1−vt (14)
where mUt indicates real money balances, dt real deposits. v measures the importance of
real money balances in the liquidity bundle (0 < v < 1).10
Each unconstrained agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
BUt
PtRBt
+
MUt
Pt
+CUt +T
U
t +
Dt
Pt
+It(1+AC
I
t ) =
BUt−1
Pt
+
MUt−1
Pt
+
Dt−1RDt−1
Pt
+qtKt+(1−φB)ΩBt
(15)
Thus, unconstrained agents allocate their wealth among money holding MUt , deposits
Dt, which pay an interest R
D
t , and holding of zero-coupon government bonds B
U
t . They
receive rental income qtKt (where Kt is capital and qt the rental rate), and a fraction
(1− φB) of banks’ profits ΩBt . They also pay a real lump-sum tax TUt . It is investment.
Unconstrained households accumulate capital and rent it to firms. The law of motion
of capital stock is expressed in the following standard way:
Kt = It−1 + (1− δ)Kt−1 (16)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of the capital stock. In addition, unconstrained
10This formulation originates from a recent approach of modeling transaction services via CES bundles
of different assets. See, for example, Canzoneri et al. (2008, 2011).
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households face quadratic adjustment costs of investment as in Kim (2000):
ACIt =
φK
2
(
It
Kt
)2
(17)
where φK is the adjustment cost scale parameter for capital.
Unconstrained households maximize their lifetime utility (12), subject to the budget
constraint (15) and the capital accumulation equation (16). The first order necessary
conditions with respect to consumption, money, deposits, bonds, capital and investment
are respectively given by:
(CUt − γCUt−1)−1/σ − βUγEt
[
(CUt+1 − γCUt )−1/σ
]
= λUt (18)
ηxv
mUt
+ βUEt
[
λUt+1
pit+1
]
= λUt (19)
ηx(1− v)
dt
+ βUEt
[
λUt+1R
D
t
pit+1
]
= λUt (20)
βUEt
[
λUt+1
pit+1
]
=
λUt
RBt
(21)
βU(1− δ)Et
[
µUt+1
]
= µUt − λUt
(
qt + φK
(
It
Kt
)3)
(22)
βUEt
[
µUt+1
]
= λUt
(
1 +
3
2
φK
(
It
Kt
)2)
(23)
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where λUt and µ
U
t are the Lagrange multipliers.
2.3 Firms
The firms’ sector is modeled in a standard way. Each j-th firm produces and sells differ-
entiated final goods in a monopolistically competitive market. The production function
is a standard Cobb-Douglas with labor provided by constrained households and capital
by unconstrained households (i.e. the owners of firms):
Yt = AtK
α
t Ft
1−α − Φ (24)
where α is the share of capital used in production, and Φ is a fixed cost to ensure that
profits are zero in the steady-state. At is technology and follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
At
A
)
= φA log
(
At−1
A
)
+ εAt (25)
where εAt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σA.
Firms’ optimizing process is constrained by nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982),
i.e. firms face quadratic price adjustment costs:
ACPt =
φP
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pi
)2
Yt (26)
Given the standard CES setting of equation (3), the demand function faced by each
single firm j is:
Yt(j) =
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−θt
Yt =⇒ Pt(j) =
[
Yt(j)
Yt
]− 1
θt
Pt (27)
Thus, the demand function for each single good j is proportionally related to the output
level of the economy, and negatively to the price of good j.
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Following Kim (2000), the profit function for each firm j is:
PtΠt(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j)− PtwtFt(j)− PtqtKt(j)− PtACPt (28)
After employing (26) and (27) into (28), the maximization problem of each firm becomes
fully dynamic: each firm maximizes the expectation of the discounted sum of profit flows,
given the information at time 0:
Π0(j) = E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
ρtPtΠt(j)
]
(29)
where ρ is the discount factor of firms.
By assuming that each agent in the economy has access to a complete market for
contingent claims, the discount factors of unconstrained households and firms are equal:
Et
[
ρt+1
ρt
]
= βUEt
[
λUt+1
λUt
]
(30)
Therefore, the necessary first order conditions of the maximization problem with respect
to labor and capital are given respectively by:
wt = (1− α)
(
Yt + Φ
Ft
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(31)
qt = α
(
Yt + Φ
Kt
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(32)
where eYt is the output demand elasticity:
1
eYt
=
1
θ
{
1− φP (pit − pi)pit + βUφPEt
[
λUt+1
λUt
(pit+1 − pi)pi2t+1
Yt+1
Yt
]}
(33)
which measures the gross price markup over marginal cost. It is easy to check that
manipulations of the log-linearized version of (33) lead to the standard New Keynesian
15
Phillips curve.
2.4 Banks
The banking sector is characterized by a continuum of banks facing perfect competition.11
Banks borrow from the central bank LCBt at the rate R
CB
t (i.e. the policy rate) and receive
deposits Dt from unconstrained households (liability side of the balance sheet), invest in
government bonds BBt and provide loans to constrained households L
C
t (asset side of the
balance sheet). Thus, the balance sheet identity of the representative bank is given by:
BBt + L
C
t = Zt +Dt + L
CB
t
(34)
where Zt represents the equity (net worth, capital) of the bank.
Each bank maximizes the present discounted value of its profits:
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(35)
where βB is the discount factor of banks. The second to last term in (35) represents a
quadratic cost that banks pay in terms of their equity whenever they move away from a
leverage ratio νb (i.e. assets over equity) imposed by regulators. The presence of these
costs is justified by the recent experience of many advanced economies, where authorities
have proposed to introduce a leverage ratio as a regulatory tool. By modifying the
imposed leverage ratio, it is possible to assess the impact of a stricter or looser macro-
prudential policy.12 The presence of capital requirements combined with a balance sheet
identity like (34) has important implications for the dynamics of the model. In fact,
any economic disturbance that affects banks’ balance sheet composition forces financial
11An extension with monopolistic competition a` la Gerali et al. (2010) is left for future research.
12For simplicity, we do not distinguish between required capital and countercyclical capital buffers
held voluntarily by banks. For a discussion, see Angelini et al. (2010). Moreover, we do not introduce a
countercyclical capital requirements rule as in Angelini et al. (2011).
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intermediaries to modify their leverage, leading to shifts in the supply of credit. As
highlighted by Adrian and Shin (2010a), this transmission channel played a crucial role
in the recent crisis. The last term in equation (35) captures an additional cost of managing
loans to households.
Drawing on Roger and Vlcˇek (2011), the leverage ratio incorporates two different
risk weights for loans to households (wCt ) and government bonds (w
G
t ). These variables
can be considered proxies for the perception of the risk embedded in the asset side of
the balance sheet of banks. The time-varying risk weights aim at capturing the nature
of risk-sensitive regulatory frameworks such as Basel II and Basel III. We propose the
following novel formulation for the two risk weights:
wGt
wG
=
(
wGt−1
wC
)φ
wG
(
Bt
Yt
κB
)ϕ
1,wG
(
Yt
Y
)ϕ
2,wG
exp
(
εw
G
t
)
(36)
wCt
wC
=
(
wCt−1
wC
)φ
wC
(
LCt R
C
t
PHt Ht
κL
)ϕ
1,wC
(
LCt
Zt
κZ
)ϕ
2,wC
(
Yt
Y
)ϕ
3,wC
exp
(
εw
C
t
)
(37)
where ϕ1,wG , ϕ1,wC , ϕ2,wC ≥ 0, ϕ2,wG , ϕ3,wC ≤ 0, and κB = YB , κL = P
HH
LCRC
, and κZ =
Z
LC
.
φwG and φwC are autoregressive parameter (0 < (φwG , φwC ) < 1). ε
wG
t and ε
wC
t are i.i.d.
shocks with zero mean and standard deviation σwG and σwC , respectively.
The intuition behind (36) and (37) is as follows. Equation (36) models the risk
associated with government debt. This risk is assumed to increase with government’s
total debt exposure (Bt/Yt). The first term in the right-hand side of (37) represents a
proxy for the leverage position of constrained households, expressed as the ratio between
the value of loans and the value of household’s collateral: the higher is this ratio, the
higher is the perceived risk associated with LCt . The second term indicates the risk
embedded in the balance sheet of banks: the perceived risk is an increasing function of
the ratio between the amount of loans provided to households and the equity of banks.
Thus, the sign of ϕ1,wC and ϕ2,wC in our calibration suggests that the risk increases as the
leverage of households and the exposure of banks increase. Lastly, both equations feature
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a component related to the macroeconomic situation capturing systemic risk. Notice that
if wGt and w
C
t are assumed to be fixed and equal to 1 (as in the steady-state situation),
the leverage cost in equation (35) boils down to the more standard formulation usually
adopted in the literature.
Equation (35) highlights another source of financing for banks (besides deposits from
unconstrained households), namely loans from the central bank. Since this reflects stan-
dard lending facilities usually provided for by monetary authorities, banks are required to
offer collateral. Therefore, similarly to what seen for constrained households, each bank
is subject to a borrowing constraint:
RCBt L
CB
t
Pt
≤ φCBB LTV CBB,t Et
[
BBt
RBt+1Pt+1
]
+ φCBC LTV
CB
C,t Et
[
LCt
RCt+1Pt+1
]
(38)
Thus, equation (38) introduces a collateralized lending market between banks and the cen-
tral bank. Both government bonds (the first term on the right-hand side) and mortgage-
backed securities (the second term on the right-hand side) can be considered as general
collateral. The parameters φCBB and φ
CB
C indicate the importance of each component
(φCBB + φ
CB
C = 1). Notice that usual standard lending facilities do not allow banks to use
asset-backed securities as eligible collateral. Therefore, in the baseline calibration, the
parameter φCBC has been set to a low level (0.1). By varying φ
CB
C it is possible to simulate
some recent measures implemented by central banks that extend the range of possible
collaterals.13
LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t resemble the haircuts applied to the collateral pledged against
the credit provided by the central bank to private banks. Although central banks’ haircuts
are officially fixed, we assume them to be time-varying, since they reflect the underlying
risk associated with the collateral. For instance, a downgrading of the eligible collaterals
may result in a lower haircut category. Thus, also in this case, the LTV ratios determining
the liquidity of the system are endogenized. More specifically, LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t are
13This analysis is not conducted in the present paper.
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expressed in the following way:
LTV CBB,t
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LTV CBC,t
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exp
(
ε
LTV CBC
t
)
(40)
where κD =
D
LC
, and φLTV CBB and φLTV CBC are autoregressive parameters, 0 < (φLTV CBB , φLTV CBC ) <
1. In (39) and (40) we have that ϕ1,B, ϕ1,C , ϕ2,C < 0 and ϕ2,B, ϕ3,C > 0. ε
LTV CBB
t and
ε
LTV CBC
t are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and standard deviation σLTV CBB and σLTV CBC ,
respectively. The same reasoning behind equations (36) and (37) applies here too. There-
fore, we assume that the LTV ratio associated with government bonds is a function of
the proxies for the systemic risk of the economy, while the LTV ratio relative to loans to
households is a function of proxies for both idiosyncratic risk of households and banks,
and the systemic risk of the economy.
As in Gerali et al. (2010), the law of motion of equity stock is given by:
Zt = (1− δb)Zt−1 + φBΩBt−1 (41)
where δb represents the cost of managing bank capital (it is analogous to the depreciation
rate of physical capital), and (1−φB) summarizes the dividend policy of the bank, which
is assumed to be exogenous. Financial intermediaries can accumulate net worth only
through retained earnings.
By substituting the definition of Zt+1 obtained from (34) forwarded one period into
(35), the latter boils down to a one-period profits equation, and the maximization problem
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becomes static. Expected real profits at the end of period t are thus defined as:
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(42)
Banks maximize their profits (42) subject to the balance sheet identity (34) and to the
borrowing constraint (38). In order to simplify the maximization problem, we proceed as
follows. We isolate BBt from equation (34) and substitute for it wherever it appears in
the Lagrangian. Since banks behave competitively, they take the path of all the interest
rates as given. Thus, the choice variables for banks are the quantities of deposits, loans to
households, equity, and loans from the central bank. The first order necessary conditions
with respect to deposits, loans to households, equity, and loans from the central bank are
the following:
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where µBt is the Lagrange multiplier.
2.5 The Government Sector
The consolidated government-central bank budget constraint is given by:
Bt
PtRBt
+
Mt
Pt
+
LCBt
Pt
+ Tt =
Bt−1
Pt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+
LCBt−1R
CB
t−1
Pt
+Gt (47)
where Bt is the stock of government interest-bearing debt held by the public (Bt =
BBt + B
U
t ), and Mt is the total amount of money held by the public (Mt = M
C
t + M
U
t ).
Government spending, net of interest expenses, Gt follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
Gt
G
)
= φG log
(
Gt−1
G
)
+ εGt (48)
where εGt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG.
We introduce a passive fiscal policy rule, whereby the total amount of tax collection is
a function of total government’s liabilities, in order to prevent the emergence of inflation
as a fiscal phenomenon, as suggested by Leeper (1991):
Tt = ψ0 + ψ1
[
bt−1
pit
− b
pi
]
(49)
where ψ0 is the steady-state level of Tt. Equation (49) indicates that the level of taxes
reacts to deviations of the outstanding level of public debt from its steady-state level. In
other words, taxes are not allowed to act independently from the stock of government
liabilities outstanding in the economy.
Besides providing loans to banks, the monetary authority sets the policy rate, which
is assumed to be the rate on central bank’s loans to private banks RCBt , according to the
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following Taylor (1993) rule:
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)
= αR log
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)
+ (1− αR)
{
αpi log
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pi
)
+ αY log
(
Yt
Y
)}
+ εRt (50)
where αR, αpi, αY indicate the response of R
CB
t to the lagged policy rate, inflation and
output, respectively. Thus, the policy rate is determined by the deviation of inflation and
output from the steady-state with an interest rate smoothing component. The monetary
policy shock εRt is an i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation σR.
2.6 The Resource Constraint and Aggregation
The model is completed by specifying the aggregated variables for consumption, money,
bonds and taxes:
Ct = C
C
t + C
U
t (51)
Mt = M
C
t +M
U
t (52)
Bt = B
U
t +B
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t (53)
Tt = T
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and the resource constraint of the economy:
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Total output is allocated to consumption, government spending, investment (comprehen-
sive of capital adjustment costs), price adjustment costs, and a component related to
banking sector’s frictions.
The model is composed of 43 equations for 43 variables. Since the equilibrium of the
model cannot be solved analytically, we log-linearized it around the steady-state. We
solved the model using both the MATLAB routine Gensys written by Christopher Sims
and Dynare developed by Adjemian et al. (2011).14 In what follows, calibration issues
are first discussed. We then analyze the properties of the model, highlighting the main
results.
2.7 The Calibration
The benchmark model is calibrated to match euro area quarterly data over the decade
prior to the crisis of 2008. Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, some steady-state
values and the chosen calibration values for the standard parameters. Some of the steady-
states are obtained from the data, or following previous studies. Output is normalized to
1. In the steady-state, 10 percent of consumption is attributed to constrained households,
while 90 percent to unconstrained households (Gerali et al., 2010). The same ratio is
assumed for taxes. The aggregate consumption-output ratio has been set to 0.4, and the
taxes-output ratio to 0.1972. The ratio of market to non-market activities is set equal to
0.3, whereas the stock of capital-output ratio to 8. The steady-state value of the gross
money market rate has been chosen equal to 1.015, which implies a gross inflation rate
of around 1.004.
Following Gerali et al. (2010), we set LTV C at 0.7, a value in line with the evidence
for mortgages in the euro area reported by Calza et al. (2007). LTV CBB is set at 0.9,
consistently with the average levels of valuation haircuts applied by the ECB to eligible
marketable central government debt instruments. LTV CBC is assumed to exhibit a lower
steady-state value, namely 0.8. We choose a steady-state value for the housing stock
14The codes are available upon request as well as the appendices reporting the deterministic steady-
state and the log-linearized model.
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equal to 1.
Some parameters are chosen following previous studies and their calibrated value is
quite standard in the literature. Among them: the elasticity of substitution across goods
θ, set equal to 6 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004); the habit formation parameter γ, set
equal to 0.7 (Smets and Wouters, 2007); the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ,
set equal to 0.5, which implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; the depreciation
rate of capital δ calibrated to 0.025 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011), which
implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent; the share of capital
in the production function α, set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011);
the parameter of the price adjustment cost φP , calibrated to 100 (Ireland, 2004); the
elasticity of real money balances χ, set equal to 7; the Frisch elasticity ψ, set equal
to 1. The discount factor of constrained and unconstrained households is calibrated to
0.9943 and 0.9923, respectively. The preference parameter of the liquidity aggregator ηx
is set at 0.3 in order to pin down a reasonable steady-state level of deposits and money
balances of unconstrained households. The share parameter v in the liquidity aggregator
index, which indicate the relative share of money in the liquidity bundle, is set equal to
0.2 (Age´nor et al., 2012). The parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are
calibrated in a standard way, with αR set equal to 0.7, αpi to 1.5, αY to zero, and ψ1 to
0.3.
The fraction of bank capital reinvested φB is assumed to be 0.9, while the costs of
managing loans to households is chosen equal to 0.01. The cost associated with the
leverage requirement is set equal to 0.1 (Gerali et al., 2010).
The AR coefficients and the standard deviations of the shocks are set to φA = 0.95,
φG = 0.90, σA = 0.01, σR = 0.005, σG = 0.012, σPH = 0.1 (see, for example, Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992; Kim, 2000; Andre´s et al., 2004; Altig et al., 2011). φPH is set
equal to 0.8 after regressing on its first lag actual quarterly data of housing prices in the
euro area over the period 2003-2008.
There is little guidance in the literature on how to set the parameters of the LTV
ratios and risk weights. Therefore, we adopt the following calibration strategy. We set
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these parameters so as to match actual correlations among LTV ratios and risk weights,
and their determinants. In other words, the correlations of our simulated variables have
to be approximately identical to the actual ones reported in Table 3, and calculated
using euro area data obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Thomson
Reuters Datastream. Table 4 reports the resulting calibration for the parameters. We
choose the autoregressive parameters by regressing the actual series of our proxies for the
LTV ratios on their first lag. The standard deviations of the shocks to the LTV ratios
and risk weights have been set equal to 0.1.
Lastly, the values of the remaining parameters and steady-states are computed using
the deterministic steady-state solution.
2.7.1 A Strategy for Modeling the Basel Accords
Thanks to the novel formulation of the weighted leverage cost, the model allows us to
distinguish different prudential regulatory regimes by adequately changing capital require-
ments and risk weight measures. In the baseline calibration of the model, the economy
is assumed to be subjected to a regulatory framework similar to Basel III. Therefore, we
set the steady-state ratio of bank capital Z to total assets (BB + LC) at 0.13, the value
imposed by Basel III. For this purpose, we need to set the cost of managing bank capital
δb at 0.021. The other regime considered in the analysis (Basel II ) requires a leverage
ratio equal to 0.08, which implies δb equal to 0.035.
The parameters of equation (36) and equation (37) are then exploited to further distin-
guish the different regimes. Besides imposing capital requirements, Basel II strengthened
the role of systemic risk in comparison with previous regulatory frameworks. Angelini
et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2012) model a risk-based Basel II mechanism by in-
troducing time-varying weights expressed as a function of output deviations from the
steady-state. The role played by financial intermediaries in the recent financial crisis
reinforced the concerns about the inadequacy of risk measures based solely on coun-
tercyclical systemic elements. Therefore, authorities proposed a new regulatory regime,
Basel III, which in fact considers a wider set of risk-sensitive capital requirements (Basel
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Committee and others, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). The new
framework emphasizes even more that the amount of capital banks must hold is also
determined by the riskiness of each particular borrower. As the risk of a specific asset
increases, banks are forced to hold a larger amount of capital (Aguiar and Drumond,
2007). In light of these considerations, and differently from the model by Angelini et al.
(2012), our risk weights depend also on the time-varying riskiness embedded in the bal-
ance sheet of banks. As a result, our richer setting is able to capture, at least to a first
approximation, the broader definition of risk introduced with Basel III. In particular,
including proxies for counterparties’ (i.e. households and government) credit risk is a
way to model the interrelationship between risk-perception and the risk weights present
in the leverage requirement imposed by regulators on financial intermediaries.
In light of these considerations, the Basel II regime is modeled by setting to zero the
parameters ϕ1,wG , ϕ1,wC and ϕ2,wC . Lastly, a No Basel regime is considered by assuming
that risk weights are time-invariant. Table 5 summarizes the calibration strategy chosen
for the different regulatory frameworks.
3 The Results
As highlighted in previous sections, the model exhibits a quite high degree of complexity.
In order to retain tractability, in this paper we focus on a few set of well-defined issues,
leaving for future research the study of further questions that may be potentially tackled
using this framework. More precisely, in this paper we first show the implications of
having endogenous loan-to-value ratios (paragraph 3.1), and then we compare the effec-
tiveness of different prudential regulatory regimes in affecting business cycle fluctuations
and restoring macroeconomic and financial stability (paragraph 3.2).
Table 6 reports the shocks present in the model economy, distinguishing between stan-
dard macroeconomic shocks, financial shocks and risk weight shocks. This classification
is used extensively in the next paragraphs. Figure 2 reports graphically the main chan-
nels at work when the economy is hit by a contractionary monetary policy shock. As it
can be easily generalized to other types of disturbances, it will guide us throughout the
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following pages.
3.1 Exogenous vs Endogenous LTV Ratios
Endogenous and time-varying loan-to-value ratios for households and banks represent
one of the salient features of model. Inspired by the empirical evidence, we have derived
a novel formulation of LTV ratios that combines both specific risk factors and a coun-
tercyclical element. The first issue we need to address regards the implications of the
presence of such endogenous constraints for the main dynamics of the model. To this
purpose, we report the impulse response functions to standard macroeconomic shocks,
comparing the cases of endogenous versus exogenous loan-to-value ratio of households
(LTV Ct ).
15 We perform this exercise using the baseline calibration, which reflects, as
already mentioned, a Basel III scenario. All the impulse response functions reported in
the paper represent percentage deviations from the steady-state.
We focus on six main variables: four standard variable that are standard in the
literature (total amount of lending to constrained households, lending rate, output and
bank equity) and two banking specific variables, which allow us to obtain a deeper insight
on the effects of capital regulation on banks’ balance sheet. These are the bank leverage,
defined as the ratio of assets over equity, and a risk ratio, defined as the ratio of loans to
households and bonds held by banks, introduced to better evaluate how the composition
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheet changes over time.
Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. In line with standard DSGE models, an exogenous increase in the policy rate
causes a negative effect on investment, which leads to a contraction of output. However,
within this setting, we have further channels through which a monetary policy shock
propagates to the economy. In particular, we observe a reduction in the total amount of
loans to constrained households due to the combined effect of a higher lending rate and
lower housing prices. Since banks are subject to a leverage cost, the drop in households
15Exogenous refers to LTV Ct following a simple AR process of order 1. In other words, ϕ1,H = ϕ2,H =
ϕ3,H = 0. The graphs relative to the other shocks and to banking loan-to-value ratios (LTV
CB
B,t and
LTV CBC,t ) are available upon request.
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lending leads banks to increase their holding of government bonds. As a result, the
risk ratio exhibits a substantial decrease, whereas bank capital increases by around 0.6
percent.
Visual inspection of Figures 3 also suggests that modeling endogenous variations of
LTVC,t (blue dashed line) amplifies the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Worsened economic conditions increase the collateral requirement for constrained house-
holds, i.e. their borrowing capacity is reduced. More specifically, downward movements
in output, house prices and wages generate an endogenous reduction in the LTV of con-
strained households, which magnifies the drop in total lending. Thus, these findings show
that the model is able to reproduce a realistic situation, in which worsened credit market
conditions arise from an endogenous tightening of lending requirements.
Turning to a positive technology innovation (Figure 4), it is possible to observe in
both cases an increase in real output and better credit conditions for households due
to a lower interest rate on loans. With endogenous collateral constraints, the overall
improvement of both households’ idiosyncratic conditions and general economic outlook
looses the collateral requirement of constrained households, generating a substantially
larger increase in the amount of loans provided by banks to households. As a consequence,
also the exposure of banks (i.e. ratio risk) exhibits a larger increase. The procyclical
dynamics of credit are thus amplified.
Monetary and technology shocks feature procyclical lending, and, therefore, endoge-
nous LTV ratios generate an amplification effect for credit conditions. However, a gov-
ernment spending shock (Figure 5) leads to a general increase in interest rates, which,
in turn, causes a fall in loans to households. In this case, lending is anticyclical, and the
presence of a time-varying constraint mitigates the negative effect on total loan quan-
tities. In particular, the lower value of the collateral needed by households reflects the
overall improvement of the economic conditions following an expansionary fiscal policy
shock. The smaller reduction in lending leads to lower volatility also in the asset side
composition of banks.
These findings clearly indicate that the presence of endogenous LTV ratios exacerbates
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the procyclicality of lending conditions, revealing that our model exhibits better business
cycle properties compared to similar settings with exogenous LTV ratios. The greater
volatility generated within our setting would require in principle incisive countercyclical
measures to prevent excessive fluctuations of business cycles. These issues are partially
covered in the next paragraphs.
3.2 Comparing No Basel with Basel III
In this sub-section we compare the results of our baseline model, which reflects a Basel
III regime, and those obtained from a specification still featuring endogenous constraints,
but no capital requirement and risk weight measures (labeled No Basel). Figures 6-8
plot the impulse response functions to the three standard macroeconomic shocks. First
of all, it should be noted that the difference in the prudential regimes does not reflect
any substantial dissimilarity in the response of output. The negligible impact on the
macroeconomy is consistent with the findings of other studies (De Walque et al., 2010;
Angelini et al., 2010, 2012), and in this model is probably exacerbated by the absence of
borrowing firms.
In addition, we find that the presence of a prudential regime like Basel III increases
the procyclical nature of credit. The procyclicality of risk-based capital regulatory frame-
works is well documented in the literature (Aguiar and Drumond, 2007; Angelini et al.,
2010; Parie`s et al., 2011),16 and is due to the fact that credit risk itself is procyclical.
Our simulated Basel III regime amplifies the response of the quantity of total lending
to households after a shock in all three cases. By contrast, Basel III is effective in
dampening the volatility of both the risk- and leverage position of banks in comparison
with the No Basel regime. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock (Figure
6), the combination of tighter capital requirements and worsening economic conditions
(which increases the riskiness of banks’ assets) forces banks to reduce their leverage ratio
generating a deeper contraction in the loan supply. The resulting reduction in the size
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheet leads banks to raise aggressively the lending
16See Drumond (2009) for a review of the most recent studies.
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rate. Higher borrowing costs faced by constrained households contribute eventually to
increase banks’ net worth. The key role played by time-varying risk weights is confirmed
by considering the responses to productivity and government spending shocks (Figure 7
and Figure 8, respectively). In the first case, for instance, improved economic conditions
induce risk weights to decline, making loans less risky. In order to meet the required
leverage ratio, banks have to further expand loan supply by reducing the interest rate on
loans. These findings corroborate the hypothesis that risk-based capital requirements, as
those proposed by Basel III, sharpen the procyclical nature of credit when the economy
is mainly affected by standard macroeconomic shocks. The countercyclical risk weights
induce financial intermediaries to hold excessive equity during economic contractions and
too less during economic expansions.
We then investigate the properties of the two regulatory frameworks by observing
the patterns of the impulse response functions to two financial shocks, namely a credit
crunch shock and a negative housing price shock. The first one, adopted following Andre´s
and Arce (2012), consists in an exogenous shock to the pledgeability ratio LTV Ct that
reduces the borrowing capacity of households. The second shock is an exogenous negative
disturbance on house prices: since the real value of houses is used by households as
collateral, a decrease in the price of houses leads to a reduction in the quantity of loans
that households are able to receive from banks. Thus, the effects of the two shocks are
expected to be qualitatively very similar. Figure 9 and Figure 10 report the impulse
response functions.
In line with what found for macroeconomic shocks, the volatility of the risk- and
leverage position of banks is substantially lower under a Basel III regime. However, the
other results are in sharp contrast with those obtained observing the economy reacting to
standard macroeconomic shocks. In fact, now Basel III seems to be capable of mitigating
significantly the negative response of both output and lending quantity. The higher
capital requirements and the broader set of risk proxies provided for by Basel III reduce
the negative spillovers from the financial sector to the economy. The intuition is as
follows. Unlike standard macroeconomic shocks, financial shocks have a direct impact
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on the quantity of loans. The immediate reduction of credit to households induces risk
weights to decrease, given that the exposure of households and banks decreases and more
than offsets the reduction in aggregate output. Since loans are now less risky, to satisfy
the imposed capital requirements the reduction of loan supply has not to be as substantial
as in the No Basel case. The gains from having a mitigated effect on credit is paid for
by higher volatility of the interest rate on loans.
Lastly, we compare the standard deviation of the simulated variables of the baseline
model and the specification No Basel. The third, fifth and seventh columns of Table 7
report the standard deviation ratios of the simulated variables when using, respectively,
all the shocks present in the model, only the macro shocks, and only the financial shocks.
The numbers are computed as the standard deviation implied by Basel III divided by
the standard deviation generated by No Basel. Thus, a value larger (smaller) than one
indicates that the volatility of the simulated variables under the Basel III regime is
larger (smaller) than that obtained under a No Basel framework. The results confirm that
when the economy is hit by all the shocks, Basel III increases the volatility of lending and
output compared with the case without prudential regulations. Not surprisingly, the same
considerations hold when the economy is affected only by standard macroeconomic shocks.
However, in a situation in which only financial shocks are at work, namely when the
economy is in a period of financial stress, Basel III is effective in downsizing substantially
the volatility of loan quantity and output. The fact that risk-based prudential regulations
seem to work properly only during periods of extraordinary financial stress is consistent
with the results of Angelini et al. (2012).
3.3 Comparing Basel II with Basel III
We now compare the baseline regulatory framework Basel III with its predecessor Basel
II, as specified in sub-section 2.7.1. The impulse response functions of the three standard
macroeconomic shocks (Figures 11-13) indicate that Basel III is able to generate a lower
volatility in the risk- and leverage position of banks than Basel II. As far as the remaining
variables are concerned, the responses of the two regimes are very close and, in the case
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of a positive technology shock, even amplified under Basel III, suggesting that Basel III
may potentially be more procyclical than Basel II during normal times. This can be
attributed to the presence of additional risk weight proxies in the Basel III specification,
which reinforce the fluctuations of risk associated with loans to households.
The ratios of the standard deviation of the simulated variables under the regime Basel
II with respect to the No Basel case are reported in the second, fourth and sixth columns
of Table 7.17 The findings corroborate the idea that, regardless of the type of shocks
hitting the economy, Basel III amplifies the volatility of loan quantities in comparison
with Basel II, whereas mitigates the fluctuations in aggregate output and the risk- and
leverage position of banks. The magnitude of these differences is nevertheless relatively
small.
These results are confirmed, and, to some extent, strengthened when we add to the
simulation exercise the two risk weight shocks, which increase exogenously the risk per-
ception of loans to households (wC) and government bonds (wG). Table 8 shows the
standard deviation ratios of Basel III with respect to Basel II. As in the previous para-
graph, a value larger than unity indicates that the volatility of the simulated variable
under Basel III is higher than under Basel II. The main conclusion that can be drawn
from this analysis is that a regulatory regime like Basel III seems to be generally more
effective than Basel II in reducing the volatility of aggregate output and the risk- and
leverage position of banks, whereas Basel II is able to stabilize more incisively credit
fluctuations.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a new theoretical framework to study the interactions between finan-
cial markets and the rest of the economy. The model formalizes the ideas that banking
assets are risky and LTV ratios are not constant and depend on systemic factors and lever-
age conditions of households and banks. Hence, the model is capable of: a) reproducing
17The impulse responses to financial and risk weight shocks are not reproduce herein, but are available
upon request.
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in a realistic way credit procyclical properties; b) analyzing different prudential regula-
tory frameworks by modifying the configuration of the key parameters and steady-states
of the model.
The results of our study indicate that endogenous LTV ratios magnify the effect
of procyclical lending, and thus the effects of a simulated credit crunch. We have also
shown the implications of different prudential regulatory measures. When standard macro
shocks prevail (i.e. in normal times), prudential regulatory frameworks such as Basel
II and Basel III increase the volatility of credit and macroeconomic variables. When
financial shocks prevail (i.e. in periods of extraordinary financial stress) Basel II and
Basel III contribute substantially to stabilize credit markets and the overall economy.
Moreover, Basel III is generally more effective in doing so than Basel II. These findings
are very important for policy-makers struggling to find effective tools to smooth business
cycle fluctuations and restore macroeconomic and financial stability.
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Tables
Table 1: Steady-state values
Notation Description SS values
Y Output 1
L/(1− L) Ratio of market to non-market activities 0.3
K/Y Stock of capital-GDP ratio 8
C/Y Total consumption-GDP ratio 0.4
CC/Y Consumption-GDP ratio CH 0.1 ∗ C
CU/Y Consumption-GDP ratio UH 0.9 ∗ C
T/Y Taxes-GDP ratio 0.1972
TC/Y Taxes-GDP ratio CH 0.1 ∗ T
TU/Y Taxes-GDP ratio UH 0.9 ∗ T
RCB Gross money-market rate 1.015
LTV C Loan-to value ratio households 0.7
LTV CBB Loan-to value ratio banks - gov. bonds 0.9
LTV CBC Loan-to value ratio banks - loans to HH 0.8
H Stock of housing 1
Notes: CH indicates constrained households; UH indicates unconstrained households.
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Table 2: Benchmark calibration of the standard parameters (Basel III)
Notation Description Benchmark values
Preferences and technology
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
βC Intertemporal discount factor of CH 0.9943
βU Intertemporal discount factor of UH 0.9923
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
χ Elasticity of money demand 7
ψ Elasticity of labor supply 1
γ Habit formation 0.7
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods 6
φP Price adjustment costs 100
v Elasticity of money in the liquidity aggregator 0.2
ηx Elasticity of liquidity in the utility function of UH 0.3
Fiscal and monetary policy
ψ0 Fiscal policy constant 0.1972
ψ1 Fiscal policy response to b 0.3
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation 1.5
αY Monetary policy response to output 0
αR Monetary policy inertia 0.7
Banking sector
δb Cost of managing bank capital 0.021
φB Profits reinvested in bank capital 0.9
γC Cost of managing loans 0.01
e Leverage ratio cost 0.1
Autoregressive parameters
φA Technology shock 0.95
φG Government spending shock 0.90
φPH Housing prices shock 0.80
Standard deviations
σA Technology shock 0.01
σG Government spending shock 0.012
σR Monetary policy shock 0.005
σPH Housing prices shock 0.1
Notes: CH indicates constrained households; UH indicates unconstrained households.
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Table 3: Actual correlations between LTVs and risk weights and their determinants
LTV Ct LTV
CB
B,t w
G
t LTV
CB
C,t w
C
t
PHt 0.624 - - - -
wtFt 0.576 - - - -
Yt 0.716 0.441 -0.441 0.702 -0.702
Bt - -0.286 0.286 - -
(LCt R
C
t )/P
H
t - - - 0.578 -0.578
LCt /Dt - - - 0.442 -
LCt /Zt - - - - -0.208
Sources: Authors’ elaborations on data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Datastream.
Notes: All the variables are expressed as quarterly percentage changes over the period 2003-2012
(except for LTV CBB,t , which is only available from 2008). LTV
C
t is proxied by the opposite of the
net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of the loan-to-value ratio of loans for house purchases
over the previous quarter (Question 10 of the Bank Lending Survey). wGt is proxied by the sovereign
CDS spread of Germany. wCt is proxied by the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of
collateral requirements for loans for house purchases over the previous quarter (Question 10 of the
Bank Lending Survey). LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t are the opposite of w
G
t and w
C
t , respectively. P
H
t is
residential property prices of new and existing dwellings. wt is hourly compensation. Ft is total
employment in hours. Yt is GDP at market price. Bt is general government debt. L
C
t is lending for
house purchase (over five years). RCt is the interest rate on loans for house purchase. Dt is deposit
liabilities. Zt is capital and reserves. For the computation of the correlations, the quantity of housing
ht has been considered fixed.
Table 4: Benchmark calibration of the parameters of LTV ratios and risk weights
Notation Description Benchmark values
Exog. LTVs Endog. LTVs
LTV Ct
ϕ1,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt the value of housing - 0.02
ϕ2,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt to labor income - 0.02
ϕ3,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt to output - 2
φLTV C AR parameter - 0.8
LTV CBB,t
ϕ1,B Elasticity of LTV
CB
B,t wrt total government debt - -0.2
ϕ2,B Elasticity of LTV
CB
B,t wrt output - 0.5
φLTV CB
B
AR parameter - 0.2
LTV CBC,t
ϕ1,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt the ratio value of loans-value of housing - -0.01
ϕ2,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt the loan-to-deposit ratio - -0.005
ϕ3,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt output - 2
φLTV CB
C
AR parameter - 0.8
Sovereign bond risk wGt
ϕ1,wG Elasticity of w
G
t wrt total government debt 0.25 0.25
ϕ2,wG Elasticity of w
G
t wrt output -0.5 -0.5
φwG AR parameter 0.2 0.2
Households’ loans risk wCt
ϕ1,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt the ratio value of loans-value of housing 0.01 0.01
ϕ2,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt the loans to capital ratio 0.01 0.01
ϕ3,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt output -2 -2
φwC AR parameter 0.8 0.8
Standard deviations
σLTV
C
Shock to LTV Ct 0.1 0.1
σw
G
Shock to wGt 0.1 0.1
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Table 5: Model specifications of the Basel Accords
wGt w
C
t
 Regime Z
LC+BB
ϕ1,wG ϕ2,wG ϕ1,wC ϕ2,wC ϕ3,wC
No Basel No min. req. x x x x x
Basel II 0.08 x X x x X
Basel III 0.13 X X X X X
Table 6: Classification of shocks
Macroeconomic shocks Financial shocks Risk weight shocks
εA Technology shock εLTV
C
Credit crunch shock εw
C
MBS risk shock
εR Monetary policy shock εLTV
CB
B Sovereign debt downgrading shock εw
G
Sovereign risk shock
εG Government spending shock εLTV
CB
B MBS downgrading shock
εP
H
Housing prices shock
Table 7: Standard deviation of the simulated variables without risk weight shocks
All shocks Only macro shocks Only financial shocks
Endog. LTVs BII BIII BII BIII BII BIII
LCt 1.234 1.327 1.294 1.406 0.772 0.809
LCt /B
B
t 1.523 0.901 2.164 1.374 0.490 0.245
(LCt +B
B
t )/Zt 0.081 0.045 0.080 0.043 0.003 0.026
Yt 1.054 1.045 1.011 1.002 0.643 0.561
Notes: Standard deviation ratios of Basel II and Basel III with respect to No Basel
(SDBII/SDNB , SDBIII/SDNB).
Table 8: Standard deviation of the simulated variables with risk weight shocks
All shocks Macro + Weights shocks Financial + Weights shocks Only weights shocks
Endog. LTVs BIII BIII BIII BIII
LCt 1.048 1.184 1.020 1.271
LCt /B
B
t 0.526 0.673 0.496 0.458
(LCt +B
B
t )/Zt 0.519 0.548 0.533 0.517
Yt 0.982 1.056 0.902 0.947
Notes: Standard deviation ratios of Basel III with respect to Basel II (SDBIII/SDBII).
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Figures
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the main connections of the model
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Figure 2: The effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions to a credit crunch shock
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions to negative housing price shock
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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This paper develops a simple Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model capable of
evaluating the effect of large purchases of treasuries by central banks. The model exhibits imperfect
asset substitutability between government bonds of different maturities and a feedback from the term
structure to the macroeconomy. Both are generated through the introduction of portfolio adjustment
frictions. As a result, the model is able to isolate the portfolio rebalancing channel of Quantita-
tive Easing (QE). This theoretical framework is employed to evaluate the impact on yields and the
macroeconomy of large purchases of medium- and long-term treasuries recently carried out in the
US and UK. The results from the calibrated model suggest that large asset purchases of government
assets had stimulating effects in terms of lower long-term yields, and higher output and inflation.
The size of the effects is nevertheless sensitive to the speed of the exit strategy chosen by monetary
authorities.
KEYWORDS: unconventional monetary policies, quantitative easing, DSGE models, asset prices
JEL Classification: E43, E44, E52, E58
∗Department of Economics, University of Bologna. Mail: matteo.falagiarda2@unibo.it Address: Piazza Scaravilli 2 - 40126
Bologna (Italy). Office Phone: +39 051 2092641
†Useful comments have been provided by Dario Bonciani, Jochen Gu¨ntner, Richard Harrison, Massimiliano Marzo, Davide
Raggi, Luca Sessa and Paolo Zagaglia. I have benefited from conversations with Neil Cabiles, Gabriella Chiesa, Guido Ruta
and Alessandro Saia. I also thank participants at seminars at the Department of Economics of the University of Bologna, at the
53rd Annual Conference of the Italian Economic Association, the ADRES Doctoral Conference 2013, the Konstanz Doctoral
Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics 2013, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2013, the European Macroeconomics
Workshop 2013, and the 28th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association. Any errors remain my responsibility.
1 Introduction
When an economy is stuck in a liquidity trap or experiences a liquidity shortage, the zero-lower bound
(ZLB) of interest rates may challenge the conventional ways of conducting monetary policy.1 Hence,
Quantitative Easing (QE) becomes one of the main tools at the disposal of central banks in order to spur
economic recovery. QE can be defined as all policies carried out by central banks involving changes in the
composition and/or size of their balance sheet aimed at, in a situation close to the ZLB, easing liquidity
and credit conditions with the final goal of stimulating the economic system. There exist therefore a vari-
ety of different unconventional measures that fall under the label of QE, such as purchases of treasuries,
purchases of private securities, and direct loans to banks, companies and households. Theoretical and
practical issues on unconventional monetary policies are discussed in several studies (Krugman, 1998;
Svensson, 2003; Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Orphanides, 2004; Borio and Disyatat, 2010; Bowdler
and Radia, 2012; Joyce et al., 2012). Figure 1 sketches strategies and policy options available to central
banks facing ZLB problems as well as the channels through which they may affect aggregate demand.
As the recent global downturn unfolded, many advanced economies experienced a serious liquidity
shortage combined with an interest rate close to the ZLB. Thus, their monetary authorities began to pur-
sue QE measures. In particular, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007, interbank money markets
froze up due to some important bankruptcies (and, more generally, solvency concerns), a consequent
widespread lack of confidence, and coordination failures among market participants. As a result, finan-
cial markets also broke down with dramatic consequences for the whole economic system. In an effort to
spur economic activity and restore financial market functioning, several central banks intervened by re-
ducing the short-term interest rate. The ZLB quickly became a serious concern for monetary institutions
since, in such situations, the availability of credit tends to become irresponsive to quantity of liquidity
present in the economic system.
In the US, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, the Fed engaged in dramatic cuts of the policy rate, and
the ZLB was virtually reached in December 2008. As Figure 2 shows, this measure was accompanied
by a huge expansion of the Fed’s portfolio assets, which jumped by over $1,000 billion in a few weeks.
Besides rescuing troubled companies, such as Bear Stearns and AIG, the Fed started a much more com-
prehensive program to provide liquidity and reduce risk premia along the term structure and across a
variety of different assets.2 Given improved conditions in financial markets, many of the programs intro-
duced at the onset of the crisis were suppressed by the end of 2009 or throughout 2010. A second stage
of QE, called by practitioners QE2 (in contrast with the first phase QE1), took place from October 2010
1The existence of liquidity traps was first hypothesized by Keynes (1936), during the years following the onset of the Great
Depression, when, in a deflationary situation, short-term nominal interest rates remained for a long time very close to zero.
2New specific programs include the Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) purchase program, which was intended to help
mortgage and housing markets, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, aimed at providing credit to households and
small companies, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, which provided funding
to banks for their purchase of asset-backed securities, and the Term Auction Facility, which provided term funds to depository
institutions.
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until June 2011, mainly consisting of purchases of medium- and long-term treasury securities.3
In September 2012, Bernanke announced that the Fed will purchase additional agency mortgage-
backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month, and will extend the average maturity of its holdings
of securities. These actions are expected to increase the Fed’s holdings of longer-term securities by about
$85 billion each month until the end of the year. The declared objective of QE3 is to “put downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial
conditions more accommodative.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012).
The QE approach of the Bank of England (BoE) has been quite different to that implemented by the
Fed. As shown in Figure 3, a huge expansion of the balance sheet occurred just after the insurgence of
the crisis. During this first stage, the central bank implemented some liquidity support measures, such
as extensions to its lending operations, by allowing banks to borrow from a wider-than-normal range of
collateral. The second stage of unconventional measures in the UK began with the establishment of the
Asset Purchase Facility (APF) fund in March 2009, a separate subsidiary company of the BoE.4 The
goal of the APF was to improve market functioning by injecting money into the economy in the form of
purchases of high-quality public and private assets. However, APF’s operations were overwhelmingly
oriented towards purchases of medium- and long-term governments bonds (Figure 4). Private securities
accounted for a tiny proportion of the APF’s purchases. Because of further recessionary pressures during
the end of 2011, the Bank of England extended the program in October 2011, injecting additional liquid-
ity into the economy, mainly in the form of medium- and long-term gilt purchases. Two more waves of
purchases took place in February 2012 and July 2012, bringing the total amount of assets purchased by
the BoE to the remarkable value of £375 billion. At the time of writing this paper, a date for a definitive
exit strategy is still uncertain.
Recent events have inspired a growing body of empirical literature trying to assess whether unconven-
tional monetary policies have been successful. However, gauging the effects of unconventional monetary
policies remains a hard task. The reasons can be found both in the uncertain time lags between actions
and effects, and in the difficulties related to disentangling other important factors, especially government
policies and international developments. Another empirical concern is the identification of the channels
through which QE may affect yields, premia, and other variables of interest. A substantial number of
empirical contributions rely therefore on event studies, i.e. they focus on the patterns of specific vari-
ables, such as yields, within a narrow time interval between the announcement or the implementation of
a policy. Evidence provided by event studies has been generally supportive of the effectiveness of QE
policies, both in the US (Klyuev et al., 2009; Blinder, 2010; Neely, 2010; Gagnon et al., 2011; Krish-
namurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Swanson, 2011; Glick and Leduc, 2012) and in the UK (Klyuev
et al., 2009; Meier, 2009; Joyce et al., 2011b; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Joyce and Tong, 2012).
3“QE1 directly supported struggling banks by buying their problematic assets. QE2 supports the government.” (Bagus,
2010).
4The accounts of the APF are not consolidated with those of the central bank. Therefore, all the operations of the APF fund
fall inside the category “other assets” in Figure 3.
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Another strand of the empirical literature employs econometric techniques (Gagnon et al., 2011;
Meaning and Zhu, 2011; Bridges and Thomas, 2012; D’Amico et al., 2012; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Joyce
and Tong, 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012; Kozicki et al., 2012; Stroebel and Taylor, 2012; Wright, 2012;
Baumeister and Benati, 2013; D’Amico and King, 2013), affine term structure models (Christensen and
Rudebusch, 2012; Hamilton and Wu, 2012) and other finance models (Doh, 2010; Neely, 2010). These
works generally find that the unconventional monetary measures recently taken in the US and in the UK
have been effective.
In addition, more or less fully-fledged structural models have been used to assess the impact of un-
conventional monetary policies.5 In standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models,
QE may only work through a signaling channel,6 since the representation of the financial sector is very
stylized. In order to capture the effects of QE policies via other channels, it is necessary to depart from
the conventional DSGE framework by introducing specific financial frictions and structures.
A first attempt has been made by modeling financial intermediaries and banking frictions, in order to
focus on the role of unconventional monetary policies in facilitating lending. These models are able to
capture the credit channel of QE. Contributions in this area have been produced by Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2010), Dib (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Brendon et al. (2011), Del Negro et al. (2011), Gertler
and Karadi (2011), Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011), Chadha et al. (2012), and Chadha and Corrado (2012).
A different type of DSGE models features imperfect asset substitutability to isolate the portfolio
rebalancing channel of QE. Within these frameworks, QE measures may affect asset prices and returns
by changing the relative supplies of different assets. There has recently been a growing attention towards
the contributions by Tobin (1969, 1982) about imperfect asset substitutability, whose portfolio approach
has been employed in dynamic optimizing models by Andre´s et al. (2004), Marzo et al. (2008), and,
more recently, by Falagiarda and Marzo (2012) and Zagaglia (2013). Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison
(2012a,b) adopt this framework to study unconventional monetary policies. In models with imperfect
asset substitutability, investors tend to rebalance their asset portfolios whenever the supply of the different
types of assets changes. Large asset purchases by the central bank vary the relative supply of assets of
different maturities, inducing movements in their prices. As a result, aggregate demand may also be
influenced.
By embracing this last approach, the present paper develops a DSGE model able to capture the effect
of large asset purchases of treasuries by central banks. Partially drawing on Chen et al. (2012) and Har-
rison (2012a,b), the model is characterized by imperfect asset substitutability and a feedback effect from
the term structure to the macroeconomy, both generated through the introduction of portfolio adjustment
frictions. In other words, agents pay a cost whenever the relative composition of their portfolio deviates
from its steady-state level. The model is therefore capable of isolating a portfolio rebalancing channel
of QE. By purchasing a particular asset, the monetary authority reduces the amount of that asset held
5For a comparison of the different DSGE approaches to QE, see Caglar et al. (2012). A large scale non-DSGE model is
used by Chung et al. (2012).
6See, for example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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by private agents usually in exchange of risk-free reserves. As a result, the price of that asset increases
and the interest rate falls, creating favorable conditions for economic recovery through the traditional
monetary transmission mechanisms. Indeed, thanks to the general equilibrium nature of the model, it is
possible to assess the effect of this type of QE policies on the macroeconomy as well as on yields.
Differently from Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison (2012a,b), who employ perpetuities as long-term
bonds, the model presented in this paper features a secondary market for bond trading, as proposed by
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), allowing a straightforward treatment of zero-coupon government bonds
of different maturities. Moreover, unlike Chen et al. (2012) the present model relies on a representative
agent setting, avoiding the troublesome differentiation between restricted and unrestricted agents. A
further distinction between Harrison (2012b) and the model proposed in this paper is the absence of
portfolio adjustment frictions in the utility function of households. I instead decide to include such costs
more plausibly in the budget constraint. In addition, particular attention is paid to the calibration strategy
in order to simulate carefully large asset purchase programs. Lastly, an extensive sensitivity analysis is
performed to show how the results crucially depend on the key parameters of the model. Due to the
novelties introduced, this model is more consistent with reality than the similar settings present in the
literature. To the best of my knowledge, this model represents the first attempt to evaluate the effects of
large asset purchases within a relatively simple DSGE framework characterized by: a) a representative
agent; b) a stylized central bank’s balance sheet; c) an endogenous term structure featuring imperfect
asset substitutability between zero-coupon government bonds of different maturities.
The theoretical framework is then employed to simulate the impact of large purchases of medium-
and long-term treasuries in the US during QE2 (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around $800 billion
of purchases - Figure 2), and in the UK during the first phase of the APF program (from March 2009 to
January 2010 - around £200 billion of purchases - Figure 3). The results from the calibrated model are
realistic and generally consistent with those obtained in the literature using different techniques. Overall,
they suggest that large asset purchases of government assets had substantial stimulating effects both in
terms of lower long-term yields and higher output and inflation. These effects seem to be generally
larger for the UK than the US. This is not surprising, given that the purchases characterizing the phases
of QE under consideration have been relatively more remarkable in the UK than in the US. Still, the
difference in the effects between the two countries is not as large as previously found in the literature.
My preferred model specification indicates that large asset purchases of QE2 in the US had a peak effect
on long-term rates in annualized percentage rates of -63 basis points, on the level of real GDP of around
0.92%, and on inflation of 0.37 percentage points. In the UK, the preferred model specification suggests
that the first phase of the APF program had a peak effect on long-term rates of -69 basis points, on the
level of real GDP of 1.25%, and on inflation of 0.49 percentage points. However, the size of the effects
crucially depends on the speed of the exit strategy chosen by monetary authorities and on the degree of
substitutability among assets of different maturities.
All in all, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it provides a new and relatively simple
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setting through which the effects of large purchases of treasuries by central banks can be evaluated
within a microfounded macro framework with optimizing agents. Second, it offers fresh evidence on the
potential effectiveness of the recent large asset purchase programs conducted in the US and in the UK.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the model and introduces
its key features. Section 3 presents the results from the calibrated model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A representative agent populates the economy and supplies labor inputs. Monopolistically competi-
tive firms hire labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. The government conducts fiscal and
monetary policy. Since the deviations from a canonical DSGE setting concern the households and the
government sectors, I start here with their discussion.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household, whose preferences are defined over consumption Ct, real money
balances MtPt and labor effort Lt, and are described by the infinite stream of utility:
Ut =
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
(1)
where β is the intertemporal discount factor. The instantaneous utility function u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
is given by:
u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
=
(Ct − γCt−1)1− 1σ
1 − 1σ
+
1
1 − χ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−χ
− Ψ
1 + 1/ψ
L1+1/ψt (2)
where γ measures the importance of consumption habits, σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
χ is the elasticity of money demand, and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
In this economy, each agent i can choose the composition of a basket of differentiated final goods.
Preferences across varieties of goods have the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form a`
la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct( j)
θ−1
θ d j
] θ
θ−1
(3)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption index of all the differentiated final goods produced in the economy
under monopolistic competition. There are j-th varieties of final goods ( j ∈ [0, 1]), and θ is the elasticity
of substitution between different final goods varieties (θ > 1).
Each agent is subject to the following budget constraint, which incorporates the secondary market
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for bond trading as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004):
Bt
PtRt
+
BHL,t
PtRL,t
(1 + ACLt ) +
Mt
Pt
+ It(1 + ACIt ) =
Bt−1
Pt
+
BHL,t−1
PtRt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+ wtLt + qtKt −Ct − Tt (4)
Thus, agents allocate their wealth among money holding, accumulation of capital, which is rented to
firms at the rental rate qt, and holding of two types of zero-coupon bonds (Bt and BHL,t), which are
purchased by households at their nominal price. They receive rental income qtKt, where Kt is capital,
wage income wtLt, where wt is the real wage. They also pay a real lump-sum tax Tt. It is investment,
and Pt is the aggregate price level.
Firms face quadratic adjustment costs of investment as in Kim (2000):
ACIt =
φK
2
(
It
Kt
)2
(5)
The law of motion of capital stock is expressed in the following standard way:
Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt (6)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
The different zero-coupon government bonds are defined as money-market bonds Bt and long-term
bonds BHL,t, whose yields are given, respectively, by Rt and RL,t. Money-market bonds are considered as
a proxy for 3-month-maturity bonds, and the long-term bonds for 10-year-maturity bonds.7 The budget
constraint incorporates the secondary market for bond trading as proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004). The strength of this approach is that it allows an explicit and straightforward treatment of assets
of different maturities. The left-hand side of the budget constraint follows the usual formulation with
bonds priced at their interest rates, since at time t, returns R and RL are known with certainty and are
risk-free from the viewpoint of agents. However, the right-hand side of (4) reveals the presence of the
secondary market for bond trading as proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), according to which
long-term bonds are priced at the money-market rate. Even though these bonds represent sure claims for
future consumption, they are subject to price risk prior to maturity. At time t − 1, an agent who buys
longer-maturity bonds and plans to sell them next period would be uncertain about the gains, since Rt is
not known at time t−1. As stressed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the price Rt follows from a simple
arbitrage argument, since, in period t, these bonds represent identical sure claims to consumption goods
at the time of the end of the maturity as newly issued one-period bonds in period t.
As already mentioned, segmentation in financial markets is obtained by introducing portfolio adjust-
ment frictions, which represent impediments to arbitrage behavior that would equalize asset returns. In
particular, it is assumed that the intratemporal trading between bonds of different maturities is costly to
7However, when calibrating the model, money-market bonds are assumed to include all government debt instruments with
maturity up to one year, whereas long-term bonds government debt instruments with maturity longer than one year (see Para-
graph 3.1).
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each agent. These bond transaction costs are given by:
ACLt =
φL2
κL BtBHL,t − 1
2
 Yt (7)
where κL is the steady-state ratio of long-term bond holdings relative to short-term bond holdings
(
BHL
B
)
.
Thus, agents pay a cost whenever they shift the portfolio allocation between short and long maturity
bonds. Transaction costs are paid in terms of income and are zero in the steady-state.8
The rationale for including portfolio frictions is threefold. First of all, these costs can be viewed
as a proxy for the behavior of agents towards liquidity risk (i.e. they rationalize a liquidity premium).
The longer the maturity of a bond, the less liquid is considered the asset, and vice versa. Since long-
term bonds are perceived as less liquid, there are liquidity costs associated with holding them. In other
words, agents perceive longer-maturity assets as riskier, and hence associated with a loss of liquidity
compared to the same investment in shorter-term bonds. It follows that, as they purchase longer-term
bonds, they hold additional short-term bonds to compensate themselves for the loss of liquidity. Thus,
agents self-impose a sort of “precautionary liquidity holdings” on their longer-term investments (Andre´s
et al., 2004). Another justification for including such portfolio frictions rests on the theory of preferred
habitat, according to which agents have preferences over bond maturities (Vayanos and Vila, 2009).
Therefore, any deviation from the preferred portfolio allocation is costly to households. Third, these
costs can be also considered as proxies for the shares of resources devoted to covering information costs,
or simply the costs of managing bond portfolios.
2.1.1 Optimality Conditions
Households maximize their lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the capital accumu-
lation equation (6). The first order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, money, money-market
bonds, long-term bonds, capital and investment, are respectively given by:
(Ct − γCt−1)−1/σ − βγEt(Ct+1 − γCt)−1/σ = λt (8)
ΨL1/ψt = λtwt (9)
(
Mt
Pt
)−χ
+ βEt
λt+1
pit+1
= λt (10)
8This distinctive formulation resembles those proposed by Andre´s et al. (2004), Falagiarda and Marzo (2012) and Harrison
(2012a,b).
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βEt
λt+1
pit+1
=
λt
Rt
+
κLφLλtYt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)
RL,t
(11)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
=
λt
RL,t
+
φLλtYt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)2
2RL,t
−
κLφLλtYtbt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)
bHL,tRL,t
(12)
β(1 − δ)Etµt+1 = µt − λt
qt + φK ( ItKt
)3 (13)
βEtµt+1 = λt
1 + 32φK
(
It
Kt
)2 (14)
where λt and µt are the two Lagrange multipliers.
2.2 The Government Sector
The consolidated government-central bank budget constraint is given by:
Bt
PtRt
+
BL,t
PtRL,t
+
∆t
Pt
=
Bt−1
Pt
+
BL,t−1
PtRt
+ Gt − Tt (15)
where BL,t is the total amount of long-term bonds present in the economy and Gt is government spending.
As stressed in the previous paragraph, money-market bonds are considered as a proxy for 3-month-
maturity government debt assets, and long-term bonds for 10-year-maturity government debt assets.
Drawing on Harrison (2012b), ∆t is defined as the change in the central bank balance sheet, equal to
money creation and net asset purchases:
∆t
Pt
=
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
−
 BCBL,tPtRL,t − B
CB
L,t−1
PtRt
 (16)
where BCBL,t is the central bank’s holdings of long-term government debt. Thus, the stylized central bank’s
balance sheet of this model includes long-term treasuries on the asset side and money on the liability
side. Central bank’s holdings of long-term government bonds are a fraction x of the total amount of
long-term bonds present in the economy:
BCBL,t = xtBL,t (17)
9
The remaining proportion of long-term bonds is available to households and is given by:
BHL,t = (1 − xt)BL,t (18)
Thus, asset purchases by the central bank are performed by varying the fraction xt, which is modeled as
a variable following an autoregressive process of order one:
log
( xt
X
)
= φx log
( xt−1
X
)
+ εxt (19)
where X is the steady-state value of the fraction of long-term bonds held by the central bank
(
BCBL,t
BL,t
)
, and εxt
represents an i.i.d. shock to asset purchases with zero mean and standard deviation σx. This means that
the central bank holds in the steady-state a quantity of long-term bonds X, and temporary fluctuations
around this level are determined by (19). One limitation of this formulation is that it is assumed that the
central bank gradually starts decumulating long-term asset holdings from the period after the shock. The
persistence of the shock is nevertheless carefully calibrated to mimic different plausible exit strategies
conducted by the monetary authority.
Government spending, net of interest expenses, Gt follows an AR(1) process:
log
(Gt
G
)
= φG log
(Gt−1
G
)
+ εGt (20)
where εGt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG.
I introduce the following passive fiscal policy rule, according to which the total amount of tax col-
lection Tt is a function of total government’s liabilities:9
Tt = ψ0 + ψ1
[
bt−1
pit
− b
pi
]
+ ψ2
[
bL,t−1
Rtpit
− bL
Rpi
]
(21)
where ψ0 is the steady-state level of Tt, and bt and bL,t denote the real stock of short- and long-term
bonds (bt = Bt/Pt, bL,t = BL,t/Pt). Equation (21) suggests that the level of taxes reacts to deviations of
the outstanding level of public debt from its steady-state level. In other words, taxes are not allowed to
act independently from the stock of government liabilities outstanding in the economy.10
The central bank is the institution devoted to set the money-market rate Rt, according to the following
Taylor (1993) rule:
log
(Rt
R
)
= αR log
(Rt−1
R
)
+ (1 − αR)
{
αpi log
(
pit
pi
)
+ αY log
(Yt
Y
)}
+ εRt (22)
where αR, αpi, αY indicate the response of Rt with respect to lagged Rt, inflation and output. Thus, the
9In such a way, it is possible to prevent the emergence of inflation as a fiscal phenomenon (Leeper, 1991).
10A similar formulation has been employed, for instance, by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
10
policy rate is determined by the deviation of inflation and output from their steady-state values with
an interest rate smoothing component. The monetary policy shock εRt is an i.i.d. with zero mean and
standard deviation σR.
Finally, the supply of long-term bonds is assumed to follow a simple exogenous AR process, as in
Zagaglia (2013):
log
(
bL,t
bL
)
= φBL log
(
bL,t−1
bL
)
+ εBLt (23)
where εBLt is a disturbance term with zero mean and standard deviation σBL. Thus, asset purchase shocks
are assumed to affect only the composition of outstanding government liabilities.
2.3 Firms
The final step is to model the firms’ sector, which follows a quite standard representation. Each firm j
produces and sells differentiated final goods in a monopolistically competitive market. The production
function is a standard Cobb-Douglas with labor and capital:
Yt = AtKαt Lt
1−α − Φ (24)
where α is the share of capital used in production, and Φ is a fixed cost to ensure that profits are zero in
the steady-state. At is technology and follows an AR(1) process:
log
(At
A
)
= φA log
(At−1
A
)
+ εAt (25)
where εAt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σA.
Firms’ optimizing process is constrained by nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982), i.e. firms face
quadratic price adjustment costs:
ACPt =
φP
2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
− pi
)2
Yt (26)
Given the standard CES setting of equation (3), the demand function faced by each single firm j is:
Yt( j) =
[
pt( j)
Pt
]−θ
Yt =⇒ Pt( j) =
[
Yt( j)
Yt
]− 1θ
Pt (27)
Thus, the demand function for each single good j is proportionally related to the general output level of
the economy, and negatively to the price of good j.
Following Kim (2000), the profit function for each firm j is:
PtΠt( j) = Pt( j)Yt( j) − wtLt( j) − PtqtKt( j) − PtACPt (28)
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After employing (26) and (27) into (28), the maximization problem of each firm becomes fully dynamic:
each firm maximizes the expectation of the discounted sum of profit flows, given the information at time
0:
Π0( j) = E0
 ∞∑
t=0
ρtPtΠt( j)
 (29)
where ρt is a stochastic pricing kernel for contingent claims, i.e. the discount factor of firms. Assuming
that each agent in the economy has access to a complete market for contingent claims, the discount
factors of households and firms are equal:
Et
ρt+1
ρt
= Etβ
λt+1
λt
(30)
Therefore, the necessary first order conditions of the maximization problem with respect to labor and
capital are given respectively by:
wt = (1 − α)
(
Yt + Φ
Lt
) (
1 − 1
eYt
)
(31)
qt = α
(
Yt + Φ
Kt
) (
1 − 1
eYt
)
(32)
where eYt is the output demand elasticity:
1
eYt
=
1
θ
{
1 − φP(pit − pi)pit + βφPEt
[
λt+1
λt
(pit+1 − pi)pi2t+1
Yt+1
Yt
]}
(33)
which measures the gross price markup over marginal cost. It is easy to check that manipulations of the
log-linearized version of (33) lead to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
2.4 The Resource Constraint
The model is completed by specifying the resource constraint of the economy:
Yt = Ct + Gt + It(1 + ACIt ) + AC
P
t +
bHL,t
RL,t
(ACLt ) (34)
The total output of the economy is allocated to consumption, government spending, investment (compre-
hensive of capital adjustment costs), price adjustment costs, and a component related to bond adjustment
frictions.
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2.5 Asset Markets: No Arbitrage and the Feedback
In order to appreciate the main features of the model, a deeper analysis of the asset market’s structure is
required. Combining the log-linearized version of the two first-order conditions for bond holdings, i.e.
equations (11) and (12), yields:
R˜L,t = R˜t + A1EtR˜t+1 + A2Etλ˜t+1 − A3Etp˜it+1 − φLA4[b˜t − b˜HL,t] (35)
where Aı (ı = 1, 2, 3, 4) are convolutions of the parameters. Equation (35) reveals that the long-term
rate depends positively on the volume of long-term bonds held by private households, as desired, and
negatively on the volume of short-term bonds, because of the imperfect substitutability between the two
assets. Thus, asset purchases carried out by the monetary authority, by reducing the supply of long-term
bonds at the disposal of households, would lead to a reduction in the long-term yield, as stated by the
portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. Conversely, an increase in the relative supply of the more illiquid
asset (i.e. long-term bond) will bid up the spread between the more illiquid asset and the more liquid
asset. The intuition is that to get agents to accept the fact of holding a larger (smaller) fraction of short-
term bonds in their portfolio the spread between the two rates has to decrease (increase). Notice the role
of the transaction costs parameter φL that, by generating impediments to the arbitrage behavior of agents
that would equalize returns, determines the degree to which relative bonds holding movements affect the
long-term rate. When financial frictions are equal to zero, equation (35) boils down to the more usual
formulation:
R˜L,t = R˜t + A1EtR˜t+1 + A2Etλ˜t+1 − A3Etp˜it+1 (36)
in which a sort of expectations hypothesis holds, and the long-term rate is not affected by changes in the
relative holdings of bonds of different maturities.
An additional crucial feature of the model is the presence of a feedback channel from the term
structure to the macroeconomy. This can be observed by combining the log-linearized version of the first
order conditions for consumption (8) and short-term bonds (11), in order to obtain the Euler equation for
consumption, and employing then the first order condition of long-term bonds (12):
c˜t = A5Etc˜t+1 + A6Etp˜it+1 + · · · − A7R˜t − A8R˜L,t (37)
where Aı (ı = 5, 6, 7, 8) are convolutions of the parameters. Aggregate demand and, through general
equilibrium forces, all the macro variables are therefore affected by the entire simple term structure of
interest rate present in this model, and not only by the short-term rate as in standard DSGE frameworks.
The whole story behind the model can be summarized as follows. Long-term bond purchases by the
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central bank alter the volumes of assets of different maturities, and hence returns (equation (35)), which,
in turn, stimulate the economy through standard general equilibrium mechanisms (equation (37)).
3 The Results from the Calibrated Model
The model is employed to simulate the effects of specific QE programs in the US and in the UK. More
specifically, I focus my attention on QE2 in the US (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around $800
billion of purchases), and the first phase of the APF operations in the UK (from March 2009 to January
2010 - around £200 billion of purchases). As already mentioned, both phases were characterized exclu-
sively by purchases of medium- and long-term government securities (Figure 2 and Figure 3). Therefore,
it is possible to assess their effects using the model proposed in this paper. I simulate the impact of such
programs using a calibrated version of the model.
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, I log-linearized it around the steady-state. I solved the
model using both the MATLAB routine Gensys written by Christopher Sims, and Dynare developed by
Adjemian et al. (2011).11 In what follows, calibration issues are first discussed. I then analyze the results
of the baseline model. Lastly, a sensitivity analysis is performed, exploring the effects of varying the key
parameters of the model.
3.1 The Calibration
The benchmark model is calibrated to match quarterly data over the most recent period prior to the
financial crisis of 2008. Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, some steady-state values and the chosen
calibration values for the standard parameters. Some parameters are chosen following previous studies
and their calibrated value is quite standard in the literature. Among them: the elasticity of substitution
across goods θ, set equal to 6 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004); the habit formation parameter γ, set
equal to 0.7 (Smets and Wouters, 2007); the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ, set equal to 0.5,
which implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; the depreciation rate of capital δ calibrated to
0.025 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011), which implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital
equal to 10 percent; the share of capital in the production function α, set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005;
Altig et al., 2011); the parameter of the price adjustment cost φP, calibrated to 100 (Ireland, 2004); the
elasticity of real money balances χ, set equal to 7 (Marzo et al., 2008); the Frisch elasticity ψ, set equal
to 1.
The parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are calibrated in a standard way, with the
exception of αR, which is chosen very close to one, in order to prevent the short-term rate from responding
to inflation/output changes (reflecting a situation close to the ZLB), and, at the same time, to avoid
indeterminacy.
11The codes are available upon request as well as the appendices reporting the deterministic steady-state and the equations
of the log-linearized model.
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The AR coefficients and the standard deviations of the shocks are set to φA = 0.95, φG = φBL = 0.90,
σA = σBL = 0.01, σR = 0.005, σG = 0.012 (see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Kim,
2000; Andre´s et al., 2004; Altig et al., 2011; Falagiarda and Marzo, 2012; Zagaglia, 2013).
Some of the steady-states are obtained from the data, or following previous studies. Output is normal-
ized to 1. The consumption-output ratio has been set to 0.57. The share of the representative household’s
time endowment spent on paid work is set equal to 0.3. The steady-state value of the money-market
rate has been chosen identical for both countries, given the very similar recent trends of rates in the
US and the UK, obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data and the Bank of England Statistical
Interactive Database.
In order to simulate accurately the unconventional programs under consideration, the parameters
and steady-states related to the new mechanisms proposed in this paper should be carefully chosen.
Their values, reported in Table 3, are country-specific and significantly influence the impact of asset
purchase policies. The ratio of total debt to GDP, the ratio of debt at different maturities to total debt, and
the proportion of long-term debt held by households and the central bank, are obtained by combining
data from the OECD Statistical Database, the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, the Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database, and the Bank of England APF Gilt Operational Results Dataset, and
taking their values as they were just before the asset purchase shock occurred. In particular, the total debt
on GDP (B + BL) is the ratio of the total amount of marketable government debt to GDP. Short-term debt
(B) includes money-market instrument plus bonds with maturity up to one year. Long-term debt (BL) is
calculated by subtracting the amount of short-term debt from the total amount of debt.12
Also, the standard deviation of the asset purchase shock and the approximated duration of the shock
should be carefully set. The magnitude of the asset purchase shock has been chosen equal to 1 for the
US (i.e. there has been an increase of 100% in the long-term bonds held by the Fed during QE2), and 12
for the UK (i.e. the BoE increased its holding of long-term treasuries by 1200% during the first stage of
the APF operations).13 The duration of the asset purchase shock is approximated to be three quarters in
the US, and four quarters in the UK.
The two free parameters of the model, namely the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx and the
parameter of bond adjustment frictions φL, are not easily quantified. They are set equal, respectively, to
0.83, reflecting a medium-term exit strategy from QE (approximately six years after the asset purchase
shock), and 0.01, i.e. 1% of agents’ income is devoted to paying portfolio transaction costs. This
calibration is similar to that in Chen et al. (2012) (0.015), but diverges from those proposed by Andre´s
et al. (2004) (0.045), Harrison (2012a) (0.1), and Harrison (2012b) (0.09). I set a lower value for φL due
to the peculiar specification of portfolio adjustment costs in (7), which, being paid in terms of household’s
income, assume a slightly different interpretation with respect to the works mentioned above. In the next
paragraphs some sensitivity analysis on these parameters is conducted.
12A debatable assumption behind this calibration strategy is that the two countries were in the steady-state when their central
banks intervened.
13See Figure 2 and Figure 3.
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Finally, the values of the remaining parameters and steady-states are computed using the determinis-
tic steady-state solutions.
3.2 The Impact of Asset Purchases
The model impulse responses to an asset purchase shock are shown in Figure 5 for the US and in Figure
6 for the UK. The impulse response functions are shown as percentage deviations from the steady-state.
The simulated asset purchase shock in the US lasts for three quarters and its magnitude is such that
central bank’s long-term bond holdings double (left upper panel in Figure 5). This reduces the amount
of long-term bonds at the disposal of households by around 23 percent, a figure in line with the empirical
evidence. The reduction in long-term bond supply pushes down the long-term rate by 47 basis points.
Through the feedback mechanisms from the term structure to the macroeconomy, output and inflation
experience a substantial increase of 0.69 percent and 0.28 percent, respectively. Notice that the term
premium decreases almost as much as the long-term rate, given that the short-term rate, being constrained
at the ZLB, does not move substantially.14
Figure 6 shows that the asset purchase shock in the UK takes place over four quarters and leads to an
increase of 1200 percent of long-term bonds held by the central bank. As a result, long-term government
bonds held by households decrease by approximately 27 percent, leading to a reduction in the long-term
rate of 69 basis points. The positive effect on the macroeconomic variables is 1.25 percent for output and
0.49 percent for inflation.
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize these findings in annualized percentage rates in the Baseline row
of My calibrated model, reporting also analogous results obtained by previous studies using different
techniques. The results obtained from the calibrated version of the model proposed in this paper are
quite consistent with what has been previously found in the literature. More precisely, for the US the
effect on long-term yield, output and inflation seems to be slightly larger than that obtained in other
studies, whereas for the UK a bit smaller. A comparison with Harrison (2012a), who employs a similar
DSGE model, reveals that the results of the present model are closer to the empirical evidence coming
from empirical studies, especially as far as inflation is concerned. A substantial part of the differences
between my results and those found by Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison (2012a) can be ascribed to the
presence of the budget constraint with secondary market, which generates higher effects on output and
inflation in response to an asset purchase shock.15
Not surprisingly, given the different amount of assets purchased, the overall effect of large asset
purchases on the economy is found to be larger in the UK than in the US. However, this difference is not
as large as previously found in the literature.
14The term premium ξt is calculated as follows: ξt = RL,t − 1N
∑N−1
j=0 EtRt+ j Thus, the term premium represents deviations of
the long-term yield RL,t from the level consistent with the expectations hypothesis. It is assumed that the short-term rate Rt is a
proxy for the 3-month yield and the long-term rate RL,t for the 10-year rate. This implies that N = 40.
15The graphs regarding the model without the budget constraint with secondary market are available upon request from the
author.
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In order to gain intuition about some of the key mechanisms at work in the model, it is useful to
carry out a sensitivity analysis exercise. In particular, in what follows I analyze what happens when
changing, first, the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx, and then the parameter relative to the
portfolio adjustment frictions φL.
3.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of the Persistence of the Asset Purchase Shock
In the benchmark calibration, it has been arbitrarily assumed that central banks, after purchasing long-
term assets, undertake a medium term exit strategy, i.e. they wind down the program over the following
six years by selling the assets accumulated during the QE phases. To illustrate how results change
when varying the length of the exit strategy, Figure 7 and Figure 8 plot the impulse response functions
considering three different values of φx: the benchmark value (red line), a higher φx (0.88), which reflects
a longer exit strategy from QE of approximately eight years (green line), and a lower φx (0.76), which
corresponds to a faster exit strategy of around four years (blue line).
When the parameter relative to the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx increases, the persis-
tence of the response of the long-term yield increases as well, both for the US and the UK, while the
magnitude of the response does not change significantly. Importantly, as for the macroeconomic vari-
ables, not only the persistence of their response goes up, but also their impact effect. By contrast, a faster
exit strategy is associated with a lower effect on the macroeconomy. This is completely in line with what
is actually expected, since a longer exit strategy is likely to exert larger inflationary pressures, and a too
fast exit strategy to have instead marginal effects on the economy. The reason for that is the presence of
nominal rigidities, which lead firms to move their prices more (less) aggressively in response to a more
(less) persistent shock (Chen et al., 2012).
Moreover, inflation responds more strongly than output to changes in the length of the policy, a fact
consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2012), and due to the presence, again, of nominal rigidities
such as price stickiness. In particular, when prices are more (less) flexible, one would expect a higher
(lower) response of inflation to asset purchase shocks. Chen et al. (2012) note that “... higher price
flexibility shifts the adjustment in response to asset purchase programs from GDP growth to inflation, by
making its process more front-loaded.”16
The quantitative effects of the simulated asset purchase shock in annualized percentage rates for the
different persistence values are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. For the US, the effect on output is in
the range of 0.66%-1.27%, while the effect on inflation is found to be in the range 0.23%-0.59%. For
the UK, the effect on output is found to lie between 0.94% and 1.61%, and that on inflation between
0.30% and 0.73%. While these findings confirm that the effectiveness of such unconventional monetary
policies seems to have been more pronounced in the UK than in the US, they also highlight that their
predictions are subject to the uncertainty associated with the timing of the exit strategy from QE chosen
16A sensitivity analysis specifically conducted on φP confirms this statement. The graphs have not been reported for the sake
of space, but are available from the author upon request.
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by the monetary authority.
3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of Financial Frictions
As already noted, the magnitude of φL measures the extent of the impediments to the arbitrage behavior of
agents, and therefore the degree of imperfect asset substitutability between short- and long-term bonds.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 report the impulse response functions for the baseline case (red line), and the
cases with higher (0.02) and lower (0.005) portfolio adjustment costs (green and blue line, respectively).
As expected, higher frictions generate larger obstacles to the arbitrage behavior of investors, making
the two assets less substitutable. As a result, changes in the relative quantities of bonds held by house-
holds lead to a higher responsiveness of long-term yield. The macroeconomic effects are also amplified
when φL increases, and vice versa. UK variables seem to be less sensitive to changes in the parameter
φL in comparison with the US. A specific sensitivity exercise, whose results are not reported here, shows
that this is due to the different steady-state values of bond quantities between the two countries. The
results in annualized percentage changes for the different calibrations are contained in Table 4 and Table
5.
Lastly, it is worth noting that when there are no frictions at all (φL=0), the two assets become perfect
substitutes and a reduction in the supply of long-term bonds does not generate any effect on yields and
on the macroeconomy, as agents can simply increase their holdings of short-term bonds by the same
amount. In such a case, the identification of the portfolio rebalancing channel of large asset purchases
would not be possible.
3.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Constrained vs Unconstrained Policy Rate
In order to simulate recent large asset purchases as realistic as possible, the baseline calibration outlined
in paragraph 3.1 has imposed a constrained policy rate, i.e. the short-term interest rate is prevented
from reacting to macro developments. An interesting exercise consists in comparing the cases when the
policy rate is constrained and non-constrained. When the policy rate is allowed to follow a standard
Taylor rule, the effects of large asset purchases on the variables of interest are expected to be smaller.
In this case, the impact of large asset purchases is mitigated by the increase in the short-term rate due
to the prescriptions of the Taylor rule. In effect, the impulse response functions displayed in Figure 11
and Figure 12 confirm this conjecture. Thus, the stimulus provided to the economy by the simulated
asset purchases by the Fed and the BoE is significantly larger with a constrained policy rate (solid red
line) than with a free policy rate (dashed black line). As stressed by Harrison (2012a), this provides a
motivation for the implementation of large asset purchases by the central bank when the policy rate is
constrained by the ZLB.17
17A similar argument is discussed in Christiano et al. (2011), who show that the government-spending multiplier can be
much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a DSGE model capable of evaluating some of the effects of large purchases
of treasuries by central banks. The model exhibits imperfect asset substitutability and a feedback from
the term structure to the macroeconomy, both generated through the introduction of portfolio adjustment
frictions. As a result, the model is able to isolate a portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. Given the
novelties introduced, the theoretical framework proposed in this paper is more consistent with reality
than similar models in the literature (Chen et al., 2012; Harrison, 2012a,b). The model is employed
to evaluate the effects of recent specific large asset purchase programs in the US and in the UK. More
specifically, the focus has been on QE2 in the US (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around $800
billion of purchases), and the first phase of the APF operations in the UK (from March 2009 to January
2010 - around £200 billion of purchases). Both phases have been characterized exclusively by purchases
of medium- and long-term government securities.
The simulation results of the calibrated model are realistic and generally consistent with those ob-
tained in the literature using different techniques. However, the estimated macroeconomic effect in the
US has been found to be slightly larger than in previous studies, while in the UK a bit smaller. Overall,
the findings suggest that large asset purchases of government assets had substantial stimulating effects
both in terms of lower long-term yields and higher output and inflation in both countries. These effects
seem to be generally larger for the UK than for the US. This is not surprising, given that the size of
asset purchases characterizing the phases of QE under consideration has been larger, in relative terms,
in the UK rather than in the US. More specifically, my preferred model specification indicates that large
asset purchases of QE2 in the US had a peak effect on long-term rates in annualized terms of around -63
basis points, on the level of real GDP of 0.92%, and on inflation of 0.37 percentage points. In the UK,
the preferred model specification suggests that the first phase of the APF program had a peak effect on
long-term rates of -69 basis points, on the level of real GDP of 1.25%, and on inflation of 0.49 percentage
points. The empirical results are nonetheless subject to some uncertainty associated with the degree of
substitutability among assets of different maturities, and, more importantly, with the speed of the exit
strategy chosen by monetary authorities.
All in all, the most substantive contribution of this paper is to provide a new setting through which
the effects of large purchases of treasuries by central banks can be evaluated within a microfounded
macro framework with optimizing agents. This study points to further avenues for future research. First
of all, through the estimation of the model it would be possible to check whether actual data support the
theoretical framework. Moreover, the model can be easily extended in several directions, e.g. to include
an explicit and more structured central bank’s balance sheet, a wider term structure representation, or
different types of assets, such as corporate bonds. Lastly, it would be worth combining this framework
with those proposed by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Brendon et al. (2011),
Del Negro et al. (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), which, by introducing financial intermediaries,
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are able to isolate the credit channel of QE.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Steady-state values of some variables
Notation Description SS value
Y Output 1 (norm.)
C Consumption-output ratio 0.57
I Investment-output ratio 0.23
T/Y Taxes-output ratio 0.1972
L/(1 − L) Ratio of market to non-market activities 0.3
R Gross money-market rate 1.010
Table 2: Benchmark calibration of some parameters
Notation Description Benchmark value
Preferences and technology
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
β Intertemporal discount factor 0.994
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
χ Elasticity of money demand 7
ψ Elasticity of labor supply 1
γ Habit formation 0.7
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods 6
φP Price adjustment costs 100
Fiscal and monetary policy
ψ1 Fiscal policy response to short-term debt 0.3
ψ2 Fiscal policy response to long-term debt 0.3
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation 1.5
αY Monetary policy response to output 0
αR Monetary policy inertia 0.997
Autoregressive parameters
φA Technology shock 0.95
φG Government spending shock 0.90
φBL LT bonds shock 0.90
Standard deviations
σA Technology shock 0.01
σG Government spending shock 0.012
σR Monetary policy shock 0.005
σBL LT bonds shock 0.01
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Table 3: Calibration values of the key parameters and steady-states
Notation Description US UK
φL Portfolio adjustment frictions 0.01 0.01
B + BL Total debt on GDP 0.496 0.542
B Total ST debt on total debt 0.188 0.052
BL Total LT debt on total debt 0.308 0.490
BHL LT debt held by households 0.250 0.479
BCBL LT debt held by the CB 0.058 0.011
σx Magnitude of the asset purchases 1 12
φx Persistence of the asset purchases 0.831 0.831
Approximated duration of the shock 3Q 4Q
Notes: 1A persistence of 0.83 reflects an exit strategy of approximately 6 years.
Sources: The values are calculated by combining data from the OECD statistical database, the Federal Reserve
Statistical Release, the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database, and the Bank of England APF Gilt Op-
erational Results Dataset. Notice that they represent only approximations, given the difficulties of combining data
with different frequency.
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Table 4: Estimated effect of the LSAP2 on the LT rate,1 output and inflation (US - annualized)
Total impact Peak impact Peak impact
Study Method on LT Rate on Output on Inflation
KVJ (2011)2 Event study/regressions -33 bp - -
D’Amico et al. (2012) Regressions -55 bp - -
Chen et al. (2012) DSGE model -30 bp3 0.4% 0.05%
Chung et al. (2012) FRB/US model -20 bp3 0.6% 0.1%
My calibrated model Specification
Baseline -63 bp 0.92% 0.37%
High persistence (φx = 0.88) -61 bp 1.27% 0.59%
Low persistence (φx = 0.76) -65 bp 0.66% 0.23%
Higher frictions (φL = 0.02) -77 bp 1.57% 0.75%
Lower frictions (φL = 0.005) -46 bp 0.50% 0.17%
Notes: 110-year Treasury yield. 2Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). 3Effect on the risk premium.
Table 5: Estimated effect of the first phase of the APF on the LT rate,1 output and inflation (UK - annualized)
Total impact Peak impact Peak impact
Study Method on LT Rate on Output on Inflation
Glick and Leduc (2012) Event study -49 bp - -
Harrison (2012a) DSGE model -60 bp2 1.3% 0.13%
Joyce et al. (2011a) Event study -125 bp - -
Joyce et al. (2011b) SVAR - 1.5% 0.75%
Joyce et al. (2011b) Reduced form model - 1.5-2.5% 0.75-2.25%
Kapetanios et al. (2012) Time-series model - 1.5% 1.25%
Bridges and Thomas (2012) Time-series model - 2% 1%
My calibrated model Specification
Baseline -69 bp 1.25% 0.49%
High persistence (φx = 0.88) -66 bp 1.61% 0.73%
Low persistence (φx = 0.76) -71 bp 0.94% 0.30%
Higher frictions (φL = 0.02) -69 bp 1.31% 0.53%
Lower frictions (φL = 0.005) -68 bp 1.13% 0.41%
Notes: 110-year Treasury yield. 2 5-year rate.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Fed assets composition
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Figure 3: Evolution of BoE assets composition
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Figure 4: Cumulative BoE asset purchases by type (a) and cumulative gilts purchases by maturity (b)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Feb 2009 Feb 2010 Feb 2011 Feb 2012
£
 b
ill
io
n
s 
Private securities
Gilts
(a)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Feb 2009 Feb 2010 Feb 2011 Feb 2012
£
 b
ill
io
n
s 
25+ years
10-25 years
5-10 years
3-5 years
(b)
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock when varying the persistence of the shock
0 5 10 15 20
0
50
100
150
Central Bank LT Bond Holdings
0 5 10 15 20
−30
−20
−10
0
Households LT Bond Holdings
0 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Long−term Rate
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Term Premium
 
 
φ
x
=0.83 φ
x
=0.88 φ
x
=0.76
Figure 8: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock when varying the persistence of the shock
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock when varying bond transaction costs
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock when varying bond transaction costs
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock: constrained vs unconstrained ST rate
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock: constrained vs unconstrained ST rate
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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of ECB communications about unconventional monetary policy
operations on the perceived sovereign risk of Italy over the last five years. More than fifty
events concerning non-standard operations are identified and classified with respect to the
specific ECB program. The empirical results are derived from both an event-study analysis
and a GARCH framework, which uses Italian long-term bond futures to disentangle expected
from unexpected policy actions. We find that the ECB announcements about unconventional
monetary policies substantially reduced Italian long-term government bond yield spread
relative to German counterparts. Particularly, among the different types of measures, news
about the Securities Markets Programme and the Outright Monetary Transactions are found
to be effective in affecting the perceived sovereign risk of Italy.
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1 Introduction
As the recent financial crisis unfolded international investors became increasingly concerned with
the sustainability of government debt in a number of European countries. Long-term government
bond spreads relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries. In
particular, during the period 2008-2010 the Italian spread vis-a´-vis Germany widened to almost
200 basis points from about 30 basis points, the average level after the introduction of the
euro in 1999. Since the mid-2011, the Italian long-term government bond yield differential has
widened even more markedly reaching peaks of over 550 basis points in the late months of 2011
in connection with the Italian political crisis. Only at the end of 2012 the surge in the spread
calmed down approaching the 300 basis point level.
This unprecedented increase in euro area sovereign bond yield spreads reflects, inter alia,
growing concerns in financial markets about governments’ capacity to satisfy their future debt
obligations. In fact, an increasing spread indicates a significant risk premium that investors
demand when lending to a specific government, which, in turn, suffers the higher cost of bor-
rowing and a limited capacity to access capital markets. There is strong empirical evidence that
countries borrowing excessively, i.e. with a high debt-to-GDP ratio and/or with substantial fis-
cal deficits, are likely to face financial markets asking for higher default premia (Goldstein and
Woglom, 1991; Bayoumi et al., 1995; Schuknecht et al., 2009). This market-based mechanism of
fiscal discipline seems to have been switched off until the first half of 2008, when bond yields of
Italian government debt - and, more generally, of a number of other euro area countries - were
relatively close to the German ones (Figure 1).
[Figure 1 about here]
The reassessment and differentiation of country risk by financial markets can also be observed
by looking at the pattern of the Italian sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) premia (Figure
2). The time series evolves very similar to the Italian bond yield spread over the last five years
with a first substantial increase in the late 2008 and a dramatic hike starting from the mid of
2011. Recent contributions in the empirical literature (Attinasi et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2010;
Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Giordano et al., 2013) have found that the
widening of euro countries’ sovereign bond spreads relative to the German Bund observed during
the recent crisis is due both to countries’ fiscal positions and/or macroeconomic fundamentals,
and to more general factors such as liquidity risk, international risk aversion or contagion effects.
[Figure 2 about here]
Besides facing serious sovereign debt tensions, the euro area was earlier also severely stressed
by the breakdown of financial and interbank markets following Lehman Brothers’ collapse in
2008. To stop the meltdown of the financial system, governments, international and European
institutions proposed unprecedented unconventional measures, such as bank-rescue packages,
bailout agreements, and financial-support schemes. When it comes to monetary policy the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) as well as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England reduced
their key interest rates to historically low levels (Figure 3). In fact, the zero-lower bound (ZLB)
of interest rates quickly became a serious concern for monetary policy as conventional monetary
2
policy measures consisting of standard open market operations were unable to restore the func-
tioning of interbank markets. While the monetary authorities in the US and the UK intervened
by implementing unprecedented non-sterilized interventions often referred to as Quantitative
Easing (QE),1 the ECB adopted a less aggressive strategy by launching a number of temporary
non-standard measures and programs to face liquidity and sovereign debt problems. As a result
of non-standard monetary policies, the asset side of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England almost tripled in the last five years, whereas that of the ECB almost
doubled.
[Figure 3 about here]
While the effectiveness of unconventional monetary programs in the US and the UK has
been extensively analyzed,2 the evidence on the unconventional measures adopted by the ECB
is scarce. Existing contributions to the literature focused on the core variables of monetary
policy and investigated the effect of specific ECB unconventional policies on interbank rates
(Abbassi and Linzert, 2011), on covered bond markets (Beirne et al., 2011), on money market
rates (Angelini et al., 2011), on some monetary and credit variables (Giannone et al., 2011), on
bank credit volumes (Peersman, 2011), and on macroeconomic variables (Lenza et al., 2010).
Currently, however, there have been no studies on the impact of ECB unconventional monetary
measures on the perceived sovereign risk of euro area countries. In fact, important spillover
effects from monetary to fiscal policy may arise as extensive liquidity provision may reduce
the risk of government bailouts thereby decreasing expected future debt-to-GDP ratios. As
stressed by Gerlach et al. (2010) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), the role of domestic
banking sectors is crucial, with the financial system transforming global risk into sovereign
risk through two channels. First, in periods of financial stress banks should be recapitalized by
governments, increasing its fiscal liabilities. Second, poor banking liquidity limits lending flows to
private agents, exacerbating the recession and raising fiscal imbalances. The supporting spillover
effect provides a strong incentive for governments to demand a continuation of unconventional
monetary policy measures. This clearly contrasts with the central bank’s ultimate goals, if
the exit from non-standard measures is significantly postponed. To what extent these spillover
effects establish a policy trade-off is an empirical question.3
The paper aims at filling this gap by empirically investigating whether and to what extent
the unconventional monetary operations conducted by the ECB affected the Italian sovereign
risk premium. Focusing on the period between 2008 and 2012, we assess the effect of ECB com-
munications about unconventional monetary policies on the Italian spread vis-a´-vis Germany.4
More than fifty events (press conferences, press releases and speeches) concerning non-standard
monetary operations are identified and classified with respect to the relevant ECB program. A
1QE policies are discussed in several studies (Krugman, 1998; Svensson, 2003; Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004;
Orphanides, 2004; Borio and Disyatat, 2010; Joyce et al., 2012). These measures include purchases of treasuries,
private securities, direct loans to banks, households and companies, and extensions of existing lending facilities.
2See, for example, Klyuev et al. (2009), Meier (2009), Baumeister and Benati (2010), Blinder (2010), Doh
(2010), Neely (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011b), Kozicki et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Meaning and Zhu (2011), Swanson (2011), Bridges and Thomas (2012), Chen et al.
(2012), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), D’Amico et al. (2012), Glick and Leduc (2012), Hamilton and Wu
(2012), Joyce and Tong (2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Wright (2012), and Falagiarda (2013).
3In a sense, our work tries to open the black box of the transmission of extraordinary interventions.
4For a survey on the theory and evidence of central bank communications, see Blinder et al. (2008).
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comprehensive event-study analysis is conducted to observe the patterns of the Italian spread
within a narrow time interval around each ECB announcement. As a robustness check, GARCH
models are implemented to control for other factors than ECB communications affecting spread
movements, such as disruption in financial markets, credit risk developments, and the busi-
ness climate. Following Wright (2012), we isolate the surprise component of each central bank
announcement by using the futures of Italian long-term bonds.
The results suggest that ECB communications about unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures substantially decreased the perceived sovereign risk of Italy. Particularly, the events oc-
curring during the period 2010-2012 were more effective in reducing the Italian spread vis-a´-vis
Germany compared to events that took place at the onset of the crisis in 2008-2009. Not sur-
prisingly, among the different types of unconventional operations, those introduced specifically
to tackle sovereign debt tensions are found to be particularly effective in diminishing the Ital-
ian spread. These findings are important to guide monetary and fiscal policy in designing and
implementing future unconventional programs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the main non-
standard measures recently implemented by the ECB. In Section 3, we discuss the main channels
through which unconventional operations may affect financial markets and the economy. Section
4 and Section 5 report the empirical results from the event-study and the econometric analysis,
respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 ECB Unconventional Monetary Policies during the Crisis
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the ECB took a number of temporary non-
standard measures aimed mainly at restoring a proper functioning of interbank markets. In fact,
interbank markets were severely stressed due to solvency concerns, a consequent widespread
lack of confidence, and liquidity hoarding of market participants. Financial markets suffered
from substantial drawdowns as investors cut their exposures, with massive consequences for
the real sector of the economy. During this stage, ECB unconventional measures included:5
a) unlimited provision of liquidity through “fixed rate tenders with full allotment”, allowing
banks to get unlimited access to central bank liquidity at the main refinancing rate, subject
to appropriate collateral; b) extension of the list of eligible collateral assets for refinancing
operations; c) extension of the maturity of long-term refinancing operations, in order to reduce
uncertainty and improve liquidity conditions for banks; d) liquidity provision in foreign currencies
through swap lines with other central banks, in order to enhance banks’ foreign currency funding.
A comprehensive package of non-standard measures was adopted by the ECB in May 2009,
the Enhanced Credit Support (ECS), which reorganized the set of measures previously imple-
mented and added to them. The five pillars characterizing the ECS included the four types
of operations listed above plus a program of outright purchases of covered bonds, the so-called
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1). A further program of this kind was announced
in November 2011 (CBPP2). The goal of the two programs was to rekindle the functioning
of the covered bond market, constituting an essential source of banks’ refinancing. Figure 4
displays the amount of bonds purchased by the ECB under CBPP1 and CBPP2 over time.
5For more details, see de Haan et al. (2012).
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Under CBPP1, the ECB purchased euro-denominated covered bonds at a value of e60 billion
over the period between May 2009 and June 2010. The purchases of CBPP2 were conducted
between November 2011 and October 2012. The total amount of bonds acquired under CBPP2
was substantially smaller than under CBPP1.
A program specially designed to address sovereign-debt tensions was introduced by the ECB
in May 2010. The so-called Securities Market Programme (SMP) involved purchases of euro
area government bonds in the secondary markets, in order to ensure depth and liquidity in
those market segments that were dysfunctional. The impact of these interventions was sterilized
through specific operations to reabsorb the injected liquidity. Some details on the securities
acquired under the SMP have been released in February 2013 and are reported in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Approximately one half of the securities purchased by the ECB are Italian government bonds
with an average remaining maturity of 4.5 years. The timing of SMP purchases is depicted in
Figure 4, which shows that SMP operations have been carried out in two big waves, one in the
first half of 2010 and the other in the second half of 2011.
A further program aimed at responding to the turbulences surrounding the European sovereign-
debt crisis has been proposed in July 2012 and adopted in September 2012. According to this
program, labeled Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), once a government asks for financial
assistance, the ECB can purchase government-issued bonds maturing in 1 to 3 years, provided
that the bond-issuing country agrees to specific domestic measures (the so-called conditionality
principle). The declared objective of the program is to safeguard “an appropriate monetary pol-
icy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy” by lowering bond yields, especially
at the long end of the yield curve, and thus reducing borrowing costs for countries and providing
confidence to investors in the sovereign-bond markets. Also in this case, the liquidity created
through the OMT is fully sterilized. Notice that, at the end of 2012, no OMT purchases were car-
ried out yet. Thus, it can be argued that so far OMT was communication without intervention,
in contrast with SMP that, being little transparent, was intervention without communication.
To gauge the effectiveness of different ECB unconventional operations, we classify them into
seven categories:
• Liquidity provisions in foreign currencies through swap lines with other central banks
(FOR).
• Unlimited provisions of liquidity through fixed rate tenders with full allotment for the
main refinancing operations (FRTFA).
• Extensions of the list of collateral assets (COLL).
• Operations concerning long-term refinancing operations, such as extension of the maturity,
new special long-term refinancing operations, and introduction of fixed rate tenders with
full allotment (LTRO).
• Outright purchases of covered bonds (CBPP).
• Purchases of government bonds carried out under the Securities Market Programme (SMP).
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• Purchases of government bonds carried out under the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT).
This classification is used throughout the empirical part of the paper, where the effects of
ECB non-standard operations are investigated. As long as financial markets are informationally
efficient, the effect of monetary policies on asset prices occurs via changes of market expec-
tations, typically at times when they are disclosed to market participants. We use the term
announcement (or event) to refer to any means by which an unconventional policy decision was
communicated to financial markets by the ECB, including press conferences, press releases and
speeches. Table 2 reports all the events identified related to unconventional operations over the
period 2008-2012. For each event we report the day and the exact time when it was announced,
the type of the announcement, the nature of the measure announced, and a brief description.
[Table 2 about here]
3 The Channels of Unconventional Monetary Policies
In the literature, a number of different channels are reported through which ECB announcements
may have affected the Italian spread. However, we decided to abstain from restricting the
empirical model, which would imply a test of a specific transmission channel. Instead, we
opt for a more general framework attempting to quantify the overall impact of ECB policy
news regarding unconventional measures in the last five years. Nevertheless, in this section we
briefly review the transmission mechanisms of unconventional monetary policies. First of all,
unconventional monetary policies may affect asset prices and the real economy via the signaling
channel emphasizing the role of expectations of private agents. In particular, central bank
announcements are likely to exert their effects on financial markets through their influence on
agents’ expectations of future economic conditions and policy actions.
Another important channel of unconventional monetary policies is the so called portfolio
rebalancing channel according to which purchases carried out by a central bank imply a rebal-
ancing of investors’ portfolios.6 A necessary condition is the imperfect substitutability among
different assets, i.e. assets are not perceived as perfect substitutes by investors.7 By purchas-
ing a particular security, the monetary authority reduces the amount of that security held by
private agents usually in exchange of risk-free reserves. As a result, the asset price increases
and the interest rate falls, creating more favorable conditions for economic recovery through the
traditional monetary transmission mechanisms.8
Unconventional measures may then influence the economic system through the liquidity
premia channel, also labeled market functioning channel. In a crisis like the one occurred after
6The portfolio balance approach was first described by Tobin (1958).
7Imperfect substitutability may emerge when agents are risk-averse and different assets have different risk
characteristics, or when investors have “preferred habitats” (Vayanos and Vila, 2009).
8The reduction in yields is driven by a reduction of the risk premium, which may consist of different components.
For instance, if the central bank purchases long-term government securities, it removes assets with high maturity
from the market, i.e. high duration risk. Thus, less duration risk leads the market to require a lower term premium
to bear that risk (Gagnon et al., 2011). A central bank engaging in purchases of private assets is also able to
affect the premium associated with credit and liquidity risk. Whatever the effect at work, the likely outcome is
a decrease in interest rates. A detailed analysis of all the determinants of the portfolio rebalancing channel is
contained in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).
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the demise of Lehman Brothers, markets are characterized by poor liquidity and, therefore, high
liquidity risk premia on specific assets. The presence of a central bank acting as a protagonist
in the markets could substantially improve market functioning and reduce liquidity risk premia.
This new role of the central bank may make investors more prone to behave actively in the
markets, knowing that they may sell assets to the monetary authority if necessary.
Non-standard monetary measures consisting of asset purchases, special loans, and extension
of existing lending facilities are mostly financed by the creation of new central bank’s reserves.
Therefore, commercial banks experience an increase in their reserve balances at the central
bank. This could promote an expansion of lending opportunities by banks. Through this credit
channel, or bank lending channel, banks may provide more loans to households and companies,
fostering consumption and investment spending.
How do ECB non-standard measures fit into this classification? All the types of unconven-
tional operations implemented by the ECB may potentially signal future intentions and future
economic developments (signaling channel), improve overall market functioning (liquidity premia
channel) and work through the credit channel. However, only purchases of securities (CBPP,
SMP, OMT) are able to affect financial markets and the economy through the portfolio rebalanc-
ing channel, which has been found to be one of the most important channels of unconventional
monetary policies in the US and in the UK (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2011a). Therefore,
we might expect these latter programs to exert a larger impact on the Italian spread vis-a´-vis
Germany than the other ones, as they may affect asset prices via a wider set of transmission
channels. This conjecture is strengthened by the fact that the SMP and OMT have been intro-
duced with the declared objective to fight the sovereign debt tensions of the euro area. As a
result, the signaling and liquidity effects might be amplified in comparison with other kinds of
non-standard operations.
Beyond these traditional transmission channels, the ECB unconventional measures aimed
at improving the functioning of interbank markets (FOR, FRTFA, COLL, LTRO, CBPP) may
influence government bond spreads via banks’ balance sheets. As stressed by Arghyrou and
Kontonikas (2012), the role of domestic banking sectors is crucial, with the financial system
transforming global risk into sovereign risk through two channels. First, in periods of financial
stress banks should be recapitalized by governments, increasing its fiscal liabilities. Second, poor
banking liquidity limits lending flows to private agents, exacerbating the recession and raising
fiscal imbalances. Gerlach et al. (2010) show that during the height of the current crisis, up to
almost one percentage point of euro area sovereign spreads can be explained by these banking
related factors. Thus, the effect of unconventional operations designed to improve the health of
interbank markets may help reduce the sovereign risk of a country.
4 An Event-Study Analysis
In this section, we perform an event-study analysis of ECB communications of unconventional
monetary policy operations. In particular, we adopt a strategy similar to those recently used
in Neely (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Glick
and Leduc (2012) to study the effect of non-standard measures implemented by the Federal Re-
serve. More specifically, we focus on changes in the Italian spread around ECB communications
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concerning non-standard monetary policy measures. Inspired by Craine and Martin (2008), we
first report in Table 3 the standard deviations of daily spread changes (in basis points) for event
and non-event days over the entire period 2008-2012 as well as over each individual year. Since
more than half of our events occurred on Thursdays, we also calculate the standard deviation of
daily spread changes for non-event Thursdays and non-event Governing Council meeting days
(usually Thursdays).
[Table 3 about here]
As for the entire sample period, the figures show that the standard deviation of spread
changes on event days is more than twice that on non-event days and Thurdays, and is still
substantially larger than that on non-event Governing Council meeting days, stressing the im-
portance of ECB announcements of unconventional measures on spread movements. Moreover,
the volatility of spread changes has generally increased over time for event days, non-event days
and non-event Thursdays. Lastly, the difference in volatility between event and non-event days
in 2008 and 2009 was less pronounced than in the subsequent years suggesting that ECB com-
munications of unconventional operations had a higher impact on the spread in 2010-2012 than
in 2008-2009.
The third column of Table 4 presents daily changes in the Italian spread on each ECB an-
nouncement day, as well as the cumulative and average effect over all announcements. Moreover,
it shows the cumulative and average effect when distinguishing events by year and type of the
operation. The cumulative spread changes are considered as a measure for the overall effects.
Basis points spread changes are measured using a one-day window, and are calculated as the
difference between the closing spread value on the event day and the closing spread value on the
day before. Moreover, we also report pseudo p-values defined as the proportion of daily changes
during the period 2008-2012 that are larger in absolute value than the actual change on the
announcement day (Neely, 2010; Glick and Leduc, 2012).
[Table 4 about here]
The figures reported in the third column of Table 4 indicate that the cumulative effect of
ECB announcements on the Italian spread was a reduction of around 200 basis points, which
amounts to an average reduction for each announcement of 3.7 basis points. If we distinguish
events by year, the cumulative effect is substantially higher in 2010-2012 than in 2008 and 2009.
In particular, whereas events happening in 2008 even exhibit a positive cumulative effect on the
spread,9 2010 is the year with the highest cumulative and average effect in absolute value. By
considering the nature of the operations announced, we can verify that SMP events feature the
highest cumulative and average effect on the Italian spread, followed by the OMT and CBPP.
The figures regarding FOR announcements show a large cumulative effect, but a rather small
average effect. FRTFA and COLL events are instead associated with a negligible impact on the
spread, both in terms of cumulative and average effect.
By extending the event window to two days (from the closing level of the spread on the day
before to that on the day after the announcement), as in Neely (2010), we allow for delayed
9In Section 5 we provide some intuition for this empirical result.
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reactions to news by market participants. The results are reported in the fourth column of Ta-
ble 4. The pseudo p-values are now defined as the proportion of two-day spread changes during
the period 2008-2012 that are larger in absolute value than the actual two-day change on the
announcement day. The findings show that there has been a general increase (in absolute value)
in the cumulative and average effects in comparison with a one-day window, both considering
all the events and the events distinguished by year and type, suggesting a delayed reaction of
financial market participants to ECB news. More specifically, the two-day window analysis im-
plies a cumulative effect of all events of approximately minus 286 basis points. Except for events
in 2010, the cumulative and average impact of ECB announcements is amplified substantially
for all the years compared to the one-day window case. Also, these considerations remain valid
when distinguishing the events by type, except for events related to CBPP operations.
Lastly, a different two-day window is adopted (from the closing level of the spread on the
second day prior to the announcement to that on the day of the announcement) to better
capture possible anticipation effects. The results are presented in the last column of Table 4.
They indicate that ECB news have been generally subjected to some anticipation effect. In fact,
the cumulative spread changes for all events are much higher in absolute value than using a
one-day window, i.e. around minus 329 basis points. The same pattern is observable by looking
at the cumulative and average effects when announcements are distinguished by year and type,
with the exception of COLL events.
This section has provided some evidence on the effectiveness of ECB announcements of
non-standard operations in reducing the Italian spread. The results are consistent with the
idea that there were delayed market adjustments as well as a certain degree of anticipation
by market participants. However, it is worth emphasizing some general limitations of event-
study analyses. As has been stressed in the literature, it is necessary to assume that markets
are informationally efficient, i.e. the majority of the impact of ECB unconventional policies
on the spread does not occur when operations are actually implemented, but when market
expectations about those measures are formed. Hence, the choice of the event window length
is crucial, since it involves a trade-off between keeping the interval narrow to avoid the noise
produced by extraneous information, and choosing a wider window to identify potential delayed
and/or anticipated reactions of market participants. For this reason, the results obtained using
two-day windows are, on the one hand, less accurate in comparison with those obtained using a
one-day window, as extending the event window increases necessarily the noise in the estimates
of the announcement effect. On the other hand, they are able to better capture market reactions
that are incorporated with delay and/or anticipation in asset prices. The difficulties to identify
accurately other relevant news affecting the spread and the anticipation effects of agents may
potentially generate biases in the estimates of spread changes. Therefore, a more formal analysis
is needed to better gauge the relationship between ECB news and the perceived Italian sovereign
risk. In the next section, we use time-series econometrics to tackle these issues by controlling
for expectations of market participants and for other factors that could affect the Italian spread
vis-a´-vis Germany.
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5 The Time-Series Analysis
5.1 The Surprise Content of ECB Announcements
Since the expected part of monetary policy decisions is already priced into the market before a
central bank announcement, it is only the surprise component that drives movements in yields
(Kuttner, 2001; Fracasso et al., 2003). Therefore, to avoid the estimation bias that may arise
from anticipated monetary policy decisions it is necessary to isolate the surprise component of
monetary policy announcements. Moreover, the change in monetary policy could actually reflect
the authorities’ response to asset price developments. As stressed by Rigobon and Sack (2004),
the causality between monetary policy decisions and asset prices runs in both directions. This
endogeneity may introduce a significant bias in empirical estimations. To mitigate this problem
it is useful to employ high-frequency data and focus on a narrow time interval around the policy
decision. By shrinking the time period around the announcement, it becomes more likely that
the monetary policy shock is the predominant driver of asset prices within that time window.
If the variance of the monetary policy shock becomes infinitely large relative to the variances of
the other disturbances, then the bias goes to zero (Rigobon and Sack, 2004).
Incorporating these considerations, we construct a monetary policy surprise indicator by
adopting the technique recently proposed by Wright (2012) and employed by Glick and Leduc
(2012). In particular, Wright (2012) uses intra-daily data on medium- and long-term interest
rate bond futures to identify the surprise component of Federal Reserve announcements during
the recent zero-lower-bound period. Futures prices are a natural and market-based proxy for
expectations of central bank policy actions, and, therefore, have been frequently used in the
literature to isolate monetary policy surprise shocks (Kuttner, 2001; Fleming and Piazzesi, 2005;
Gu¨rkaynak, 2005; Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2005a,b; Mirkov, 2011).10 It is worth noting that, by
quantifying the communications’ variable, it is also possible to better assess both the direction
and magnitude of the shock in comparison with models employing dummy variables.
In the present paper, the monetary policy surprise shock is computed as yield changes of
Italian long-term bond futures (EUREX-Euro BTP futures index) from 15 minutes before each
ECB announcement to 1 hour and 45 minutes afterwards.11 As in Wright (2012), yield changes
are constructed as returns on the futures contract divided by the duration of the cheapest-
to-deliver asset in the deliverable basket. Since EUREX futures on Italian government bonds
have been introduced in September 2009, for events occurring earlier we employ EUREX-Euro
Bund futures. This choice is justified by the fact that until the first months of 2010 Italian
and German long-term bond futures prices have been very highly correlated. For comparison
purposes, the monetary policy surprise indicator has been scaled to have a standard deviation
of one. Positive changes in the index of BTP future prices are associated with positive values
of the surprise indicator, while negative movements with negative values. The monetary policy
surprise indicator for each ECB announcement of unconventional operations is reported in the
10Other ways to identify the unanticipated component of monetary policy announcements include the use of
polls on market participant expectations (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2003, 2004, 2007a,b) and newspaper articles
(Rosa, 2012).
11As stressed by Wright (2012), the selection of a quite wide window is supported by the fact that the events
under scrutiny represent the interpretation of statements and speeches, as opposed as specific numerical values.
Therefore, markets need more time to digest the new information and a relatively wide window is more suitable.
Nevertheless, the use of narrower windows provides very similar results.
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last column of Table 2.
5.2 The Econometric Methodology
This sub-section investigates, through the lenses of time-series econometrics, whether and to
what extent ECB communications of non-standard operations have been capable of influencing
the spread between the Italian and German long-term government bonds. More specifically,
we investigate the effect of communications on the spread in a standard GARCH framework,
originally proposed by Bollerslev (1986) to model time-varying volatility.12 The conditional
mean of the model is an augmented autoregressive process where both the lagged endogenous
variables as well as the monetary policy surprise indicator are statistically insignificant for lag
orders exceeding two and were omitted for reasons of parsimony:
∆St = α+
2∑
i=1
βi∆St−i +
2∑
i=0
γiUNCt−i + δ∆Xt + εt, (1)
where ∆St is the first difference of spread between Italian and German government bonds,
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UNCt is the monetary policy surprise indicator calculated as explained in the previous subsec-
tion, and Xt represents a vector of controls. The lags of the monetary policy surprise indicator
are introduced to capture possible delayed reactions of markets participants to non-conventional
event shocks. Let the error process be such that εt = νt
√
ht, where νt is an i.i.d. sequence with
zero mean and σ2ν = 1. The conditional variance of εt is modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process:
ht = c+ aε
2
t−1 + bht−1. (2)
The vector of control variablesXt includes: a) A volatility index for the euro area (EuroV IXt)
to control for financial turmoil, as in Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Glick and Leduc
(2012). We expect a positive relationship between ∆St and ∆EuroV IXt. b) The total stock
market index for the EU (EUDSt) to control for market-wide business climate changes in the
EU, as in De Bruyckere et al. (2012). We expect a negative sign for the coefficient of EUDSt in
the model. c) The TED spread (TEDt), calculated as the three-month LIBOR rate less the US
Treasury bill rate, to control for perceived credit risk in the global economy, as in Gerlach et al.
(2010). The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is positive. d) The credit default
swap (CDS) of Greece (CDSGreecet) to control for the turbulences due to the Greek sovereign
crisis. We expect a positive relationship between this variable and the Italian spread.14 Lastly,
we also added a dummy variable (MPEt) to account for the fact that five unconventional events
listed in Table 2 coincide with a reduction of the key ECB interest rates.
12The estimation of a GARCH-M model reveals that the conditional volatility does not help to explain the
spread, a finding in line with Taylor (1992). The results are available from the authors upon request.
13As in Gerlach et al. (2010), Attinasi et al. (2011), and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012).
14Due to statistical insignificance, a proxy for international risk aversion has been omitted from the analysis.
This finding is in line with the evidence in Kozicki et al. (2011). Also, Bund futures turnover as a proxy for
liquidity conditions has been found not to be statistically significant. Lastly, the presence of day dummies does
not produce any substantial change in the results.
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Parameters are estimated by (quasi-) maximum likelihood using the Broyden, Fletcher, Gold-
farb and Shanno (BFGS) numerical algorithm with robust standard errors. The model is esti-
mated using daily data obtained from the Thomson Reuters-Datastream database, covering the
period 01:01:2008-31:12:2012. Details on the data employed in the analysis are reported in the
Appendix.
5.3 The Results
The sample period from 2008 to 2012 covers both the global financial crisis as well as the
European government debt crisis giving rise to the possibility of a different sovereign bond
market reaction to ECB announcements. For instance, the zero-lower bound of interest rate was
virtually reached only in the mid of 2009, and markets were repeatedly disappointed during 2008
following ECB refusals to move interest rates, while other central banks were cutting aggressively
their policy rates. In this context, non-standard operations may have had undesired effects on
market participants’ behavior, as events perceived as a loosening of monetary policy could have
been mainly considered by agents as a herald of unfavorable economic news (e.g. worsening
macroeconomic outlook and increasing uncertainty), rather than a credible commitment by the
ECB to improve market liquidity. This, in turn, may have raised the risk premium on Italian
long-term treasuries and/or reduced German Bund rates within a ’flight to quality’ context.
In early 2010, markets were again worrying about excessive national debt and demanded
higher risk premia from countries with elevated debt levels, budget deficits and current account
deficits. Of course, this further complicates the financing of budget deficits and servicing existing
bonds, particularly when GDP growth was shrinking. On May, 8th, 2010, the EU launched the
European Financial Stability Facility constructed to maintain financial market stability in the
euro area by issuing financial assistance to threatened member states. This coincides with a
structural break in the linear relationship between the spread change and the above mentioned
regressors. A formal Chow break test reveals a highly significant F-statistic of 47.27 suggesting
to estimate the GARCH models in two sub-samples, the first ranging from January, 2nd, 2008
to May, 7th, 2010 and the second ranging from May, 10th, 2010 to December, 31st, 2012.
Table 5 reports the parameter estimates of the GARCH model in equation (1) and (2).
Ljung-Box (LB) Q-statistics were computed to test for remaining autocorrelation in standardized
and squared standardized residuals. The p-values of the calculated LB-Q values show that
the null hypothesis of no-autocorrelation up to five and ten orders cannot be rejected. The
estimated coefficients of the variance equation are statistically significant at conventional levels
(not reported here), revealing clustering and long memory of the spread volatility. From these
observations we can conclude that GARCH models are reasonably specified. Turning to the
estimates of the mean equation, we find that, in the first sub-sample, the sign of the control
variables are as expected and statistically significant. For example, a one percent increase of
the European risk measure EuroV IXt increases the Italian government bond spread by 28 basis
points. To a lesser extent, the spread also reacts positively to changes of the global risk measure
TEDt. In contrast, an improved economic outlook (EUDSt) removes some pressure from Italian
bonds. The figures also suggest some contagion effects from the Greek government debt crisis.
Not surprisingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable MPEt is negative, although statistically
significant only at the ten percent level. With the transition to the second sub-sample, only
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EUDSt and CDSGreecet remain significant.
[Table 5 about here]
The estimates of the monetary policy indicator are negative and highly significant in the
second sub-sample suggesting that positive monetary policy surprises associated with ECB non-
standard operations led to a substantial daily decline in the Italian spread. More precisely, a
one standard deviation monetary policy surprise is estimated to lower the spread by around
13 basis points.15 Since the coefficient of the surprise indicator is not subsequently reversed
(as indicated by lower coefficient values for lags) our analysis suggests a permanent impact of
monetary policy on the Italian government bond spread. In line with the above argumentation
leading to a structural break in early 2010 we find an adverse influence of ECB non-standard
operations in the first sub-sample. Consistently with the findings of the event-study analysis,
monetary policy surprises are positively correlated with the spread before the structural break
occurred, and negatively in the remaining years. Besides the above mentioned argumentation
leading to the sub-sample estimation, which highlights the potential role of risk premium move-
ments and expected - but not implemented - policy rate cuts, unconventional events right after
the start of the crisis were mainly supplementary long-term refinancing operations and new
liquidity-providing operations in foreign currency, which, as we will show in Table 7, do not
exhibit any significant relationship with the Italian government bond spread. While confirming
our approach, these results stress the importance of the prevailing market environment when
predicting the influence of ECB policy measures.
Table 6 provides a more detailed view by distinguishing positive from negative monetary
policy surprises. This is done by interacting the surprise monetary indicator with 0,1-dummies
for positive and negative changes.
[Table 6 about here]
In the first sub-sample, positive surprises are associated with an increase in the spread,
whereas negative surprises with a reduction generally reproducing the results of Table 5. It
should be mentioned, however, that positive surprises exhibit a much larger influence on spreads
than negative surprises, although coefficients are now not significant or only borderline signifi-
cant. In the second sub-sample, we find a more symmetric contemporaneous influence of mone-
tary surprises. A one standard deviation surprise affects the spread on average by 13 basis points
in the expected direction. In case of negative shocks the impact is substantially diminished over
the next trading day.
Within the event study analysis of section 4 we showed that the effect of ECB non-standard
operations on the Italian spread seems to differ over time and across types of measure. While
the sub-sample estimation of the GARCH model confirmed the time variation of results, we
additionally check the robustness of the event study findings by distinguishing the policy events
by typology. Due to the fact that some policy measures such as purchases of government bonds
15As stressed by Glick and Leduc (2012), the procedure to calculate the policy surprises does not ensure that a
positive surprise will lower the Italian spread and a negative surprise will increase it. Since the surprise component
is obtained using the futures on long-term Italian government bonds, the indicator is able to capture only the
expectations of agents about ECB announcements. Long-term bond yields, and consequently the spread, can also
be affected by other factors such as risk and term premia.
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carried out under the Securities Market Programme or the Outright Monetary Transactions only
occur in the second sub-sample we also provide a full-sample estimation.16 Moreover, lags of
higher than first order remain statistically insignificant and are skipped for parsimony. The
estimation results are represented in Table 7.
[Table 7 about here]
From inspection of the full-sample estimation, we find that the ECB programs specially
designed to improve conditions in euro area sovereign bond markets, i.e. the SMP and OMT,
turn out to be most effective in influencing the Italian spread. A one standard deviation increase
in the monetary policy indicator for these two programs is associated with a reduction in the
spread of around 15-17 basis points. The coefficient of announcements of CBPP events is
concurrently also negative and statistically significant, but is overcompensated by a significant
reversal on the following trading day. Lastly, there is no evidence that measures aimed at
expanding the collateral have affected the interest rate differential, a result that remains valid
for the other three types of non-standard monetary policy measures. When looking at the second
sub-sample the following results are worth mentioning. Compared to the first column of Table
7 the coefficient of events related to the extension of the collateral for banks becomes strongly
statistically significant. According to these figures, COLL communications were even more
effective in affecting the Italian spread than OMT events. Announcements of policies regarding
foreign currency agreements, long-term refinancing operation and fixed rate tenders with full
allotment are confirmed to play no role in spread movements. All in all, we found only weak
evidence that news on measures specifically introduced to improve liquidity in banking markets
were able to affect the Italian sovereign spread. These findings are somewhat in contrast to
the hypothesis in Gerlach et al. (2010), and are probably related to the relative soundness of
the Italian banking sector during the recent crisis. In fact, in countries with a relatively less
vulnerable banking sector, aggregate risk fluctuations are likely to exert a smaller influence on
sovereign risk movements via this banking channel.
6 Concluding Remarks
As the perceived sovereign risk of Italy started to increase in 2008, the differential between
the Italian long-term government bond yields and their German counterparts widened to un-
precedented levels since the introduction of the euro. At the same time, the European Central
Bank launched a series of non-standard operations and programs aimed at restoring the proper
functioning of interbank and financial markets, but also influencing the euro area sovereign debt
problems. This paper has investigated how ECB announcements of unconventional operations
affected the Italian spread vis-a´-vis Germany during the last five years. We have explored this
relationship empirically through an event-study as well as a time series analysis. The results from
the event-study indicate that ECB communications about non-standard operations were able
to reduce the sovereign solvency risk of Italy. Moreover, events taking place during the period
2010-2012 were more effective in shrinking the Italian spread vis-a´-vis Germany in comparison
16News on CBPP operations only occur twice in the second sub-sample rendering parameter estimates unreli-
able. Thus, we skipped this variable from estimation.
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with events occurring at the onset of the crisis in 2008-2009. Lastly, announcements of opera-
tions regarding the Covered Bond Purchase Programmes, the Securities Market Programme, and
Outright Monetary Transactions are associated with a much stronger and significant reduction
of the differential between Italian and German long-term bond yields as compared with other
kinds of unconventional measures. By controlling for market participants’ expectations and other
factors, the findings from the econometric analysis confirm that ECB announcements of uncon-
ventional measures influenced significantly the Italian spread in the last five years. In addition,
events happening in 2010-2012 and those related to the Securities Market Programme, Outright
Monetary Transactions, and, to some extent, Extensions of Eligible Assets were remarkably
powerful in affecting the yield differential. From a policy-making point of view, this paper has
shown that the way the ECB ’bought time’ during the last five years has been successful in
downsizing the euro area sovereign debt crisis, at least for Italy.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Details on securities holdings acquired under the SMP
Issuer country Outstanding amounts Average remaining maturity
Nominal amount Book value (in years)
(ebillion) (e billion)
Greece 33.9 30.8 3.6
Ireland 14.2 13.6 4.6
Italy 102.8 99.0 4.5
Portugal 22.8 21.6 3.9
Spain 44.3 43.7 4.1
Total 218.0 208.7 4.3
Notes: The table shows the breakdown of the Eurosystems SMP holdings as at 31 December 2012, per
country of issuer, indicated at nominal value, book value and average remaining maturity. Source: ECB
Press Release, 21 February 2013.
Table 2: ECB unconventional monetary policy programs announcements
Date Time
(CET)
Event Type Description Monetary
surprise
10/01/2008 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to conduct US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
-0.089
07/02/2008 2:30 pm PC LTRO The GovC decided to renew two outstanding supplementary
longer-term refinancing operations
-0.088
11/03/2008 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to conduct US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
0.040
28/03/2008 3:00 pm PR LTRO The GovC decided to conduct supplementary longer-term re-
financing operations
-0.101
02/05/2008 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to enhance US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
-0.355
30/07/2008 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to enhance US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
0.125
31/07/2008 3:00 pm PR LTRO The GovC decided to renew two outstanding supplementary
longer-term refinancing operations
0.229
04/09/2008 2:30 pm PC LTRO The GovC decided to renew three outstanding supplementary
longer-term refinancing operations
-0.175
18/09/2008 9:00 am PR FOR The GovC decided to enhance US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
0.114
26/09/2008 8:00 am PR FOR The GovC decided to enhance US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
0.357
29/09/2008 4:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to double the temporary swap lines with
the Fed
0.444
07/10/2008 2:15 pm PR LTRO,
FOR
The GovC decided to enhance a longer-term refinancing op-
eration and expand US dollar liquidity-providing operations
-0.051
08/10/2008* 1:00 pm PR FRTFA The GovC decided to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure with
full allotment
-0.406
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Table 2: (continued)
13/10/2008 8:00 am PR FOR The GovC decided to conduct US dollar liquidity-providing
operations
-0.334
15/10/2008 3:00 pm PR COLL,
LTRO,
FOR
The GovC decided to expand the list of assets eligible as col-
lateral, enhance the provision of longer-term refinancing op-
erations, and provide US dollar liquidity through foreign ex-
change swaps
-0.367
18/12/2008 3:00 pm PR FRTFA The GovC decided that the main refinancing operations will
continue to be carried out through a fixed rate tender proce-
dure with full allotment for as long as needed
0.360
19/12/2008 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to continue conducting US dollar liquidity-
providing operations
0.066
03/02/2009 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements
with the Fed
-0.337
05/03/2009* 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GpvC decided to continue the fixed rate tender procedure
with full allotment for all main refinancing operations, special-
term refinancing operations and supplementary and regular
longer-term refinancing operations for as long as needed
-0.056
19/03/2009 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to continue conducting US dollar liquidity-
providing operations
-0.226
06/04/2009 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to establish a temporary reciprocal cur-
rency arrangement (swap line) with the Fed
0.125
07/05/2009* 2:30 pm PC,
PR
LTRO,
CBPP
The GovC decided to proceed with the ECS. In particular, the
GovC decided to purchase euro-denominated covered bonds
issued in the euro area, and to conduct liquidity-providing
longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of one year
-0.295
04/06/2009 2:30 pm PC CBPP The GovC decided upon the technical modalities of the
CBPP1
-0.544
25/06/2009 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements
with the Fed
0.030
24/09/2009 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to continue conducting US dollar liquidity-
providing operations
0.245
03/12/2009 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as is needed, and to enhance the provision of longer-
term refinancing operations
0.036
04/03/2010 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as is needed, and to return to variable rate tender
procedures in the regular 3-month longer-term refinancing op-
erations
0.247
10/05/2010 Night
09/05
PR SMP,
FOR,
LTRO
The GovC decided to proceed with the SMP, to reactivate
the temporary liquidity swap lines with the Fed, to adopt a
fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment in the regular
3-month longer-term refinancing operations, and to conduct
new special longer-term refinancing operations
2.695
10/06/2010 2:30 pm PC LTRO The GovC decided to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure with
full allotment in the regular 3-month longer-term refinancing
operations
-0.010
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Table 2: (continued)
02/09/2010 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
-0.029
02/12/2010 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
-0.043
17/12/2010 3:00 pm PR FOR The ECB announced a temporary swap facility with the Bank
of England
-0.019
21/12/2010 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements
with the Fed
0.106
03/03/2011 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
-0.456
09/06/2011 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
0.151
29/06/2011 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements
with the Fed
-0.133
04/08/2011 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, to conduct 3-month longer-term re-
financing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment, and to conduct a liquidity-providing supplemen-
tary longer-term refinancing operation with a maturity of six
months as a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment
0.012
08/08/2011 Night
07/08
PR SMP The GovC decided to actively implement its Securities Mar-
kets Programme for Italy and Spain
4.815
25/08/2011 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangement
with the Bank of England
-0.074
15/09/2011 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to conduct three US dollar liquidity-
providing operations in coordination with other central banks
0.043
06/10/2011 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO,
CBPP
The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, to conduct 3-month longer-term re-
financing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment, to conduct two liquidity-providing supplementary
longer-term refinancing operation with a maturity of twelve
and thirteen months as a fixed rate tender procedure with
full allotment, and to launch a new covered bond purchase
program (CBPP2)
-0.011
03/11/2011* 3:00 pm PR CBPP The GovC decided upon the technical modalities of CBPP2 -0.138
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Table 2: (continued)
30/11/2011 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided in cooperation with other central banks
the establishment of a temporary network of reciprocal swap
lines
1.510
08/12/2011* 2:30 pm PC LTRO,
COLL
The GovC decided to conduct two longer-term refinancing op-
erations with a maturity of three years and to increase collat-
eral availability
-1.263
09/02/2012 2:30 pm PC COLL The GovC approved specific national eligibility criteria and
risk control measures for the temporary acceptance in a num-
ber of countries of additional credit claims as collateral in
Eurosystem credit operations.
1.085
06/06/2012 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
0.034
22/06/2012 3:00 pm PR COLL The GovC took further measures to increase collateral avail-
ability for counterparties
0.170
26/07/2012 12:00
noon
SP OMT Draghi’s London speech (“. . . the ECB is ready to do whatever
it takes to preserve the euro.”)
2.541
02/08/2012 2:30 pm PC OMT The GovC announced that may undertake outright open mar-
ket operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. Mar-
kets disappointed for lack of details about OMT
-3.084
27/08/2012 5:00 pm SP OMT Asmussen’s Hamburg speech supporting the new bond pur-
chase program
0.046
06/09/2012 2:30 pm PC OMT,
COLL
The GovC announced the technical details of OMT and de-
cided on additional measures to preserve collateral availability
0.455
12/09/2012 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangement
with the Bank of England
0.377
06/12/2012 2:30 pm PC FRTFA,
LTRO
The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month longer-term
refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full
allotment
0.547
13/12/2012 3:00 pm PR FOR The GovC decided to extend the liquidity swap arrangements
with the Fed
-0.062
Notes: The table reports all the identified events related to ECB unconventional operations over the period 2008-2012.
For each event we indicate the day and the exact time when it was announced, the type of the announcement, the nature
of the measure announced and a brief description. PC indicates Press Conference; PR indicates Press Release; SP
indicates Speech. * denotes that the event coincides with a reduction of the key ECB interest rates.
Table 3: Standard deviations of daily basis point changes in the spread
Event days Non-event days Non-event Thursdays Non-event GovC days
Entire sample 18.12 8.82 8.10 10.30
2008 5.11 2.94 2.47 3.02
2009 4.17 4.15 4.40 4.20
2010 19.42 5.43 5.87 9.44
2011 25.88 13.59 11.70 5.61
2012 24.18 12.17 11.82 20.21
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Table 4: Effects of ECB unconventional monetary policy operations on the Italian spread
Date Type 1-day window 2-day window 2-day window
(lagged effects) (anticipation effects)
10/01/2008 FOR 2.6 1.5 4.3
(0.56) (0.81) (0.55)
07/02/2008 LTRO −0.2 −1.9 0.5
(0.94) (0.76) (0.94)
11/03/2008 FOR −3.5 −4.7 −2.8
(0.48) (0.52) (0.68)
28/03/2008 LTRO −1.8 −1.7 −3.1
(0.66) (0.79) (0.65)
02/05/2008 FOR −1.0 −2.1 −1.0
(0.80) (0.74) (0.87)
30/07/2008 FOR −0.3 −2.4 2.2
(0.93) (0.72) (0.73)
31/07/2008 LTRO −2.1 9.5 −2.4
(0.62) (0.30) (0.72)
04/09/2008 LTRO 2.1 5.0 2.4
(0.62) (0.50) (0.72)
18/09/2008 FOR 5.2 −3.6 6.6
(0.34) (0.61) (0.42)
26/09/2008 FOR 4.0 21.0 2.2
(0.44) (0.10) (0.73)
29/09/2008 FOR 17.0 16.0 21.0
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10)
07/10/2008 LTRO, FOR 0.2 3.7 2.6
(0.94) (0.60) (0.70)
08/10/2008* FRTFA 3.5 3.2 3.7
(0.48) (0.64) (0.60)
13/10/2008 FOR −6.0 −12.3 −5.4
(0.29) (0.22) (0.49)
15/10/2008 COLL, LTRO, FOR −4.4 −2.9 −10.7
(0.41) (0.67) (0.26)
18/12/2008 FRTFA −0.2 1.5 1.8
(0.94) (0.81) (0.77)
19/12/2008 FOR 1.7 2.2 1.5
(0.68) (0.73) (0.81)
03/02/2009 FOR −6.6 −18.6 −12.4
(0.26) (0.12) (0.22)
05/03/2009* FRTFA, LTRO 0.4 7.2 −5.7
(0.90) (0.39) (0.47)
19/03/2009 FOR 4.6 −1.9 3.3
(0.39) (0.76) (0.63)
06/04/2009 FOR 1.3 4.1 −8.6
(0.74) (0.57) (0.33)
07/05/2009* LTRO, CBPP −10.0 −15.1 −12.7
(0.15) (0.16) (0.21)
04/06/2009 CBPP 3.4 −1.2 3.5
(0.50) (0.85) (0.62)
25/06/2009 FOR −1.2 −1.7 −4.2
(0.76) (0.79) (0.56)
24/09/2009 FOR 0.6 1.9 2.4
(0.86) (0.76) (0.72)
03/12/2009 FRTFA, LTRO −1.1 −8.1 −2.1
(0.78) (0.35) (0.74)
04/03/2010 FRTFA, LTRO −0.2 −3.8 −1.7
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Table 4: (continued)
(0.94) (0.59) (0.79)
10/05/2010 SMP, FOR, LTRO −50.5 −49.2 −42.1
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
10/06/2010 LTRO −17.1 −13.1 −34.3
(0.06) (0.20) (0.04)
02/09/2010 FRTFA, LTRO −6.5 −11.6 −17.4
(0.27) (0.24) (0.13)
02/12/2010 FRTFA, LTRO −17.5 −19.4 −44.5
(0.06) (0.11) (0.02)
17/12/2010 FOR 5.6 9.9 7.1
(0.31) (0.29) (0.39)
21/12/2010 FOR 3.7 6.2 8.0
(0.46) (0.44) (0.36)
03/03/2011 FRTFA, LTRO 0.0 −1.7 −2.0
(0.98) (0.79) (0.75)
09/06/2011 FRTFA, LTRO 7.3 11.2 10.7
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26)
29/06/2011 FOR −10.2 −18.7 −14.2
(0.15) (0.12) (0.18)
04/08/2011 FRTFA, LTRO 18.3 2.3 14.6
(0.05) (0.73) (0.17)
08/08/2011 SMP −71.4 −86.4 −87.4
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
25/08/2011 FOR 0.2 6.4 0.9
(0.94) (0.43) (0.88)
15/09/2011 FOR −9.4 −16.0 −27.8
(0.17) (0.15) (0.06)
06/10/2011 FRTFA, LTRO, CBPP −16.9 −14.8 −22.3
(0.07) (0.17) (0.09)
03/11/2011* CBPP −4.7 14.6 −8.5
(0.38) (0.17) 0.34
30/11/2011 FOR −12.4 −44.1 −11.9
(0.12) (0.02) (0.23)
08/12/2011* LTRO, COLL 45.2 41.7 64.7
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
09/02/2012 COLL −13.2 4.8 −18.8
(0.11) (0.52) (0.12)
06/06/2012 FRTFA, LTRO −10.3 −15.9 −11.9
(0.14) (0.15) (0.23)
22/06/2012 COLL 4.6 34.7 7.4
(0.39) (0.04) (0.38)
26/07/2012 OMT −43.7 −61.7 −58.9
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
02/08/2012 OMT 41.2 11.2 22.7
(0.01) (0.25) (0.09)
27/08/2012 OMT −24.3 −13.1 5.0
(0.03) (0.20) (0.50)
06/09/2012 OMT, COLL −29.0 −54.5 −45.3
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
12/09/2012 FOR −14.1 −11.5 −22.5
(0.10) (0.24) (0.09)
06/12/2012 FRTFA, LTRO 16.1 13.9 24.0
(0.07) (0.18) (0.08)
13/12/2012 FOR −0.4 −7.1 −10.1
(0.90) (0.39) (0.28)
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Table 4: (continued)
All events Sum −201.4 −286.7 −329.6
Avg −3.7 −5.3 −6.1
(0.46) (0.49) (0.44)
Events distinguished by year
Events 2008 Sum 16.8 32.0 23.4
Avg 1.0 1.9 1.38
(0.81) (0.77) (0.83)
Events 2009 Sum −8.6 −33.0 −36.5
Avg −1.0 −3.7 −4.1
(0.81) (0.61) (0.57)
Events 2010 Sum −82.5 −81.0 −124.9
Avg −11.8 −11.6 −17.8
(0.13) (0.24) (0.13)
Events 2011 Sum −54.0 −105.5 −83.2
Avg −4.9 −9.6 −7.6
(0.36) (0.30) (0.37)
Events 2012 Sum −73.1 −99.2 −108.4
Avg −7.3 −9.9 −10.8
(0.23) (0.29) (0.26)
Events distinguished by type
FOR events Sum −73.3 −123.5 −111.6
Avg −2.9 −4.9 −4.5
(0.53) (0.50) (0.54)
FRTFA events Sum −7.1 −36.0 −52.8
Avg −0.5 −2.8 −4.1
(0.87) (0.69) (0.57)
LTRO events Sum −49.0 −64.7 −93.4
Avg −2.3 −3.1 −4.4
(0.59) (0.66) (0.54)
COLL events Sum 3.2 23.8 −2.7
Avg 0.6 4.8 −0.5
(0.84) (0.52) (0.93)
CBPP events Sum −28.2 −16.5 −40.0
Avg −7.1 −4.1 −10.0
(0.24) (0.56) (0.29)
SMP events Sum −121.9 −135.6 −129.5
Avg −61.0 −67.8 −64.8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
OMT events Sum −55.8 −118.1 −76.5
Avg −14.0 −29.5 −19.1
(0.10) (0.05) (0.11)
Notes: The table reports changes in the Italian spread around each ECB announcement, as well as the cumulative and
average effect over all announcements. Moreover, it shows the cumulative and average effect when distinguishing events by
year and type of the operation. Three different event windows are used. “P-values” in parentheses indicate the proportion
of n-day spread changes during the period 01:01:2008-31:12:2012 that were larger in absolute value than the actual change
in the n-day period around the event. * denotes that the event coincides with a reduction of the key ECB interest rates.
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Table 5: Parameter estimates - All events
01/02/08 to 05/07/10 05/10/10 to 12/31/12
Constant 0.036(0.109) 0.310(0.231)
∆St−1 0.215(0.042)∗∗∗ 0.238(0.035)∗∗∗
∆St−2 −0.032(0.048) −0.120(0.032)∗∗∗
UNCt 2.199(3.396) −13.033(1.279)∗∗∗
UNCt−1 8.223(2.912)∗∗∗ 3.348(1.544)∗∗
UNCt−2 0.587(2.714) −2.327(1.025)∗∗
∆EuroV IXt 0.279(0.127)
∗∗ 0.450(0.296)
MPEt −5.749(3.231)∗ 16.137(12.342)
∆EUDSt −0.017(0.008)∗∗ −0.160(0.026)∗∗∗
∆TEDt 0.044(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.058(0.129)
∆CDSGreecet 0.076(0.016)
∗∗∗ 0.001(0.001)∗∗
Log-Likelihood −1506.49 −2415.81
Q(5) 0.5223 0.3300
Q(10) 0.6928 0.3382
Q2(5) 0.4112 0.2468
Q2(10) 0.6375 0.7169
Observations 610 691
Notes: GARCH(1,1) regressions of daily basis point change in the spread. *** (**, *) indicates statistical
significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Q(5) and Q(10) is the statistical
significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations of the standardized residuals up to the 5th and 10th
order, respectively. Q2(5) and Q2(10) is the statistical significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations
of the squared standardized residuals up to the 5th and 10th order, respectively.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates - Events distinguished by surprise direction
01/02/08 to 05/07/10 05/10/10 to 12/31/12
Constant −0.010(0.122) 0.335(0.238)
∆St−1 0.09(0.040)∗∗∗ 0.236(0.037)∗∗∗
∆St−2 −0.034(0.044) −0.122(0.035)∗∗∗
UNCpost 11.363(8.334) −13.494(1.439)∗∗∗
UNCpost−1 5.511(7.011) 1.648(1.750)
UNCpost−2 −1.651(5.464) −2.089(0.969)∗∗
UNCnegt 1.353(3.067) 12.321(1.111)
∗∗∗
UNCnegt−1 −5.153(3.115)∗ −9.506(0.947)∗∗∗
UNCnegt−2 −0.843(3.618) 3.484(1.338)∗∗∗
∆EuroV IXt 0.285(0.129)
∗∗ 0.442(0.232)∗
MPEt −6.712(3.420)∗∗ 16.461(11.344)
∆EUDSt −0.016(0.008)∗∗ −0.160(0.021)∗∗∗
∆TEDt 0.041(0.014)
∗∗∗ −0.071(0.126)
∆CDSGreecet 0.077(0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.001(0.001)∗∗
Log-Likelihood −1503.75 −2413.14
Q(5) 0.3688 0.4009
Q(10) 0.3934 0.4793
Q2(5) 0.26212 0.2837
Q2(10) 0.7192 0.7466
Observations 610 691
Notes: GARCH(1,1) regressions of daily basis point change in the spread. *** (**, *) indicates statistical
significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Q(5) and Q(10) is the statistical
significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations of the standardized residuals up to the 5th and 10th
order, respectively. Q2(5) and Q2(10) is the statistical significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations
of the squared standardized residuals up to the 4th and 12th order, respectively.
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Table 7: Parameter estimates - Events distinguished by type
01/02/08 to 12/31/12 05/10/10 to 12/31/12
Constant 0.061(0.102) 0.331(0.239)
∆St−1 0.237(0.031)∗∗∗ 0.223(0.041)∗∗∗
∆St−2 −0.092(0.032)∗∗∗ −0.111(0.042)∗∗∗
FORt 2.677(5.663) 14.578(9.449)
FORt−1 5.913(4.001) 6.457(11.668)
FRTFAt 2.147(8.794) 13.028(13.471)
FRTFAt−1 2.507(24.284) 13.466(15.353)
LTROt 2.431(5.077) −8.883(8.959)
LTROt−1 4.706(6.494) −3.335(11.052)
COLLt −10.909(7.412) −15.071(5.049)∗∗∗
COLLt−1 8.620(7.215) 6.740(6.425)
CBPPt −6.046(2.181)∗∗∗ −−
CBPPt−1 8.181(1.962)∗∗∗ −−
SMPt −17.054(2.023)∗∗∗ −16.198(0.520)∗∗∗
SMPt−1 −2.220(2.355) 0.182(0.901)
OMTt −15.163(0.771)∗∗∗ −13.486(1.067)∗∗∗
OMTt−1 5.569(3.097)∗ 4.791(2.741)∗
∆EuroV IXt 0.471(0.151)
∗∗∗ 0.535(0.250)∗∗
MPEt −9.108(3.402)∗∗∗ −9.254(14.796)
∆EUDS −0.027(0.009)∗∗∗ −0.153(0.022)∗∗∗
∆TEDt 0.043(0.013)
∗∗∗ −0.032(0.124)
∆CDSGreecet 0.002(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.001(0.001)∗∗
Log-Likelihood −4009.77 −2410.42
Q(5) 0.7055 0.5465
Q(10) 0.7953 0.6220
Q2(5) 0.4749 0.2104
Q2(10) 0.4859 0.6214
Observations 1301 691
Notes: GARCH(1,1) regressions of daily basis point change in the spread. *** (**, *) indicates statistical
significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Q(4) and Q(12) is the statistical
significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations of the standardized residuals up to the 4th and 12th
order, respectively. Q2(4) and Q2(12) is the statistical significance of the Ljung-Box Q test for the autocorrelations
of the squared standardized residuals up to the 4th and 12th order, respectively.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Italian spread vis-a´-vis Germany
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Source: Thomson Reuters-Datastream.
Figure 2: Italian sovereign CDS premia (levels)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
So
ve
rei
gn
 C
DS
 pr
em
ia
Source: Thomson Reuters-Datastream.
Figure 3: Evolution of the policy rate in the UK, the US and the euro area
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Figure 4: ECB purchases under the CBPP1, CBPP2 and SMP
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Appendix: The Data
Daily data (obtained from Thomson Reuters-Datastream):
• Long-term bond yield for Italy: Italy Benchmark Bond 10 YR - Redemption Yield (Datas-
tream mnemonic: ITBRYLD)
• Long-term bond yield for Germany: Germany Benchmark Bond 10 YR - Redemption
Yield (Datastream mnemonic: BDBRYLD)
• EuroVIX: VSTOXX volatility index (Datastream mnemonic: VSTOXXI)
• Total stock market index for the EU: EU-DS Market (Datastream mnemonic: TOTMKEU)
• TED spread: TED spread rate - middle rate (Datastream mnemonic: TRTEDSP)
• CDS Greece: Greece Senior 10 Year Credit Default Swap (Datastream mnemonic: GRGVTSX)
• CDS Italy: Republic of Italy Senior CR 10 Year (Datastream mnemonic: ITGAEAC)
Intraday data (obtained from www.tickdatamarket.com):
• Bund futures: EUREX Euro-Bund Futures
• BTP futures: EUREX Long-term Euro-BTP Futures
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different liquidity conditions. The main properties of the model are analyzed through
both simulation and estimation exercises. The contribution of the paper is twofold.
On one hand, the calibrated model is able to replicate the stylized facts regarding the
yield curve and the term premium in the US over the period 1987:3-2011:3, without
compromising its ability to match macro dynamics. On the other hand, the estima-
tion, besides providing an empirical support to the theoretical setting, highlights the
potentialities of the model to analyze the term premium in a microfounded macro
framework. The results match very closely the behavior of actual yields, reflecting the
recent activity of the Fed on longer maturity bonds.
KEYWORDS: term structure, DSGE models
JEL Classification: C5, E32, E37, E43, E44
∗Department of Economics, University of Bologna
†Department of Economics, University of Bologna, 2, Piazza Scaravilli; Mail: massimil-
iano.marzo@unibo.it. Phone: +39-0512098019
‡We have benefited from conversations with Davide Raggi, Alessandro Saia and Paolo Zagaglia. We
also thank for helpful comments participants at seminars at the Department of Economics of the University
of Bologna, at the European University Institute of Florence, at the PhD Conference in Monetary and
Financial Economics 2012 organized by the Centre for Global Finance of Bristol, at the 5th PhD Conference
in Economics organized by the University of Athens, and at the 53rd Annual Conference of the Italian
Economic Association. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
It is well known that one of the main limitations of standard Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models is their inability to generate sufficiently large and volatile
term premia.1 Therefore, it has become an urgent task to better analyze the effects of
real and nominal shocks on the term structure, and vice versa. Standard DSGE models,
which represent the workhorse macro models of central banks and academic institutions,
often lack a realistic and comprehensive representation of the financial sector. In partic-
ular, since all assets are taken as perfect substitutes, term premia are ignored, and the
expectations hypothesis generally holds. Trying to incorporate in a coherent manner the
term structure of interest rates into full-fledged DSGE models represents nowadays one of
the most challenging research areas in macroeconomics.
In order to obtain richer models for policy advice it is crucial to bring term structure
elements into general equilibrium frameworks. The yield curve is indeed very informa-
tive about expectations of future dynamics regarding macroeconomic variables (such as
inflation and interest rates) and risk. More specifically, a complete understanding of term
structure dynamics within DSGE models could be particularly helpful for the conduct of
monetary policy. This issue has been gaining momentum in the last decade, as many cen-
tral banks faced zero-bound interest rate challenges, or simply tried to react to unexpected
or undesired changes of long term interest rates.
Recently, a macro-finance literature has been growing with the attempt to analyze how
macro factors and the yield curve interact. Some works in this direction are due to Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001), Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Ho¨rdahl et al. (2006), Evans and Marshall
(2007), and Yang (2008), in which the macro structure is modeled as exogenous to the
yield curve.2 Other studies (Dewachter and Lyrio, 2006; Diebold et al., 2006; Rudebusch
and Wu, 2007, 2008) are able to identify a bidirectional feedback between term structure
factors and macro variables. The advantage of taking this joint perspective is twofold.
On one hand, it is possible to observe how movements in the yield curve are affected
by macroeconomic shocks. On the other hand, since the yield curve is a good predictor
of future dynamics of the economy, these expectations contribute to the determination
of current macroeconomic variables, although in a forward-looking setting. Thus, inte-
grating term structure models with macro variables could substantially contribute to a
better understanding of both financial and macroeconomic issues. Lastly, reduced-form
macro models have been developed by Wu (2006), Ho¨rdahl et al. (2008) and Bekaert et al.
(2010). However, it is clear that this kind of frameworks, either linking macro variables
to some latent-factor finance structures or using reduced-form macro models, cannot ad-
equately address some important questions regarding the complex interactions between
macro variables and asset prices.
1This has been called in the literature bond premium puzzle, and is closely linked to the equity premium
puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).
2This is the so-called dichotomous modeling approach (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008). For an overview
of this research area, see Diebold et al. (2005).
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Another stream of the literature has focused on how to integrate yield curve dynamics
into macro models with optimizing agents, such as DSGE models. Within these frame-
works all variables obey a set of structural macro relations: for this reason, it is possible to
give a more meaningful economic interpretation to the macro-finance connections. How-
ever, as explained by Rudebusch et al. (2007), standard DSGE models are not able to
generate time-varying term premia. More specifically, the term premium is zero in first-
order approximations, and constant in second-order approximations.
In order to address these drawbacks, the literature has explored four approaches. The
first one tries to capture the variability of the term premium by using higher-order ap-
proximations or global nonlinear methods (Ravenna and Seppa¨la¨, 2006; Rudebusch et al.,
2007; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008, 2009) combined with long-memory habit formation
in consumption (as suggested by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) and labor market fric-
tions (Uhlig, 2007). These models generally find a larger and more volatile term premium
than standard models, but still without matching the dynamics shown by data (i.e. move-
ments of the term premium are too small), or at the cost of distorting the model’s ability
to fit other macroeconomic variables, as reported by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
The second approach introduces Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive preferences to dif-
ferentiate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from the inverse of the risk aversion
coefficient. In this context, Rudebusch and Swanson (2009), drawing on an endowment
economy model with recursive preferences developed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), are
able to generate substantial volatility in the term premium. In particular, the model pro-
duces a reasonably large and volatile term premium matching also basic macroeconomic
moments. However, their results come at the cost of an unrealistically high risk aversion
parameter. Other contributions using Epstein-Zin preferences are due to van Binsbergen
et al. (2010) and Hsu (2011).
A third type of DSGE models is characterized by the presence of heterogeneous agents
(Guvenen, 2009; De Graeve et al., 2010; Hsu, 2011). For instance, the model by De Graeve
et al. (2010) is able to capture the role of heterogeneous capital market participation
across agents (shareholders, bondholders and workers), generating realistic term premia
and reasonable dynamics for the intra- and intertemporal allocation decisions.
Other efforts to explain asset prices in macro models have been pursued by the so-
called rare macroeconomic disasters literature, according to which asset returns volatility
can be explained by incorporating disaster risk, in the form of a probability that a disaster
will happen in the future (Gourio, 2009; Barro and Ursua, 2011).
Despite these recent substantial improvements, Rudebusch (2010, p.40) himself admits
that “the DSGE model financial sector remains far too rudimentary in terms of financial
frictions and intermediation.” More importantly, there are still theoretical uncertainties
among economists about the appropriate model specification to analyze the term premium
within a DSGE framework (Rudebusch et al., 2007).
This paper adopts and extends the DSGE framework proposed by Marzo et al. (2008),
which was one of the first studies that endogenizes bond yields of different maturities.
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In particular, our tractable model reproduces segmentation in financial markets by intro-
ducing bonds of different maturities and portfolio adjustment frictions. Transaction costs
can be considered either as proxies for the liquidity of an asset, or simply costs associ-
ated to managing portfolios. Alternatively, the economic motivation for the inclusion of
portfolio adjustment frictions may originate from the preferred habitat theory, whereby
households have a preference for holding bonds of different maturity (Vayanos and Vila,
2009). These frictions generate a certain degree of stickiness in the timing of reallocation
of bond holdings. As a result, the model is characterized by a non-zero demand for bonds
of different maturities at each point in time, making assets imperfect substitutes. Our
framework closely follows the message of Tobin (1969, 1982) about imperfect asset sub-
stitutability, whose portfolio approach has been first employed in a dynamic optimizing
model by Andre´s et al. (2004). With the model at hands, it is possible to analyze the
dynamics of yield spreads and term premia in a general equilibrium setting. Moreover,
the model features two feedback channels from the term structure to the macroeconomy
that work, respectively, through the money demand and the resource constraint.
The main operational advantage emerging from this setting is given by its ability
to generate time-varying term premia, without recurring to higher order approximation
instead of the simple first-order log-linearized solution.
The novelties of this paper with respect to Marzo et al. (2008)’s contribution are
basically three. First of all, we allow for a secondary market for bond trading, as proposed
by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). Second, open market operations by the central bank
are explicitly modeled, allowing the quantity of bonds of different maturities to move in
response to shocks. Third, a deeper analysis of the term premium dynamics is conducted.
The results highlighted in this paper are important along two dimensions, and differ
substantially from the original model by Marzo et al. (2008). On the one hand, the cal-
ibrated model is able to replicate stunningly well the stylized facts regarding the yield
curve in the US over the period 1987:3-2011:3. More specifically, the moments of the
simulated data match very closely those of the US yield curve. Moreover, the impulse
response functions show that term premia react to shocks consistently with what is de-
scribed in the literature. Finally, the model is able to generate a realistically high term
premium while simultaneously matching the main macro dynamics, a fact that goes in
the direction of solving the bond premium puzzle. The model is tested against data by
using both calibration and Bayesian estimation methods. In particular, the estimation
procedure highlights the full potential of the model in analyzing the term premium within
a microfounded macro framework: the estimated term premium generated by the model
is very similar to that obtained by Kim and Wright (2005), both in terms of pattern and
volatility.
The model presented in this paper points to further avenues for future research, like,
for example, an analysis of the recent waves of Quantitative Easing policies carried out by
central banks, and the study of the strategic asset allocation implications.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The results from the
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calibrated model are discussed in Section 3, whereas Section 4 is devoted to the results
from the estimation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A representative agent populates the economy and supply labor inputs. Monopolistically
competitive firms hire labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. The government
conducts fiscal and monetary policy.
2.1 The Household Sector
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived households. Households’ preferences
are defined over consumption Ct, real money balances
Mt
Pt
and labor effort Lt, and are
described by the infinite stream of utility:
Ut =
∞∑
t=0
βtνPRt u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
(1)
where β is the intertemporal discount factor, and νPRt is a preference shock that follows
an AR(1) process:
log νPRt = φPR log ν
PR
t−1 + ε
PR
t (2)
where εpt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σPR.
The instantaneous utility function u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
is given by:
u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
=
(Ct − γCt−1)1− 1σ
1− 1σ
+
1
1− χ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−χ
− Ψ
1 + 1/ψ
L
1+1/ψ
t (3)
where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, γ measures the importance of con-
sumption habits, χ is the elasticity of money demand, ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
In this economy, each agent i can choose the composition of a basket of differentiated
final goods. Preferences across varieties of goods have the standard constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) form a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
θt−1
θt dj
] θt
θt−1
(4)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption index of all the differentiated final goods produced
in the economy under monopolistic competition. There are j-th varieties of final goods
(j ∈ [0, 1]), and θt is a time-varying elasticity of substitution between different final goods
varieties (θt > 1).
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Each agent is subject to the following budget constraint, which incorporates the sec-
ondary market for bond trading as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004):
Bt
PtRt
+
BS,t
PtRS,t
(1 +ACSt ) +
BM,t
PtRM,t
(1 +ACMt ) +
BL,t
PtRL,t
(1 +ACLt ) +
Mt
Pt
(1 +ACBt )+
+ It(1 +AC
I
t ) =
Bt−1
Pt
+
BS,t−1
PtRt
+
BM,t−1
PtRt
+
BL,t−1
PtRt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
Lt + qtKt − Ct − Tt + Ωt
(5)
Thus, agents allocate their wealth among money holding Mt, accumulation of capital Kt,
which is rented to firms at the rental rate qt, and holding of four types of zero-coupon
government bonds (Bt, BS,t, BM,t, BL,t), which are purchased by households at their
nominal price. Agents receive rental income qtKt, where Kt is capital, wage income wtLt,
where wt is real wage, and a share of firms’ profits Ωt. They also pay a real lump-sum tax
Tt; It is investment, and Pt is the aggregate price level. Firms face quadratic adjustment
costs of investment as in Kim (2000):
ACIt =
φK
2
(
It
Kt
)2
(6)
The law of motion of capital stock is expressed in the following standard way:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (7)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of capital stock.
The different zero-coupon government bonds are defined as money-market bonds Bt,
short-term bonds BS,t, medium-term bonds BM,t, and long-term bonds BL,t, whose yields
are given, respectively, by Rt, RS,t, RM,t, and RL,t. The left-hand side of the budget
constraint follows the usual formulation with bonds priced at their interest rates, since
at time t, the return Rı,t is known with certainty and is risk-free from the viewpoint of
agents. However, the right-hand side of (5) incorporates the secondary market for bond
trading: bonds of different maturities are priced at the money-market rate. Even though
these bonds represent sure claims for future consumption, they are subject to price risk
prior to maturity. At time t − 1, an agent who buys longer-maturity bonds and plans
to sell them next period would be uncertain about the gains, since Rt is not known at
time t − 1. As stressed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the price Rt follows from a
simple arbitrage argument, since, in period t, these bonds represent identical sure claims
to consumption goods at the time of the end of the maturity as newly issued one-period
bonds in period t.
As already mentioned, segmentation in financial markets is obtained by introduc-
ing portfolio adjustment frictions, representing impediments to the arbitrage behavior
of agents that would equalize asset returns. First of all, we propose bond-adjustment
costs (Marzo et al., 2008; Zagaglia, 2013), assuming that intertemporal bond trading is
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costly to each agent. Costs of bond adjustment are quadratic and are defined as follows:
ACıt =
[
φı
2
(
Bı,t
Bı,t−1
)2]
Yt (8)
where ı = S,M,L. Costs defined by (8) are paid in terms of output, and are non-zero
at the steady-state, generating a non-zero demand for bonds of different maturities in
the long-run. The rationale behind the presence of transaction costs as in (8) is firstly
related with the theory of preferred habitat, according to which agents have preferences
over bond of different maturities (Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Under this view, transaction
costs represent the inertial behavior of the investor located at each maturity. Moreover,
these costs are proxies for the shares of resources devoted to covering information costs, or
the costs of managing bond portfolios. As stressed by Marzo et al. (2008), the magnitude
of the adjustment costs φı at the steady-state is different across maturities, as they reflect
different opportunity costs of bonds. In particular, as long as RS < RM < RL (an upward
sloping yield curve), we have φS < φM < φL.
The bond adjustment costs proposed in (8) represent another crucial innovative point of
the present paper, in contrast with the existing literature, where portfolio reallocation
among bonds are assumed to be zero at the steady-state. This is what generates differen-
tial yields among bonds, emerging from structural liquidity conditions characterizing the
market of bonds having different maturities.
Moreover, we add money-bond transaction costs following Andre´s et al. (2004), given
by:
ACBt =
[
vS
2
(
Mt
BS,t
κS − 1
)2
+
vM
2
(
Mt
BM,t
κM − 1
)2
+
vL
2
(
Mt
BL,t
κL − 1
)2]
Yt (9)
where κı = bı/m (ı = S,M,L), i.e. the ratio between bond holdings and money in the
steady-state. Thus, In other words, agents are assumed to pay a cost whenever their asset
allocation moves away from a preferred portfolio composition. Costs (9) are assumed to
be zero at the steady-state ad they can be viewed as a rationalization of the liquidity
premium, representing the attitude towards risk on behalf of representative agent. Longer
is the maturity of a bond, the less liquid is considered the asset. These costs are set to
be increasing with maturity (vS < vM < vL). Another intuition behind the presence of
costs under (9) can be that agents perceive longer-maturity assets as riskier, and therefore
associated to a loss of liquidity in comparison with the same investment in shorter-term
bonds. For this reason, as they purchase longer-term bonds, they hold additional money to
compensate themselves for the loss of liquidity. Thus, agents self-impose a sort of “reserve
requirements” on their longer-term investments (Andre´s et al., 2004).
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2.1.1 Optimality Conditions
Households maximize their lifetime utility stream (1), subjected to (3), (5), (6), (7), (8)
and (9), together with a usual transversality condition on all bonds.
The first order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, money, money-market
bonds, short-term bonds, medium-term bonds, long-term bonds, capital and investment,
are respectively given by:
νPt (Ct − γCt−1)−1/σ − νPt+1βγEt(Ct+1 − γCt)−1/σ = λt (10)
νPt ΨL
1/ψ
t = λt
Wt
Pt
(11)
νPt
(
Mt
Pt
)−χ 1
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
=
λt
Pt
[
1 +ACBt
]
+
+ λt
Mt
Pt
[
vSκS
(
Mt
BS,t
κS − 1
)
Yt
BS,t
+ vMκM
(
Mt
BM,t
κM − 1
)
Yt
BM,t
+ vLκL
(
Mt
BL,t
κL − 1
)
Yt
BL,t
]
(12)
βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
=
λt
PtRt
(13)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
+ βφSEt
λt+1
RS.t+1
(
BS,t+1/Pt+1
BS,t/Pt
)3
Yt+1 =
=
λt
RS,t
[
1 +
3
2
φS
(
BS,t/Pt
BS,t−1/Pt−1
)2
Yt
]
− λt
[(
Mt
BS,t
)2
κSvS
(
Mt
BS,t
κS − 1
)
Yt
] (14)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
+ βφMEt
λt+1
RM.t+1
(
BM,t+1/Pt+1
BM,t/Pt
)3
Yt+1 =
λt
RM,t
[
1 +
3
2
φS
(
BM,t/Pt
BM,t−1/Pt−1
)2
Yt
]
− λt
[(
Mt
BM,t
)2
κMvM
(
Mt
BM,t
κM − 1
)
Yt
] (15)
8
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
+ βφLEt
λt+1
RL.t+1
(
BL,t+1/Pt+1
BL,t/Pt
)3
Yt+1 =
=
λt
RL,t
[
1 +
3
2
φL
(
BL,t/Pt
BL,t−1/Pt−1
)2
Yt
]
− λt
[(
Mt
BL,t
)2
κLvL
(
Mt
BL,t
κL − 1
)
Yt
] (16)
β(1− δ)Etµt+1 = µt − λt
(
qt + φK
(
It
Kt
)3)
(17)
βEtµt+1 = λt
(
1 +
3
2
φK
(
It
Kt
)2)
(18)
where λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers.
2.2 Firms
Each j-th firm produces and sells differentiated final goods in a monopolistically competi-
tive market. The production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas with labor and capital:
Yt = AtK
α
t Lt
1−α − Φ (19)
where α is the share of capital used in production, and Φ is a fixed cost to ensure that
profits are zero in the steady-state. At is technology and follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
At
A
)
= φA log
(
At−1
A
)
+ εAt (20)
where εAt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σA.
Firms face quadratic price adjustment costs a` la Rotemberg (1982), given by:
ACPt =
φP
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− pi
)2
Yt (21)
Given the standard CES setting of equation (4), the demand function faced by each
single firm j is:
Yt(j) =
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−θt
Yt =⇒ Pt(j) =
[
Yt(j)
Yt
]− 1
θt
Pt (22)
Thus, the demand function for each single good j is proportionally related to the general
output level of the economy, and negatively to the price of good j. The elasticity of
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substitution of demand θt is time-varying around a mean θ:
θt = θ + ν
M
t (23)
where νMt is a shock to price mark-up that follows an autoregressive process:
log νMt = φM log ν
M
t−1 + ε
M
t (24)
where εMt is an exogenous shock with zero mean and standard deviation σM .
With the presence of quadratic price adjustment costs highlighted under (21), the
maximization problem becomes fully dynamic: each firm maximizes the expectation of
the discounted sum of profit flows, given the information at time 0:
Π0(j) = E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
ρtPtΠt(j)
]
(25)
where ρ is the firms’ discount factor.
Following Kim (2000), the profit function for each firm j is:
PtΠt(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j)− PtWtLt(j)− PtqtKt(j)− PtACPt (26)
Assuming that each agent in the economy has access to a complete market for contin-
gent claims, we have that the discount factor of households and firms are set to be equal,
as in Kim (2000):
Et
ρt+1
ρt
= Etβ
λt+1
λt
(27)
Therefore, the FOCs of the maximization problem with respect to labor and capital are
given, respectively, by:
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)
(
Yt + Φ
Lt
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(28)
qt = α
(
Yt + Φ
Kt
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(29)
where eYt is the output demand elasticity:
1
eYt
=
1
θt
{
1− φP (pit − pi)pit + βφPEt
[
λt+1
λt
(pit+1 − pi)pi2t+1
Yt+1
Yt
]}
(30)
which measures the gross price markup over marginal cost. Given the above structure, it
is immediate to check that the standard New-Keynesian aggregate supply curve obtains
naturally after repeated substitution of the previous equations one into the other, after
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log-linearization around the non-stochastic steady state.
2.3 The Government Sector
The government constraint is given by:
Bt
PtRt
+
BS,t
PtRS,t
+
BM,t
PtRM,t
+
BL,t
PtRL,t
+
Mt
Pt
=
Bt−1
Pt
+
BS,t−1
PtRt
+
BM,t−1
PtRt
+
BL,t−1
PtRt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+Gt−Tt
(31)
where Gt is government spending, for which we assume to follow an AR(1) process:
log
(
Gt
G
)
= φG log
(
Gt−1
G
)
+ εGt (32)
where εGt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG.
We introduce the following fiscal policy rule, where the total amount of tax collection
is a function of the total government’s liabilities, in order to prevent the emergence of
inflation as a fiscal phenomenon, as suggested by Leeper (1991):
Tt = ψ0+ψ1
[
bt−1
pit
− b
pi
]
+ψ2
[
bS,t−1
Rtpit
− bS
Rpi
]
+ψ2
[
bM,t−1
Rtpit
− bM
Rpi
]
+ψ2
[
bL,t−1
Rtpit
− bL
Rpi
]
(33)
where ψ0 is the steady-state level of Tt, and ψ1 has been set to be equal for all bonds.
Equation (33) tells us that the level of taxes react to deviations of the outstanding level
of public debt from its steady-state level. In other words, taxes are not allowed to act
independently from the stock of government liabilities outstanding in the economy.
The central bank sets money-market rate Rt, according to the following Taylor (1993)
rule:
log
(
Rt
R
)
= αR log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+(1−αR)
{
log
(
pi∗t
pi
)
+ αpi
[
log
(pit
pi
)
− log
(
pi∗t
pi
)]
+ αY log
(
Yt
Y
)}
+εRt
(34)
where αR, αpi, αY indicate the response of Rt with respect to lagged Rt, inflation and
output. The policy rate is determined by the deviation of inflation and output from
steady-state with an interest rate smoothing component. Monetary policy shock εRt is an
i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation σR. pi
∗
t is a time-varying inflation target, as
in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Zagaglia (2013):
log
(
pi∗t
pi
)
= φpi log
(
pi∗t−1
pi
)
+ εpit (35)
where εpit is an exogenous shock with zero mean and standard deviation σpi.
Finally, instead of assuming a simple exogenous AR process for the supply of bonds,
as in Marzo et al. (2008) and Zagaglia (2013), let us suppose that central bank carries out
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a kind of “passive” open market operations (OMOs): whenever money demand increases
(decreases), the central bank intervenes by buying (selling) government bonds of different
maturities, and increasing (destroying) base money:
Mt/Pt
Mt−1/Pt−1
=
(
Bı,t/Pt
Bı,t−1/Pt−1
)−ηı
εBıt (36)
where ηı is the elasticity of money growth supply with respect to changes in bond holdings
for ı = S,M,L. The coefficient ηı indicates the extent by which changes in bond supply
is reflected into money growth rate. According to (36), in order to respond to changes
in money demand, the central bank varies the quantity of money supply by exchanging
bonds, consistently with the policy-rate objective. where εBıt are i.i.d. shocks with zero
mean and standard deviation σBı. Employing and manipulating (12), (13), (14), (15), and
(16), equation (36) becomes:
bı,t = bı,t−1 +A1Rı,t +A2λt + . . . (37)
where the A coefficients are convolutions of structural parameters. From (37) we can
observe that bond quantities depend positively on the interest rate. Thus, bond quantities
are indirectly demand-driven.
The model is completed by specifying the resource constraint of the economy:
Yt = Ct+Gt+It(1+AC
I
t )+AC
P
t +
bS,t
RS,t
(ACSt )+
bM,t
RM,t
(ACMt )+
bL,t
RL,t
(ACLt )+mt(AC
B
t ) (38)
Total output is allocated to consumption, government spending, investment (comprehen-
sive of capital adjustment costs), price adjustment costs, and a component related to bond
adjustment costs and money transaction costs.
2.4 The Pricing Kernel
It is now worth showing the main features underlying the bond pricing kernel emerging
from this model, in order to understand why the expectations hypothesis does not hold
within this framework. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Marzo and Zagaglia
(2011), and assuming the simplest case without adjustment or transaction costs, we can
rewrite the FOCs of bond quantities as follows:
βEt
λt+1
pit+1
=
λt
Rt
(39)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
=
λt
Ri,t
(40)
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where i = S,M,L. The standard pricing kernel (or stochastic discount factor) is given by:
Mt+1 = R
−1
t = βEt
λt+1
λtpit+1
(41)
By using Eq.(41) and the law of iterated expectations, we obtain the pricing of a two-period
bond:
R−12,t = β
2Et
λt+2
λtpit+1pit+2
(42)
We can generalize (42) to the j-th-period bond to get:
R−1j,t = β
jEt
λt+j
λt+j−1(pit+1 . . . pit+j)
(43)
The standard approach to term structure of interest rates implies that long-term interest
rates are determined by expected future short-term rates. This is the so-called expectations
hypothesis, whereby R2,t = RtEtR1,t+1. Let us check whether this hypothesis holds in our
case. Eq.(40) can be rewritten as follows:3
R−1i,t = βEt
[
λt+1
λtpit+1
]
EtR
−1
t+1 + Covt
[
β
λt+1
λtpit+1
, R−1t+1
]
(44)
Using Eq.(39), we obtain:
R−1i,t = R
−1
t EtR
−1
t+1 + Covt
[
β
λt+1
λtpit+1
, R−1t+1
]
(45)
where the covariance term represents the term premium. Eq.(45) implies that the Expec-
tations Hypothesis, (EH, henceforth) holds only when utility is linear in consumption, i.e.
when λt+1λtpit+1 = 1, leading the covariance term to disappear.
It is easy to verify that in the present setting the EH is not satisfied, since the utility
is not linear in consumption. Moreover, there are also adjustment and transaction costs
in the first order conditions of bonds of longer maturities (neglected in this analysis),
that make the model characterized by a non-standard representation of the stochastic
pricing equations. However, it is worth noting that what generates deviations from EH is
the presence of the budget constraint with secondary markets, allowing for bond trading
before their mature, while the portfolio adjustment frictions help to characterize the entire
term structure by inserting wedges among the various rate of returns.
3Remember that Cov(X,Y ) = E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ].
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2.5 How Money, Bonds and Yields Interact
It is evident that the model presents non-trivial dynamics for what concerns the relation-
ships between money, yields and quantity of bonds. This paragraph aims to shed light on
these mechanisms. The interrelationships among money, bonds and returns are depicted
in the following diagram. Notice, in particular, that, differently from what has been as-
sumed by Marzo et al. (2008), there is an effective bidirectional feedback between money
and bond quantities, due to the presence of open market operations.
 SHOCK Taylor rule //
FOC
%%
FOCs
'' Rt FOCs //
FOC




Rı,t
 Mt OMOs //
FOCs
::



Bı,t
FOCs
OO
FOC
(Feedback channel)
ee
Leaving aside the policy rate, determined by Taylor rule (34), and bond quantities of
longer maturities, determined by open market operations (36), let us focus on the other
variables of interest. Consider first a simplified log-linearized version of money demand
equation:
m˜t = B1Etc˜t+1 −B2c˜t +B3c˜t−1 −B4R˜t +B5b˜S,t +B6b˜M,t +B7b˜L,t (46)
where the B coefficients are convolutions of structural parameters. Given the imperfect
substitutability between money and bond holdings, money demand is positively affected
by quantities of bonds at short, medium, and long maturities. This is due to the presence
of the money-bond transaction costs. As previously stressed, households purchase longer-
term assets and hold additional money to compensate for the potential loss of liquidity.
Eq.(46) highlights one of the two feedback channels of the model from the term structure
to the macroeconomy stressed by Marzo et al. (2008) and Zagaglia (2013), namely a money
demand channel. The other feedback channel works through the resource constraint, as it
is possible to see by looking at Eq.(38). In the latter case, bond transaction costs directly
affect the spending decisions of agents.4
4It is worth to note that the present model lacks a channel through which aggregate demand depends
directly on the prices of both short-term and longer-term maturity bonds, as in Harrison (2012) and
Falagiarda (2013).
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The log-linearized version of the first order conditions of bond holdings, from which
yields of different maturities are derived, is given by:
R˜ı,t = C1λ˜t − C2Etλ˜t+1 + C3Etp˜it+1 − C4Ety˜t+1 + C5y˜t + C6EtR˜ı,t+1 + C7EtR˜t+1−
− vıC8[m˜t − b˜ı,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imperfect asset
substitutability
+φıC9b˜ı,t − φıC10b˜ı,t−1 − φıC11Etb˜ı,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intertemporal stickiness
(47)
where ı = S,M,L, and the C coefficients are convolutions of structural parameters. Thus,
yields of longer maturities are determined also by two components generated by portfolio
adjustment frictions, which characterize respectively the degree of imperfect asset sub-
stitutability and the degree of intertemporal stickiness of bond trading. In particular,
Eq.(47) reveals that the long-term rate depends positively on long-term bond supply, as
desired, and positively on money supply, because of the imperfect asset substitutability.
In other words, an increase in the relative supply of the more illiquid asset will bid up the
spread between the more illiquid asset and the more liquid asset.
It is immediate to check that transaction and adjustment costs parameters generate im-
pediments to the arbitrage activity which would equalize returns. At the same time,
the presence of transaction costs determines the extent of the influence of relative assets
holdings on long-term rate. In (47), when φı = 0, deviations from EH are smaller, and
longer-term rates are not affected by changes in relative assets holdings.
3 The Results from the Calibrated Model
The model has been log-linearized around the non-stochastic steady-state, whose details
are reported in the Appendix. We generate artificial time series of the variables, by
simulating 1000 observations and discarding the first 500. In what follows we report the
calibration strategy.
3.1 The Calibration
The benchmark model is calibrated to match US quarterly data over the period 1987:3-
2011:3, the Greenspan-Bernanke era. Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, the steady-
state values and the calibrated values of the core parameters. Some values have been
chosen by following previous studies and are quite standard in the DSGE literature. In
particular, the elasticity of substitution across goods θ is set to be equal to 6 (as Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004)); habit formation parameter γ, is set to be equal to 0.7 (as in
Smets and Wouters (2007)); the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ, is 0.5, which
implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; the depreciation rate of capital δ is
calibrated to be 0.025 (as in Christiano et al. (2005) and Altig et al. (2011)): this value
implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent.
Capital share in production function α is set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al.,
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2011); parameter of price adjustment cost φP , is set to be calibrated to 100 (Ireland, 2004).
The elasticity of real money balances χ is set equal to 7, as in Marzo et al. (2008); the
Frisch elasticity ψ is set equal to 1 (Marzo et al. (2008)).
The parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are mainly calibrated following
Marzo et al. (2008), while the AR coefficients and the standard deviations of the shocks
are set to φA = 0.95, φG = φM = 0.90, σA = 0.01, σR = 0.005, σG = 0.012 (see, for
example, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Kim, 2000; Andre´s et al., 2004; Marzo et al.,
2008; Altig et al., 2011; Zagaglia, 2013).
Transaction costs between money and bonds are considered as free parameters and
are calibrated to match the empirical moments of the US yield curve, in the benchmark
case. Their values are respectively set to be: vS = 0.0030 (which means 0.3% of income),
vM = 0.004, and vL = 0.0041. In the next paragraphs a sensitivity analysis on these
parameters will be performed to test robustness of the results conditional to benchmark
calibrated values.
For what concerns the parameters ηS , ηM and ηL, their calibrated values are obtained
from data concerning the conduct of open market operations in the US. We rely therefore
on various issues of the Domestic Open Market Operations Report prepared by the New
York Fed, and we set these parameters to 2.5, 2.5, and 7, respectively. These values are
indicative of the period prior to the financial crisis, during which holdings of government
securities were skewed towards the shorter end of the maturity spectrum. In fact, it is
well known that, from 2008, purchases of government securities were instead weighted
towards longer term maturities. However, in the next section we will carry out some
sensitivity analysis on these parameters, in order to show the mechanisms behind the
OMOs formulation within this framework.
The steady-state value of some variables is obtained from the data, or following pre-
vious studies. Output is normalized to 1. The consumption-output ratio has been set to
0.57, and the taxes-output ratio to 0.1972 (Marzo et al., 2008). The ratio of market to
non-market activities is set equal to 0.3. The ratio of total debt on GDP is calibrated to
0.45 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004; Marzo et al., 2008). The ratio of debt at different
maturities to total debt is obtained from the OECD Database, using US series from 1995
to 2010 and calculating the average over this period. The steady-state values of the yields
have been calculated from the Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Finally, values of remaining parameters and variables are computed using steady-state
solutions, as shown in the Appendix.
3.2 The Benchmark Model
3.2.1 Moments of the Simulated Variables
It is useful to start by illustrating some stylized fact of the US term structure in recent
years. Table 3 summarizes the main moments of US term structure over the period 1987:3-
2011:3. We report standard deviations of yield spread and yields of four maturities (the
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Federal Funds Rate, 3 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years), and the correlation between
the output gap (computed as a percentage deviation of real GDP from potential) and the
yield spread. The statistics have been computed using Federal Reserve Economic Data.
As expected, rates of shorter maturity are generally more volatile than those of longer
maturities. Moreover, the yield spread is countercyclical.
Table 4 displays the analogous statistics of the simulated data generated by the model
using the benchmark calibration.5 Standard deviations of various maturities yields are
extremely close to actual data, reported in Table 3. The same can be said for the volatility
of yield spreads. The only exception is the policy rate, whose standard deviation is very
low because we did not include any specific investment technology (like transaction costs)
for bonds paying a return equal to the policy rate, as explained by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004, p.377).
Furthermore, the contemporaneous correlation of the spread with the output gap is
negative, as found in actual data over the sample considered. We also report the stan-
dard deviation of the generated term premium, as well as its contemporaneous correlation
with the output gap. The term premium is found to be countercyclical: this negative
relationship in real data is documented by Rudebusch et al. (2007). More importantly,
it is worth noting that in comparison with standard DSGE models using higher order
approximations, the standard deviation of the term premium emerging from our model is
much higher and very close to the empirical one that is 0.752.6
Thus, it seems that the model in its benchmark calibrated version is able to generate
moments that match stunningly well the US term structure features over the Greenspan-
Bernanke period, and, at the same time, to reproduce a sufficiently and realistically large
term premium.
3.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions (IRFs) with respect to one standard deviation innovations
to the three main shocks (technology, monetary policy and government spending) are
shown in Figures 1-3.7 A positive productivity shocks (Figure 1) leads to a decreasing
response of inflation, which, in turn, causes a reduction in the monetary policy rate.
5The yield spread is simply computed by taking the difference between the long-term rate and the
money-market rate. The term premium ξt is defined as follows:
RL,t =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
EtRS,t+j + ξt
Thus, the term premium is the deviation of the long-term yield RL,t from the level consistent with the
expectations hypothesis. Since we assume that the short-rate RS,t is the 3-month yield and the long-term
rate RL,t is the 10-year rate, we have N = 40.
6We use the term premium estimated by Kim and Wright (2005), computed over the period 1990:4-
2011:3.
7The IRFs regarding the other shocks, not reported here, are available upon request.
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Moreover, the responses of the remaining yield rates are negative, due to the decreasing
response in money-market rate. After the shock money demand increases, while the term
premium falls, reaching a minimum of around 0.13%. The direction of the response of the
term premium is consistent with what has been showed by Rudebusch et al. (2007) in a
standard business cycle model with a third-order approximation. However, our model is
able to generate a response substantially higher than that reported in Rudebusch et al.
(2007). Finally, main macro variables dynamics are perfectly consistent with the patterns
derived from a standard DSGE model.
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock, which,
not surprisingly, triggers a negative response of inflation and output. The increase in
the policy rate drives money demand down, and yields of different maturities hike: the
model does not display any liquidity puzzle. Moreover, on impact after the shock the
term premium displays an increase: this is again consistent with Rudebusch et al. (2007).
Previous considerations about the size of the response of the term premium and the
dynamics of the macro variables apply for results displayed in Figure 2 as well.
A government spending shock (Figure 3) leads to an increase in output and inflation,
crowding out consumption. As a result, money demand falls, driven by an increase in
the policy rate. In line with Rudebusch et al. (2007), the term premium experiences an
increase on impact.
Summing up, we have shown that the baseline version of the model is capable to match
the main stylized fact about the US term structure without distorting the dynamics of
the main macro variables. To our knowledge, this is the first DSGE model that, by
endogenizing the term structure, is able to achieve this goal. In particular, while the
direction of the response of the term premium to the shocks is consistent with what
previously found in the DSGE literature, its magnitude is much higher. Next paragraphs
are devoted to sensitivity analysis, where we will show how the term structure dynamics
vary after changing key model parameters.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The goal of the next two paragraphs is to gain intuition about some of the mechanisms
at work in the model. In particular, we analyze what happens when changing, first, the
money transaction costs, and then the parameters relative to the open market operations.
3.3.1 The Role of Money Transaction Costs
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions of a technology shock for different values
of the transaction costs parameters, while simulated moments are reported in Table 5. It
is worth remembering that, in this framework, variations in the transaction costs reflect
variations in the liquidity of the asset: the higher the transaction costs, the higher the
liquidity premium associated with that kind of asset. It is evident from Figure 4 that the
responsiveness of each yield increases when its own transaction cost increases. Table 5
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shows that even yield volatility is larger, when the value of the transaction costs is higher.
The intuition is simple. When transaction cost is lower (higher), the bond becomes more
(less) liquid, and, therefore, the propensity of agents to reallocate income between money
and bonds is higher (lower), since the degree of substitutability between money and bonds
increases (decreases). As a result, the responsiveness to shocks of the bond’s price and
yield decreases (increases), as shocks can be better absorbed in liquid markets (i.e. the
stress over yields is lower in liquid markets). Finally, a lower (higher) responsiveness of
yields reflects, in turn, a lower (higher) degree of volatility of the simulated yields. In
other words, deviations of prices and yields from the steady-state are less pronounced in a
liquid market, in which it is relatively easy to trade asset. The price impact to a specific
shock is lower.
Finally, given existing parameter values, feedback effects from the term structure to
the macroeconomy, highlighted in paragraph 2.5, although present, are negligible (Figure
4).
3.3.2 The Role of Open Market Operations
Impulse response functions to a productivity shock and the moments of the simulated
variables when varying the parameters of the open market operations ηı, for ı = S,M,L,
are respectively displayed in Figure 5 and Table 6. They indicate that the higher the
parameter of Open Market Operations for a specific bond, the lower is the responsiveness
and the volatility of its own yield. The explanation is straightforward. The higher (lower)
is the parameter, the lower (higher) is the quantity of bonds of that type that the central
bank is buying or selling on the markets after a variation of the money demand. As a
result, also the volatility of prices and yields of that specific asset turns out to be lower
(higher). Also in this case, the feedback effects are not fully appreciable.
Lastly, it is worth briefly emphasizing the potentialities of this model of analyzing
unconventional tools for monetary policy, such as Quantitative Easing policies, which have
become very popular in the recent years, given that in many countries short-term interest
rates have been very close to the zero lower bound.8 Indeed, within this framework, it
would be possible to study the response of yields of different maturities to longer-term
assets purchases by the central bank. This issue goes beyond the scope of the present
paper, and is the focus of another work (Falagiarda, 2013).
3.4 Yield Spread Decomposition
We decompose the yield spread into an expectations component and a term premium, in
order to analyze the relative contribution of each component to movements of the yield
8See, for example, Gagnon et al. (2010) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).
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spread. This decomposition takes the following form:
RL,t −RS,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yield spread
=
 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
EtRS,t+j −RS,t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expectations component
+
RL,t − 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
EtRS,t+j

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term premium
(48)
with N = 40. Figure 6 displays the relative contribution of each component concurring
to determine yield spread variations, using simulated data. As also proved analytically
in paragraph 2.4, the model generates substantial deviations from the EH. In fact, with
baseline calibration, the expectations-related component accounts on average for more
than 54% of yield spread changes (Figure 6). By increasing transaction costs on long-term
bonds, the contribution of the term premium becomes predominant. At the contrary,
an increase in transaction costs on short-term bonds leads the expectations component
to take a larger share, since the wedge between short-term and long-term rate becomes
smaller.9
4 The Results from the Estimated Model
Once the model has proved to do a good job in its calibrated version, in terms of both
term structure moments and macro dynamics, a natural step forward is to carry out a
more direct link of theory with data by explicitly estimating the model. The estimation is
conducted on US data at a quarterly frequency over the period considered before (1987:3-
2011:3).
The goal of the estimation exercise is twofold. First, we check whether the assumptions
about the parameters used in the calibrated version are empirically plausible, at least as
a first approximation. Obviously, our main focus is on the parameters regarding money
transaction costs and open market operations. Second, the time series of the estimated
term premium is compared with that obtained by Kim and Wright (2005), who use an
affine term structure model to estimate term premium movements.
4.1 The Estimation Technique
Estimation is performed using Bayesian techniques, which have become very popular in the
DSGE literature in the last decade, as carefully explained in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010).
Once the model has been log-linearized, we can write it in a state space representation,
where the transition equation is:
St = f(St−1,Wt; Θ) (49)
9The graphs are available upon request.
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where St is the vector of states, Wt is the vector of innovations, and Θ is the vector of
structural parameters.
The measurement equation is:
Yt = g(Yt−1, Zt; Θ) (50)
where Yt are the observables and Zt the measurement errors to the observables.
Given our data Y T ≡ {Yt}Tt=1, the general expression of the likelihood function of the
model is:
L (Θ|Y T ) = T∏
t=1
p
(
Yt|Y T−1,Θ
)
(51)
The likelihood function is evaluated through the Kalman filter.10 According to Bayes’
theorem, the posterior distribution of the parameters is given by:
pi
(
Θ|Y T ) = p(Y T |Θ)pi(Θ)∫
p(Y T |Θ)pi(Θ)dΘ (52)
Using a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, as described by Chib and Green-
berg (1995), An and Schorfheide (2007), and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), we obtain an
empirical approximation of the posterior density function of the model, ready to perform
inference.
The chosen observables are output, inflation, consumption, money, short term rate,
medium-term rate, and long-term rate. Quarterly data on real GDP, GDP deflator, real
consumption expenditure, money base M0, and yields (respectively, 3-month, 1-year, and
10-year yields - constant-maturity interest rates, in percent per year) covering the period
1987:3-2011:3 are employed. They are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
database. We calculate log-differences of each series, with the exception of interest rates.
The dataset is then detrended using a linear trend.
4.2 Prior Distribution of the Parameters
Some parameters are not estimated, since they are either obtained through the steady-state
solution or usually treated as fixed in the literature (such as the coefficient of intertemporal
substitution β). The remaining parameters are estimated, and their prior distribution is
shown in the second column of Table 7, chosen consistently with the calibration of previous
section, or following previous contributions in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003;
Del Negro et al., 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Zagaglia, 2013).
10For more details, see Canova (2007).
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4.3 The Results
The posterior mean estimates of parameters are reported in the third column of Table 7.11
The estimated posterior mean of almost all the parameters estimates is quite close to the
prior mean, with the exception of the standard error and the stochastic process of gov-
ernment spending shock, which displays a higher standard error, and a lower persistence.
Other divergences between priors and posteriors are physiological, as documented in the
literature.
Looking at the estimates of free parameters - those regarding money adjustment costs
and open market operations - it turns out that the mean of the posterior distribution
generally departs from the mean of the prior assumptions, and the estimates generally
respect the ordering of their calibrated value, except for the parameter of medium-term
bonds adjustment costs, slightly higher than that of long-term bond. This is probably due
to the fact that medium term bonds are usually less actively traded than short- and long-
term bonds. Moreover, the estimates confirm that OMOs are more skewed towards short
and medium-term securities. These results seem to provide a strong empirical support to
our previous calibration and to the whole theoretical framework. In addition, concerns of
weak identification, which usually arise for these types of parameters (Chen et al., 2012;
Falagiarda, 2013), do not seem justified, i.e. the data are informative for identifying these
parameters.
On the other hand, the main goal of the estimation carried out in this section is to
show how powerful the present model is for studying term premium dynamics. We showed
that this model is able to generate an endogenous term premium. Figure 7 compares the
series of the estimated term premium with that obtained by Kim and Wright (2005), who
employ an affine term structure model. It should be remembered that we are dealing
with deviations from the steady-state and our time series have already been detrended:
to facilitate comparisons, the term premium by Kim and Wright (2005) has also been
detrended. From Figure 7 we observe a considerable similarity in the volatility of the two
series. The slightly smaller volatility of our estimated term premium may be ascribed to
the absence of inflation risk in the model, which has been recenlty found as an important
determinant of term premium variations (Wright, 2011). Secondly, the two term premia
follow very similar patterns, as proved by the high correlation coefficient between them,
given by 0.638.
As a last exercise, we carry out the estimation over two sub-periods, 1987:3-1998:1
and 1998:2-2011:3. Figure 8 and 9 report posterior impulse response functions of term
structure variables to technology and monetary policy shocks over the full sample period
and the two sub-periods.12 They represent the mean of a series of impulse response
11Estimates are obtained using two blocks of 100,000 replications each, of which the first 45 percent have
been discarded. The convergence diagnostic tests indicate that the Markov chains converge. Moreover,
the Bayesian IRFs reflect the dynamics highlighted in the calibrated model. For reasons of space, both set
of graphs have not been reported here, but are available upon request.
12The confidence intervals have not been reported for the sake of clarity. All the responses are never-
theless statistically significant at least at 5% level.
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functions obtained by drawing from the parameter posteriors. The responses have been
rescaled in order to capture a 1% shock. First of all, it should be noted that the direction
of the responses are consistent with the predictions obtained from the theoretical model.
More importantly, it is possible to observe that the two sub-periods are characterized by
different degrees of responsiveness of yields of different maturity. In fact, during the first
sub-period, yields’ reaction to shocks is smaller and less persistent in comparison with
that relative to the second sub-period. The reason is likely to be found in the fact that in
the recent years financial markets have been substantially more turbulent. The bubbles
characterizing the early 2000s and the recent Great Recession are just the most celebrated
examples. Moreover, the pattern of the model relatively to the more recent sample period
(1998:2-2011:3) shows a clear effect of the more active role of central banks over longer
maturities, if compared with previous periods.
In conclusion, through this estimation exercise, we have shown that this approach,
by considering the term premium as an endogenous variable, allows yield curve dynamics
to be analyzed in a much deeper way than standard DSGE models. In particular, the
estimated term premium is realistically large and follows very closely the pattern of that
estimated by Kim and Wright (2005) using a finance model.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduce a new way of modeling the term structure within a DSGE
framework. In particular, by introducing portfolio adjustment frictions on bond trading, it
is possible to generate segmented financial markets, in which assets of different maturities
are imperfect substitutes. This allows for a full endogenization of a time-varying term
premium.
The calibrated model is able to match both US term structure moments over the
period 1987:3-2011:3 and the main macro dynamics. Moreover, it generates a sufficiently
large term premium without using higher order approximations, which reacts to shocks
consistently with what found in previous studies.
The estimation exercise performed in Section 4 provides a strong empirical support to
this theoretical framework. In particular, the estimates of the free parameters of the model
are in line with their calibrated values, and the responses of yields of different maturity
consistent with theoretical predictions. Moreover, the estimated term premium generated
by the model is very similar to that obtained by Kim and Wright (2005), both in terms
of pattern and volatility.
All in all, the most important contribution of this paper is to provide a new setting,
through which the term premium can be incorporated into a microfounded macro frame-
work with optimizing agents. Further work is needed to better evaluate the role of money,
and to identify movements and determinants of the yield curve. In addition, the model
proposed in this paper points to further avenues for future research, such as the introduc-
tion of financial intermediaries and different categories of assets, and the analysis of the
23
strategic asset allocation implications of this framework. It would also be important to
adopt a more effective feedback mechanism from the term structure to the macroeconomy,
such that employed by Harrison (2012), in which, in a similar model, aggregate demand
depends directly on interest rates of bonds of different maturities. Moreover, it would be
interesting to adapt and use this framework to study the recent waves of Quantitative
Easing policies carried out by central banks in the US and the UK.
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Appendix. The Steady-State
λ = (1− βγ)[C(1− γ)]− 1σ (53)
β =
pi
R
(54)
m−χ = λ
(
1− 1
R
)
(55)
Ψ =
λ
L1/ψw
(56)
β
1
piR
+ βφi
1
Ri
Y =
1
Ri
[
1 +
3
2
φiY
]
(57)
φi =
βRi
piR − 1
Y
(
3
2 − β
) (58)
K =
I
δ
(59)
G
Y
= 1− C
Y
− It(1 +ACIt )−
φS
2
bS
RS
− φM
2
bM
RM
− φL
2
bL
RL
(60)
w = (1− α)
(
Y + Φ
L
)(
1− 1
eY
)
(61)
q = α
(
Y + Φ
K
)(
1− 1
eY
)
(62)
Φ =
[
1− α
(
1− 1
θ
)]
AKαL1−α =⇒ Φ
Y + Φ
=
[
1− α
(
1− 1
θ
)]
(63)
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eY = θ (64)
Combining equations (17) and (18), we have the following formula, from which we can
derive φK :
βEt
λt+1
λt
{
(1− δ)
[
1 +
3
2
φK
(
It+1
Kt+1
)2]
+Qt+1 + φK
(
It+1
Kt+1
)3}
= 1+
3
2
φK
(
It
Kt
)2
(65)
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Tables
Table 1: Steady-state values of some variables
Notation Description SS values
Y Output 1 (norm.)
C Consumption-output ratio 0.57
T/Y Taxes-output ratio 0.1972
L/(1− L) Ratio of market to non-market activities 0.3
Debt/GDP ratio 0.45
Fraction of very short-term debt over total debt 0.233
Fraction of short-term debt over total debt 0.142
Fraction of medium-term debt over total debt 0.334
Fraction of long-term debt over total debt 0.240
R Gross money-market rate 1.01046
RS Gross short-term rate 1.00963
RM Gross medium-term rate 1.01070
RL Gross long-term rate 1.01428
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Table 2: Benchmark calibration of the parameters
Notation Description Benchmark values
Preferences and technology
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
β Intertemporal discount factor 0.9975
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
χ Elasticity of money demand 7
ψ Elasticity of labor supply 1
γ Habit formation 0.7
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods 6
φP Price adjustment costs 100
φK Capital adjustment costs 1143.9
Fiscal and monetary policy
ψ0 Fiscal policy constant 0.1972
ψ1 Fiscal policy response to b 0.3
ψ2 Fiscal policy response to longer-term debt 0.3
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation 1.5
αY Monetary policy response to output 0
αR Monetary policy inertia 0.7
Money-bonds transaction costs
vS Short-term bonds 0.0030
vM Medium-term bonds 0.0040
vL Long-term bonds 0.0041
OMOs parameters
ηS Short-term bonds 2.5
ηM Medium-term bonds 2.5
ηL Long-term bonds 7
Autoregressive parameters
φA Technology shock 0.95
φG Government spending shock 0.90
Standard deviations
σA Technology shock 0.01
σG Government spending shock 0.012
σR Monetary policy shock 0.005
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Table 3: U.S. term structure main statistics 1987:3-2011:3
FFR 3-month 1-year 5-year 10-year Spread
Standard deviation 2.522 2.288 2.390 2.051 1.788 1.382
Correlation with output gap - - - - - -0.656
Notes: Main moments of U.S. yields data: Federal funds rate (FFR), 3-month, 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year
yields (constant-maturity interest rates, in percent per year). The spread is calculated as the difference
between the 10-year yield and the FFR. Statistics computed using Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Table 4: Term structure moments in the benchmark calibration
PR ST MT LT Spread Term premium
Standard deviation 0.763 2.195 1.828 1.957 1.202 1.339
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.615 -0.326
Notes: Term structure moments of simulated data: Policy rate (PR), short-term rate (ST), medium-term
rate (MT), long-term rate (LT). The spread is calculated as the difference between the long-term rate and
the short-term rate. The term premium is calculated as explained in footnote 5.
Table 5: Term structure moments when varying money transaction costs
PR ST MT LT Spread Term premium
Benchmark values: vS = 0.0030, vM = 0.0040, vL = 0.0041
Standard deviation 0.763 2.195 1.828 1.957 1.202 1.339
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.615 -0.326
Increase of the costs: vS = 0.0060, vM = 0.0080, vL = 0.0081
Standard deviation 0.763 2.815 2.179 2.364 1.606 1.595
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.616 -0.306
Reduction in the costs: vS = 0.0015, vM = 0.0020, vL = 0.00205
Standard deviation 0.763 1.803 1.607 1.699 0.947 1.177
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.612 -0.343
No transaction costs: vS = vM = vL = 0
Standard deviation 0.763 1.340 1.346 1.391 0.647 0.987
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.602 -0.369
Notes: Term structure moments of simulated data when varying money transaction costs: Policy rate
(PR), short-term rate (ST), medium-term rate (MT), long-term rate (LT). The spread is calculated as
the difference between the long-term rate and the short-term rate. The term premium is calculated as
explained in footnote 5.
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Table 6: Term structure moments when varying the parameters of OMOs
PR ST MT LT Spread Term premium
Benchmark values: ηS = 2.5, ηM = 2.5, ηL = 7
Standard deviation 0.763 2.195 1.828 1.957 1.202 1.339
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.615 -0.326
Higher skewness towards ST bonds: ηS = 1.5, ηM = 9, ηL = 15
Standard deviation 0.763 2.317 1.782 1.933 1.178 1.286
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.613 -0.282
Higher skewness towards LT bonds: ηS = 9, ηM = 4, ηL = 1.5
Standard deviation 0.763 2.071 1.799 2.148 1.399 1.547
Corr. with output gap - - - - -0.623 -0.407
Notes: Term structure moments of simulated data when varying the parameters of open market operations:
Policy rate (PR), short-term rate (ST), medium-term rate (MT), long-term rate (LT). The spread is
calculated as the difference between the long-term rate and the short-term rate. The term premium is
calculated as explained in footnote 5.
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Table 7: Prior and posterior distribution (mean) of the parameters
Notation Description Prior distribution Posterior distr.
Preferences and technology
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution Normal (1,0.5) 1.151
χ Elasticity of money demand Normal (7,3) 5.706
ψ Elasticity of labor supply Normal (1,0.5) 1.494
γ Habit formation Beta (0.7,0.3) 0.403
φP Price adjustment costs Normal (100,10) 102.767
Monetary policy
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation Normal (1.5,0.9) 2.197
αY Monetary policy response to output Normal (0.4,0.1) 0.461
αR Monetary policy inertia Beta (0.5,0.2) 0.875
Money-bonds transaction costs
vS Short-term bonds Normal (0.02,0.01) 0.0074
vM Medium-term bonds Normal (0.02,0.01) 0.0166
vL Long-term bonds Normal (0.05,0.01) 0.0100
OMOs parameters
ηS Short-term bonds Normal (2.5,2) 5.186
ηM Medium-term bonds Normal (2.5,2) 4.191
ηL Long-term bonds Normal (7,3) 8.737
Autoregressive parameters
φA Technology Beta (0.85,0.1) 0.750
φG Government spending Beta (0.85,0.1) 0.532
φM Mark-up shock Beta (0.85,0.1) 0.840
φpi Inflation targeting shock Beta (0.85,0.1) 0.777
φPR Preferences shock Beta (0.85,0.1) 0.386
Standard deviations
σA Technology shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.335
σG Government spending shock Inv. Gamma (0.5,2) 2.261
σR Monetary policy shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.051
σM Mark-up shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.271
σpi Inflation targeting shock Inv. Gamma (0.1,2) 0.057
σPR Preferences shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.399
σBS ST bond supply shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.982
σBM MT bond supply shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 1.034
σBL LT bond supply shock Inv. Gamma (0.4,2) 0.921
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Figures
Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Notes: The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level.
Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Notes: The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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Notes: The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level.
Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock when varying money
transaction costs
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Benchmark values vS=0.0015, vM=0.0020, vL=0.00205 vS=0.0060, vM=0.0080, vL=0.0082
Notes: The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock when varying the
parameters of OMOs
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Benchmark values ηS=1.5, ηM=9, ηL=15 ηS=9, ηM=4, ηL=1.5
Notes: The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level.
Figure 6: Decomposition of the yield spread - Benchmark model
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Notes: Yield spread decomposition into an expectation component and a term premium, as shown in
equation (48).
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Figure 7: The estimated term premium vs. Kim and Wright’s (2005) term premium
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Notes: Comparison between our estimated term premium and Kim and Wright (2005) term premium
(1990:4-2011:3). The term premium by Kim and Wright (2005) has been detrended.
Figure 8: Posterior impulse responses (median) to a positive technology shock
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Notes: The figure reports the median of the posterior impulse responses to a positive technology shock.
The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level. Red line: full sample period; Blue
line: 1987:3-1998:1; Green line: 1998:2-2011:3.
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Figure 9: Posterior impulse responses (median) to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Notes: The figure reports the median of the posterior impulse responses to a positive technology shock.
The impulse responses represent deviations from the steady-state level. Red line: full sample period; Blue
line: 1987:3-1998:1; Green line: 1998:2-2011:3.
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